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TROUBLE AT THE LORDSBURG INTERNMENT CAMP

JOHN J. CULLEY

3:30 A.M., in the pre-dawn hours of 27 July
1942, as 147 Issei internees arriving from other camps marched
through the inner gate of the United States Army internment camp
at Lordsburg, New Mexico, an army guard escorting two stragglers
shot both men shortly after they passed the guard house at the
main entrance. Hirota Isomura died immediately, and Toshiro Kobata died within three hours. Humble and ordinary men in life,
in death they were largely forgotten, a footnote to history. That
they were undistinguished men should not obscure their significance, however. Not only are there unresoJved questions concerning the shooting of Isomura and Kobata, their death is also related
to broader issues of importance. l
To begin with, the question persists of whether the shooting of
Isomura and Kobata was justifiable under military regulations or
an act of unjustifiable homicide. But beyond this, the event calls
attention to an overlooked aspect ofJapanese-American internment
during World War II. While the evacuation of Japanese Americans
from the west coast and their relocation and detention by the War
Relocation Authority is widely known, the earlier Justice Department program that interned selected individuals, including many
Issei (first-generation immigrants born in Japan), as dangerous enemy aliens remains largely unknown. It is even less well-known
that until June 1943 the United States Army maintained the prison
camps that housed these interned civilians. An effort to understand
why Isomura and Kobata were shot leads to questions about the
army's ability to effectively administer and staff such camps, and
about specific problems encountered at Lordsburg. In addition, in
the broadest sense this fatal shooting raises questions concerning
AT APPROXIMATELY
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the government's attitude toward interned enemy aliens. Did the
government adequately safeguard the lives of these civilians, or
did government policy prejudicially endanger their lives? A close
examination of the shooting and of the circumstances surrounding
it will shed light on these issues. 2
The Lordsburg Internment Camp, the site of the shooting, originated in January 1942 to serve the needs of the enemy alien control
program of the Justice Department. Beginning on 7 December,
the FBI arrested thousands of aliens previously targeted as potential threats to national security. Many of the aliens arrested were
of Japanese ancestry. The Immigration and Naturalization Service
held them in temporary detention until each received a hearing
before an Enemy Alien Hearing Board, which could order the
person to be either released, paroled, or interned for the duration.
The Justice Department created more than one hundred such hearing boards, one in each federal judicial district. The Alien Enemy
Control Unit of the Justice Department, which sat in Washington,
D.C., administered the program. When a hearing board ordered
a person interned, the Immigration and Naturalization Service surrendered its temporary custody, and the United States Army assumed responsibility for permanent custody. In mid-June 1942, the
just-completed Lordsburg camp began to receive Issei transferred
from temporary INS detention camps at Santa Fe and elsewhere. 3
In its physical facilities,. organization, staffing, and relative isolation, Lordsburg was a typical Army prisoner-of-war camp. It was
located six miles from Lordsburg, a small town of 3,800 in the
remote southwest corner of New Mexico, eighty miles north of the
Mexican border and twenty-six miles east of the Arizona state line.
The Southern Pacific Railroad provided the main transportation
connection. The high altitude, 4,200 feet, and the arid climate
produced a countryside typical of the desert Southwest. There were
no trees to be seen in any direction, only greasewood and mesquite
bushes, and mountains on the far horizon. The camp covered two
square miles and consisted of a main area measuring 2,600 feet by
1,300 feet enclosed within a double barbed wire fence, with watch
towers and floodlights. The main stockade was divided into three
compounds, which were subdivided into four company areas each
containing eight barracks, a latrine, a recreation hall, and a mess
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hall and kitchen. In addition to the main stockade there was a large
enclosed recreation area contiguous to the east side and another
fenced area adjacent to the southwest corner of the main enclosure
that cont~ined the hospital. All told, the camp had more than 150
buildings, had cost approximately three million dollars, and had a
capacity of 3,000 men. 4
In early 1942 the army realized it lacked not only the physical
facilities but also the administrative policies necessary to handle
large numbers of prisoners and hurriedly drafted regulations to
govern prisoner-of-war camps and civilian internment camps. The
Geneva Convention of 1929, to which the United States adhered,
provided the basic guidelines for the treatment of prisoners of war
and interned civilian aliens. The army envisioned that a civilian
internment camp with a full complement of 3,000 would be organized into twelve companies of 250 men. Each company would
select a leader, and they, in turn, would choose a camp spokesman.
Regulations charged company leaders with maintaining their area
in a clean and orderly condition, relaying orders, and allocating
work. The type of work the administration could require internees
to do was defined by the provisions of the Geneva Convention.
Even so, by mid-July the 613 Issei internees at Lordsburg were
locked in an angry dispute over the issue of work with army administrators. 5
The number of army personnel at a prisoner-of-war or internment
camp varied according to the number of prisoners. In July 1942
the military staff at Lordsburg was relatively small, for the camp
held less than one quarter of its full capacity. It was commanded
by a lieutenant colonel assisted by a first lieutenant as adjutant.
The full complement alloted to a camp consisted of the commander
and the administrative staff, in addition to one Military Police Escort Guard Company for each 1,000 internees. Ordinarily, a military police company had three officers and 132 enlisted men divided
into rifle, machine-gun, and shotgun squads.
In general, military police units suffered from a very low reputation. From the beginning of the war, the army staffed these
units with men who were physically unqualified for combat duty.
Postwar studies found that during the war the military police had
the worst opportunities for promotion, the lowest status, the least
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pride and job satisfaction, and the lowest educational level of any
branch of the army. These units contained many cast-offs from other
branches as well as officers destined for terminal or dead-end assignments. The official army history concluded that prison camp
commands tended to be dumping grounds for field grade officers
who were found to be unsatisfactory for other assignments. Without
belaboring the point, one may note that the command of a small
civilian internment camp in the southwestern desert was not a
choice assignment nor one reserved for an officer of notable promise, ability, or merit. 6
Lt. Col. Clyde A. Lundy, camp commander, was fifty-nine years
old and a veteran of almost forty years of army service. Lundy was
first commissioned in 1917, after serving many years in the cavalry
as an enlisted man. Lundy's adjutant at Lordsburg was 1st Lt.
Richard S. Dockum, a thirty-five-year-old civil engineer recalled
to active duty at the start of the war. In later years, Dockum
described Lundy as a colorful character who relished the role of
the typical army officer and who put on a show as he walked around
with his boots and riding crop, accompanied by his dog. Dockum
also recalled that Lundy was fond of the old, formal entertaining
of the peacetime army and that consequently every Saturday evening the officers' club featured a party. This recollection is fully
supported by stories in the local newspaper that describe an apparently endless round and variety of social affairs, including formal
dances, luncheons, buffets, picnics, mountain outings, cocktail parties, bridge luncheons, cocktail suppers, hunting trips, antelope
dinners, masquerade parties, and barn dances, which Lundy presided over for the benefit of his officers and their wives. Another
view of the camp is presented by Herbert Nicholson, a Quaker
who visited Lordsburg and who has charged that the camp commander was frequently drunk. Admittedly Nicholson was an elderly
man writing long after the events, and he did not identify the camp
commander by name, but Dockum relates that the office safe contained nothing but liquor and that while no drinking was permitted
before sundown, after the flag was lowered Lundy would initiate
a round of drinks in which "the sky was the limit." Dockum also
related a revealing incident that occurred as Lundy moved his
personal effects into his office. As he unpacked his volumes of army
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regulations and put them on the shelf, Lundy remarked that in his
view regulations were meant to be broken. In time, this attitude
led to his early retirement and perhaps contributed to some of the
difficulties experienced at the camp.7
The Lordsburg camp was already in a state of high tension when
Isomura and Kobata arrived on 27 July. Several weeks before their
arrival a dispute over work rules erupted into a confrontation between the internees and the administration. The internees, dissatisfied with the work rules, wired the Spanish ambassador on 1
July and again on 11 July asking that a Spanish representative visit
the camp. Any telegram sent by the internees to the Spanish Embassy was routed first through the Aliens Division of the Provost
Marshal General's Office, which then referred the telegram to the
State Department for action rather than sending it directly to the
Spanish Embassy.8 On 17 July the internees attempted to send
another telegram to the Spanish Embassy stating that:
WE WIRED TO YOU TWICE URGENT STOP CONDITIONS
GETTING SERIOUS SINCE THEN STOP ALL JAPANESE INTERNEES CONFINED IN BARRACKS UNDER SPECIAL
GUARD WE REQUEST TO SEND YOUR REPRESENTATIVE
AT ONCE PLEASE ANSWER,9

Alerted by this message, on 20 July the provost marshal general,
Maj. Gen. Allen Gullion, ordered Lundy to airmail to his office an
explanation of the conditions that prompted the internees' telegram. lO Lundy submitted a brief reply that contained only the
barest facts but that nonetheless revealed the extent of the crisis.
Lundy briefly reported that following regulations the internees had
been organized into companies with elected mayors and barracks
leaders, that they were given physical exams and graded according
to their physical ability, and that pertinent paragraphs of the governing regulations were posted in all barracks. But, continued Lundy,
the mayors had rejected his reasonable requests for work details,
claiming it was too hot for any work in the afternoon and arguing
that no details should be required outside the compound unless it
was rated as Class 2 labor and paid for at the regular rates. Since
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13 July the internees had furnished no work details. 11 As a disciplinary action, Lundy had confiscated all radios, suspended all
canteen credit, and, except for cooks and helpers who were given
time to prepare meals, confined all internees to their barracks with
only two hours open air exercise daily. Lundy said he intended to
replace the elected mayors and barracks leaders with appointees
who would be more cooperative. 12
The internees presented a different and more complete view of
the matter in a protest entitled "The Fundamental Question," which
the Spanish Embassy transmitted to the State Department. The
internees contended that their difference of opinion with Lundy
over the type of work that could legally be required was the source
of the difficulty. They argued that under the Geneva Convention
internees could only be required to work within their own compounds and that work outside the compounds must be strictly
voluntary; they rejected Lundy's position that all work, irrespective
of whether it be inside or outside the compound, must be done
by the internees. They protested that Lundy forced them to clean
the army garrison's mess-halls, latrines, infirmaries, and dancehalls, as well as work on the grounds, in the cemetery, and load
supplies in town, all of which was work performed outside the
compounds and without pay.
When Lundy had refused to meet with the mayors of two of the
internee companies on 21 June the internees wired the Spanish
Embassy requesting the dispatch of a representative and, pending
his arrival, agreed to furnish laborers for work outside the compound during the morning hours, provided that no labor be required in the afternoon hours. The internees reasoned that since
they averaged sixty years of age and were not accustomed to either
manual labor or the excessive heat of the region, that working in
the intense afternoon heat was dangerous to their health. Under
this agreement, from 2 July until 13 July the internees furnished
75 to 130 men daily for morning work details outside the compound.
Then 2nd Lt. Ervin W. Mitchell, the main prison officer, ordered
the internees to furnish men for an afternoon work detail. They
refused to obey, and at this point the administration confiscated all
radios, discontinued all canteen service, stopped all mail service,
and confined all internees to their barracks twenty-four hours a
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day, except for short intervals for visits to the latrine and for meals.
All lights were out at eight o'clock, and all barracks doors were
closed, day and night. This was the atmosphere of the camp when
the train carrying Isomura and Kobata arrived. 13
The shooting of Isomura and Kobata ultimately produced a record of 217 pages, consisting of sworn testimony given on three
occasions: at a hearing held on the afternoon of 27 July at Lordsburg, at a pre-trial investigation on 3 September, and at a courtmartial held on 10 September. This testimony describes in detail
the events surrounding the death of the two men, but there was
only one surviving witness to the actual shooting, Pfc. Clarence A.
Burleson-the man who pulled the trigger. 14
Trains bringing internees to Lordsburg usually arrived between
two and three o'clock in the morning at a railroad siding about
three miles from town and near the main entrance of the camp
where a detachment of guards would take custody of the new
arrivals and march them three miles to the main compound. On
27 July the garrison prepared to receive 147 internees from Bismarck, North Dakota, expected to arrive at 1:45 A. M. The officer
of the day, 1st Lt. Harold C. Stull was to receive them at the gate
of compound three. First Sgt. John A. Beckham of the 308th Military Police Escort Guard Company detailed Sgt. Truman C. Fambro's section to furnish the guards, and Private Burleson and the
twenty-three other men of the section were awakened just before
midnight and told to report to the supply room to draw arms. Four
guards drew Thompson sub-machine guns, while Burleson and the
others were armed with twelve gauge riot guns. Sergeant Beckham
told them that:
They were to allow none of them to escape; that if and in the event
any Aliens attempted to escape, that they should give them a command to "Halt" and if and in the event, they did not obey the
command of "Halt" they were to shoot them. I made these instructions definite. Informing them clearly that they were, under no
circumstances to permit any of the Aliens to escape, and that was
why they had their guns. All the guards have always been definitely
instructed that they were to permit no Aliens to escape, and they
were to use all necessary force to prevent them from escaping. 15
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Aroused to watchful vigilance by the exhortations of their first
sergeant, the detachment marched off to meet the train, which
arrived at the siding at 2:00 A. M.
Shortly before the train arrived the army officer in charge of
escorting the arriving internees appointed Senmatsu Ishizaki to
serve as interpreter for the group, and subsequently Ishizaki was
referred to as the group's leader. After detraining, Ishizaki relayed
Sergeant Beckham's instructions to the group to line up and to stay
on the paved highway as they marched into camp. When Beckham
learned that two of the men, Isomura and Kobata, were ill and
would be unable to keep up he had them drop out of formation.
Sergeant Fambro then ordered Burleson to bring the two men into
camp, staying six to fifteen feet behind them and letting them walk
at their own pace and rest when necessary. Fambro, in the presence
ofIshizaki, conversed with Isomura and Kobata in English and told
them that they must stay on the road. The main column, led by
Beckham, Fambro, and Ishizaki, moved across the highway toward
the main entrance of the camp, with the heavily armed guards
marching as flankers. As Burleson and the two internees moved
out, they were followed by Pfc. Joseph F. Kelley, an MP who had
encountered the group at the railroad siding as he returned from
his duty in town. Fambro had pressed him into service as the rear
road-guard, and Kelley maintained a position thirty steps behind
Burleson in order to direct any approaching traffic. 16
The main column had gone perhaps 150 yards when they were
overtaken by Lieutenant Mitchell who was driving in from his
quarters in town. Mitchell drove to the head of the column where
he enquired about the two stragglers and then dropped back to
see if they were under proper guard. He then returned to the head
of the column where Beckham hopped a ride on the running board
of the car and they drove to the gate of compound three. At approximately 3:15 AM. the main group passed around the ninety
degree left bend in the road and reached the gate of compound
three where Lieutenants Mitchell and Stull and Sergeants Beckham
and Fambro formed them up for a head count. After counting the
group of 145, Stull opened the compound gate and ordered the
column through, counting them again as they passed. As the head
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of the column entered the compound, the internees already imprisoned there welcomed the newcomers with loud greetings, shouts,
and cheering. 17
Meanwhile, around the bend in the road and some distance in
the rear, Isomura and Kobata had stopped four to six times to rest,
the last time just after passing the manned guardhouse, which
marked the main entrance to the camp. Burleson testified that
Isomura and Kobata seemed restless, talked to one another and
appeared to argue between themselves, and that they walked at
an erratic pace, sometimes fast and sometimes slowly. As they
approached the first building on the camp, one of three engineer's
buildings, Kelley called to Burleson that he was falling out for a
drink. As Kelley stooped over a fire hydrant some seventy-five feet
east of the road, he heard tumult coming from the direction of the
compound and then he heard two shots. However, Kelley did not
hear Burleson shout "halt," nor did he see what happened, and so
for this critical moment, one has only Burleson's uncorroborated
testimony. IS
According to Burleson, the only surviving eye witness, after
Kelley called out that he was stopping, Isomura and Kobata began
talking and then walking faster. Then, as shouting came from the
main column that was out of sight down the road, the two internees
broke off the road to the right and ran west toward a barbed wire
boundary fence. Burleson swore that he twice called for them to
halt and that when they did not, he fired on the first man. When
the second man continued running toward the first, Burleson fired
on him, and he fell. Burleson stated that he was "pretty excited"
when he fired, and that because ofthe moon it was very light and
that he could see extremely well. He did not examine the bodies
and did not know if they were dead or alive. 19
In the immediate aftermath, after Kelley heard the shots he ran
to Burleson with his weapon ready. When Kelley saw the bodies
by the fence he told Burleson not to move while he ran for help.
Simultaneously, Neely W. Marsalis, a civilian watchman, also heard
the shots and stepped out the front door of the engineer's headquarters building (building F) where he saw Burleson in the middle
of the road and two bodies over by the fence. Kelley then ran up
to Marsalis and asked for help, and the two men drove to the

CULLEY: TROUBLE AT LC

JSBURG

235

compound looking for an officer. At this point a number of people
who either heard the shots or had been told about them began to
converge on the scene. Aside from Kelley, Sergeant Beckham was
the first to arrive on the scene, followed in order by Lieutenants
Mitchell, Bond, and Stull, Sergeant Fambro, and Colonel Lundy.
Lundy later testified that he was in bed, but awake, when he heard
a cry of "halt," followed by two rapid shots. He was the only person
who claimed to have heard the cry "halt," but all of the witnesses
who viewed the scene testified that they found Burleson standing
in the middle of the road and that the two bodies were adjacent
to the fence, west of the road. 20
First Lt. Phillip Bond, a medical officer, arrived on the scene
with Mitchell. Bond stated that he found one man perhaps one
foot from the fence and the other about five feet from the fence
and five feet north of the first man. After quickly determining that
the man closest to the fence (Isomura) was dead, Bond examined
the second man (Kobata) and concluded that his legs were paralyzed
and that he was in a state of shock. Kobata groaned and asked for
water several times, which Mitchell and Stull brought to him .. After
Kobata was moved to the infirmary he continued to call for water
and was very agitated, even begging Bond to give him medicine
that would kill him. Bond administered a shot of morphine to ease
his pain and concluded that he was in a stable condition. During
this interval Lieutenant Stull talked to Kobata and asked his name,
which Kobata gave and even spelled. Kobata also told Stull that
he did not know the other man's name. Meanwhile, Isomura's body
had been left in the field under guard while Mitchell made arrangements with a local mortuary to remove it. At this point Bond,
the physician, left his patient and supervised the removal of Isomura to the mortuary. There Bond examined the body and at
approximately 5:50 A. M. returned to the infirmary where he found
Kobata in extremis. But the physician was too late, for even as
Bond examined him, Kobata died. His body was taken to the same
mortuary in town. No autopsy was performed on either body, but
Bond's cursory examination found that they were both well formed
Japanese males who had apparently died of gunshot wounds. There
were nine puncture wounds on the upper left quadrant of both
bodies; Bond did not determine how many of the wounds were
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entry wounds and how many were exit wounds. Burleson had been
armed with a Stevens, twelve gauge, pump-action shotgun, loaded
with three double "0" shells. Each shell had nine pellets. 21
On the afternoon of27 July a board convened at Lordsburg under
army regulations to investigate the death of the two internees. The
board, consisting of Capt. Arber J. Warren, Lt. Edward C. Strum,
and Bond, heard testimony from Stull, Beckham, Kelley, and
Burleson. After brief hearings the board found that Isomura and
Kobata "died as the results of Gunshot [sic] wounds inflected [sic]
at the hands of PFC Clarence A. Burleson, ... who was acting in
the performance of his duty under legal orders of a superior authority." The board recommended that a general court-martial try
Bu'rleson so that "his guilt or innocence may be forever established. "22
The court-martial occurred 10 September at Fort Bliss, Texas,
and produced a more extensive record. Burleson was twenty-nine
years old and had a wife and two daughters living in San Angelo,
Texas. He had enlisted on 14 May 1942 and was assigned to the
309th MPEG company, and he had arrived at Lordsburg on 6 July.
The prosecution charged him with manslaughter, to which he pleaded
not guilty. Seven Japanese internees testified or gave depositions,
but none had witnessed the shooting, viewed the bodies, or visited
the scene of the shooting. None of the Japanese physicians in camp
examined the bodies. However, some of the internees who testified
had not only known Isomura and Kobata for the previous five
months at Bismarck, some had known the two men for decades.
Hiroshi Aisawa, who had known Kobata since 1919, testified that
the deceased man had suffered from tuberculosis for the past sixteen years. Fukujiro Hoshiya had known Isomura for more than
two decades and testified that a fall suffered on a fishing boat ten
years previous forced Isomura to walk slowly in a bent or stooped·
position with his head down. Several witnesses who had spent the
last five months with Isomura and Kobata corroborated this testimony. But the defense maintained that the health of the two men
was not relevant, and the prosecution failed to point out why it
was relevant. The strongest challenge to the defense came from
Ishizaki, who stated that they were not the kind of men who would
run away and that he did not believe they were shot while trying
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to escape. Ishizaki noted that there had been a strike in the camp
and that the internees had been confined to their barracks for more
than ten days. He charged that Isomura and Kobata were shot as
an example. 23 Unimpressed by this accusation, the court-martial
board acquitted Burleson' upon both the specifications and upon
the charge. From the army's viewp~int the case was closed. Two
weeks after the court-martial Burleson was promoted to corporaL 24
Meanwhile, back at Lordsburg, the simultaneous dispute over
work rules, which had existed before the shooting, continued. Since
this crisis had determined the camp's atmosphere at the time of
the shooting and since it also illuminates Lundy's abilities as a
commanding officer, it must be followed to resolution. The argument centered over the distinction between class I labor and class
II labor as defined in the basic army document governing the
treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees, which the
army had issued on 23 April 1942 and which was intended to comply
with the requirements of the Geneva Convention. Class I labor
could be required of all POWs and civilian internees and was to
be performed without pay. It included all labor necessary for the
maintenance or repair of the camp (including work on barracks,
roads, walks, sewers, sanitary facilities, water piping or fencing),
all labor incident to improving or providing for the comfort or health
of internees (including work connected with the kitchens, canteens,
hospitals, garbage disposal, or camp dispensaries), and all necessary
labor connected with the internal economy of the internee companies, including serving as cooks, tailors, bankers, and other duties. Class II labor included everything that did not fall into class
I, for example, labor on projects carried on by the federal government, by a state government, or by private business. Performing
class II labor earned wages, and POWs could be directed to perform
this labor provided it was within their physical ability. But there
were also limitations on the utilization of prisoner labor. Prisoners
could not be used in any work that was directly connected with
military operations; they could not be assigned inherently unhealthy or dangerous work; they could not be worked longer hours
than civilian workers doing similar work; they could not be employed as servants by members of the armed forces, and civilian
internees could not be required to perform class II labor without

238

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

60:3

1985

their voluntary written consent or request. This last point was the
heart of the matter, for the 'internees claimed that all work outside
the immediate vicinity of their compounds was class II labor, which
they could not be forced to perform without their consent. The
army disagreed. 25
On 18 September the Provost Marshal General's Office sent
Lundy a copy of "The Fundamental Question" and the accompanying Spanish Memorandum No. 352, along with the department's
own comments, some ofwhich supported Lundy and some of which
did not. The PMG noted that the demarcation between required
work (class I) and voluntary work (class II) was not a physical line,
such as a compound fence, but an operational definition, that is,
whether the labor was for the benefit of the internees and the camp
in general. Loading and unloading quartermaster supplies in town,
which the internees had protested, was endorsed, but the practice
of limiting labor to morning hours only, a situation Lundy had
temporarily accepted, was rejected. Lundy was also rebuked for
failing to meet with the internee leaders, and he was reminded
that internees under disciplinary punishment had the right to send
and receive mail. The PMG ordered Lundy to submit another
report to the department, responding fully to the specific points
the internees raised. 26
Lundy's response was his definitive statement on the dispute,
but even so it was only two pages long, vague, and imprecise. He
blamed the crisis on barracks lawyers and "a few Jap agitators
stirring up trouble in the compounds," and he justified his initial
refusal to meet with internee leaders on the grounds that they had
not submitted a proper application for a conference. Lundy restated
his position that all work necessary to maintain the camp was class
I, and he revealed that he included in this the cleaning of the staff's
administration buildings, the recreation hall, and the latrines. When
the internees, provoked by agitators, refused to supply work details
on 13 July, Lieutenant Mitchell had imposed the maximum punishment allowed by regulations and the Geneva Convention and
confined the internees to barracks. Here Lundy became rather
vague and noted that "after a brief period of this punishment"
leaders stated that the internees desired to work and when the
matter was put to a vote, only one company refused to work. This
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. company was moved to a separate compound and left in confinement and "after a short time, they, [sic] too desired to' work, and
have been working ever since." Lundy transferred all those he
considered agitators into this disciplinary company. In conclusion,
Lundy asserted that the complaints expressed in "The Fundamental
Question" did not reflect the majority opinion of the internees. 27
The PMC agreed with Lundy's interpretation of the work required of the internees with one exception; he was ordered to stop
using internees to clean garrison mess halls, infirmaries, dance
halls, and latrines. The State Department also accepted this position and so informed the Spanish Embassy. At this point Lundy
had weathered two crises, the work dispute and the shooting of
Isomura and Kobata, with no apparent blame attached to his command. On 23 November the War Department promoted Lundy to
full colonel, but his troubles were not over: 28
The Lordsburg camp held two classes of prisoners who were not
supposed to be there, a number of Japanese military prisoners of
war, and a small group of American military personnel under disciplinary confinement. On Thanksgiving Day of 1942 an American
garrison prisoner attacked one ofthe internees, Dr. Uyehara. The
official Japanese protest charged that the camp commander had
refused requests to move some twenty American military convicts
and that one of the convicts, while drunk, intruded into the internees' quarters and wounded Uyehara in the back with a knife.
The State Department response did not mention the number of
convicts, nor the knife, but described the incident as a "fracas" in
which Uyehara was knocked down, "but was not injured to an
extent requiring medical attention." Nonetheless, the department's
response noted that the convicts were removed and the individual
who attacked Uyehara court-martialed, and that the commander
of the camp (Lundy) had been given a written admonition and
subsequently removed from command. 29
Indeed, Lundy's command at Lordsburg ended on 17 December
1942. The exact circumstances in which the army relieved Lundy
are somewhat confused, but apparently various irregularities involving the canteen profits and Lundy's penchant for social life
provided the cause. A confidential State Department report made
after a visit to Lordsburg on 9 August by the Spanish consul and
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Whitney Young, a State Department official, was strangely silent
about the shooting of Isomura and Kobata, but criticized Lundy's
handling of the work dispute, and also noted that the commander
was withholding from the internees the personal funds that had
been in their possession when they arrived and remittances they
had received after their arrival. Thus the internees had only their
grant of ten cents per day with which to buy coupons to spend at
the canteen. Lundy assured Young and the Spanish consul that he
would change this policy and allow internees to buy canteen coupons up to ten dollars per month from their personal funds. The
State Department report also noted that any profit from the internees' canteen should be expended for the benefit of the internees. 30
In an interview given in later years, Richard Dockum, the camp
adjutant, stated that Lundy was relieved from command because
of irregularities arising from this last point. Under the army's old
system of "rationed savings" any savings from the funds allocated
for the mess, along with the profits from the post exchange, went
into a special entertainment fund. According to Dockum, Lundy
used these funds improperly, favoring the needs of army officers
over those of enlisted men, and of all army personnel over the
Japanese internees. 31
Evidently the Red Cross tripped-up Lundy when he appropriated band instruments for the officers' club that had been sent for
the internees use. Dockum's account is not entirely clear, but
evidently 8th Corps Headquarters had doubts about Lundy and
sent in his successor, Col. Louis A. Ledbetter, with instructions to
look for specific irregularities. After Ledbetter inspected the records thoroughly and found irregularities, he asked for an inspector
general's investigation. Again according to Dockum, the Army allowed Lundy to retire rather than press formal charges against him.
Lundy retired in September 1943 with the rank of full colonel. 32
The departure of the feckless Colonel Lundy was not the end of
all controversy over the camp. In February 1944 the Japanese
government lodged a second protest over the shooting of Isomura
and Kobata and also protested that between April and June 1943
three instances of unwarranted use of firearms had occurred. The
three cases alleged by the Japanese government involved a captain
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who fired his revolver to make the internees work faster, a guard
in a watch tower who fired at an internee when the internee sought
the return of a ball, and a guard who fired on an internee for
approaching the fence. In November 1944 the State Department
responded to all of these protests. Regarding the shooting of Isomura and Kobata, the State Department's final comment was that
"while this Government regrets that Mr. Kobata and Mr. Isomura
lost their lives in their attempt to escape, since they failed to stop
when warned, the guard acting in the performance of his duty, had
no other recourse than to shoot. "33
The State Department narrowed the three cases of unwarranted
use of firearms to two. It admitted that during a work slow-down,
"an American captain in charge of the internees fired a shot from
his pistol to attract the attention of the internees in order to address
them and tell them to proceed with their work," for which the
captain was reprimanded. The alleged incident in which a guard
fired on an internee who sought the return of a ball was denied,
and the department maintained that in the third cas~, the guards
had been alerted to expect an escape attempt and when an internee
approached one of the gates, a sentry fired a warning shot at a
nearby telephone post. The sentry "was relieved from further duty
of this nature. "34 Obviously the State Department sought to put
the best face on these events, but there are other perspectives.
In concluding this analysis of the problems at Lordsburg, one
may suggest that these difficulties stemmed from three general
problems inherent in the army's role as custodian of interned civilians: (1) the army's lack of recent administrative experience with
prison camps, and with civilian prisoners in particular, (2) the decision to apply the same regulations to military and civilian prisoners, and (3) the shortage of first-rate officers and men to staff
these prison camps.
As noted earlier, at the beginning of the war the army was not
prepared to care for either military prisoners or for the civilian
internees it had assumed responsibility for in an agreement of July
1941. Although large numbers of military prisoners did not materialize until 1943, the confinement of civilians interned as enemy
aliens was an immediate and pressing problem. The army hastily
constructed nine civilian internment camps, physically identical to
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prisoner-of-war camps, and in April 1942 issued a set of regulations
that governed both military prisoners and interned civilians. These
civilian internment camps gave the army firsthand experience in
prison camp administration that could later be applied to prisonerof-war camps, but no precedent existed for the civilian camps, and
this lack ofexperience partially accounts for the difficulties at Lordsburg. 35
Secondly, it is significant that the army applied the same regulations to both military prisoners and civilian internees. But regulations designed to control military prisoners of war were not
necessarily suitable for governing a population of middle-aged civilian internees with different characteristics and attitudes. For
example, the army sanctioned the punishment imposed on the
Lordsburg internees during the work dispute, which allowed camp
commanders, in accordance with Article 54 of the Geneva Convention, to deal summarily with ordinary disciplinary matters by
suspension of privileges or by confinement in barracks for a period
not to exceed thirty days. That army regulations allowed this type
of punishment, however, does not mean that confining a group of
middle-aged civilians to shuttered barracks in a desert environment
during the hottest month of the year was wise or appropriate. 36
The shooting of Isomura and Kobata also illustrates the consequences of applying the same regulations to military prisoners and
civilian internees. At issue is the method of preventing escapes.
The army regulation stated that if an internee passed a defined
limit or attempted to escape, the guard should call: halt! If the
internee failed to halt immediately and if there were no other means
of preventing escape, the guard should fire at the internee. 37
The State Department, which was concerned with the consequences of mistreating interned enemy aliens, was highly critical
of this regulation. A State Department report ofAugust 1942 noted
that although the army's "possibly overly strict shooting orders"
had resulted in three deaths in as many months, and might lead
to mistreatment "or more probably to the death of Americans in
Japanese hands," nonetheless the army was not disposed to modify
these orders by authorizing guards to fire a warning shot before
they shot to kill. In contrast, the Justice Department regulation
that the INS followed in its temporary detention camps directed
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guards not to shoot if the prisoner could otherwise be captured.
The State Department report concluded that:
An examination of the Army's reports on the shootings gives the
impression that the Army's shooting rule comes close to making
death, rather than up to 30 days arrest as provided in Article 54 of
the Geneva Convention, the penalty for attempted escape. 38

In this regard it should be noted that the Issei and other civilians
interned as enemy aliens were not deliberately or prejudicially
subjected to life-threatening treatment. They were simply treated
in the same manner as military prisoners of war. During the course
of the war a maximum of 425,806 prisoners of war were held in
the continental United States. Most of the 2,828 who escaped enjoyed less than twenty-four hours of freedom, but as of May 1945,
fifty-six prisoners had been shot and thirty-five of these men had
died. Commenting on these fatal shootings, an army study concluded that some were unjustifiable and that in such cases, "the
guard usually proved to be a person of inferior caliber. "39
A third point must also be considered. It is a truism that laws
and regulations, be they harsh or lenient, are shaped by the men
who administer them. Thus the treatment of prisoners may depend
as much on the character and intelligence of their guards as on official policy. As noted earlier, military police companies and prison
camp commands tended to be dumping grounds for less qualified
men and less competent officers. The commander at Lordsburg,
Colonel Lundy, seemed more interested in preserving the formal
social life of the peacetime army and in enjoying the privileges of
rank than in the more arduous aspects of command. Moreover the
guards at the camp were generally not rated for combat duty because of age or another disqualification. Unfortunately, then, the
Lordsburg internees were not only subject to military regulations,
but also to military administrators of questionable competence,
ability, and character. These factors are not irrelevant to the case
of Isomura and Kobata.
Even after a close examination of the circumstances of the deaths
ofthe two men the event is still puzzling. Several witnesses testified
that the two bodies were found by the fence some thirty-six feet
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west of the road; evidently Isomura and Kobata had left the road
and moved in the opposite direction from the lights and noise
coming from the compound. The question is, why? Several internees testified that Isomura and Kobata, especially the former, would
have found it very difficult to run. One may also ponder the likelihood that the two men would have attempted to escape into the
middle of an unknown and forbidding desert. But assuming the
truthfulness of Kelley's testimony that he did not see the shooting,
the only surviving witness was the man who pulled the trigger,
Burleson, and he testified that the men ran for the fence in an
effort to escape. Given the inconsonant nature of these facts, an
element of skepticism and uncertainty remains. It is certain, however, that for whatever reason, Hirota Isomura and Toshiro Kobata
met a violent and premature death on a moonlit night in the New
Mexico desert. 40
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TERRITORIAL POLITICS AND CULTURAL IMPACT

ROBERT W. LARSON

IN 1866 A GRUFF EX-CONFEDERATE SOLDIER arrived in the territory
of New Mexico. His name was Thomas B. Catron, and he hailed
from a state that had provided New Mexico with most of its early
Anglo leaders, Missouri, at the other end of the Santa Fe Trail. A
shrewd and opportunistic young man, Catron quickly perceived
that the only way he could have a successful political or economic
career in this remote frontier territory was to learn Spanish, so he
located in a native village where that was the only language spoken
and soon became fluent. Grounded in the culture and language of
the territory's overwhelming majority, Catron aggressively moved
into the field of law. Again he was successful, becoming one of the
most active and important practicing attorneys in the territory. One
of his legal specialties was to defend native grantees whose lands
awarded under Spanish or Mexican rule were being threatened by
acquisitive Anglo newcomers. A calculating lawyer, he saw the
advantage of taking plentiful land instead of scarce money as his
legal fee, and by 1883 he was reputed to be one of the largest
landowners in the nation.
Catron also had great skills as a politician. During his long tenure
in New Mexico, which fell seventeen years short of spanning the
entire sixty-two years of the state's territorial period, he was the
key person in that nefarious and shadowy political clique, the Santa
Fe Ring. This political ring, which specialized in gaining control
of much of the territory's economic wealth, including its coveted
land grants, provided Catron with much of the support he would
need to win high office. In 1894 he was elected territorial delegate,
receiving important backing from the more afHuent native leaders,
the ricos, as well as from significant numbers of los pobres fot
0028-6206/85/0700-0249 $2.10
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Thomas B. Catron. Courtesy of Special Collections, University of New Mexico
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whom he had become a revered patron. When New Mexico was
admitted to statehood in 1912, this remarkably astute and successful
Republican was chosen as one of the first two United States. senators. A more impressive success story for a New Mexico Anglo
would be difficult to find.
In many ways Catron's career is symbolic of the traditional scenario of the prominent Anglo achieving success in territorial New
Mexico. As historians of the territorial era have noted, the Anglo,
being a comparative newcomer, started as an outsider, a member
of a small minority. Prior to the seventies, the Anglo population
was small indeed. Col. George A. McCall, whom the Taylor administration sent to New Mexico to assist in the organization of a state
or territory, claimed there were only 1,200 Anglos in 1860; a later
estimate made by the territory's first delegate, Richard T. Weightman, was only half that number. Newcomers from "the States," as
the East was frequently called, usually made business or political
alliances with native New Mexicans; indeed, success in almost anything would have been elusive without at least some cooperation
with the territory's Spanish-speaking majority. Usually the Hispano
ally was wealthy, if not in money then in land. New Mexico historians have customarily labeled such people ricos. The nature of
Anglo relatioNships with less affiuent or less notable Hispanos,
however, is more clouded. Some prominent Anglos, such as Catron,
won through patient and systematic efforts the exalted status 'of
patron. Others apparently confined their cooperation to the more
accessible and "savvy" ricas. But the interaction of Anglos and
Hispanos in all these relationships has usually been viewed as one
of accommodation. Certainly in comparison with other states the
United States acquired as a result of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, this accommodation view appears sound, even though it is
largely derived from studies involving the territory's more affiuent
or influential citizens.
An examination of this accommodation model (here the Catron
model) should illuminate that distinctive brand of cultural politics
practiced in territorial New Mexico. It should also suggest some
provocative questions. For example, was the territory's governance
primarily the handiwork of the much-chronicled alliance involving
ambitious Anglos and those ricos with keen political instincts, or
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were there other important factors that must be considered? What
was the role of the ordinary Spanish-speaking citizen who was
usually rural and often remote from the sources of political power
(a gr~up that many Chicano historians call los pobres because their
material goods were few)? Was there any political role for that third
group in New Mexico's proud cultural triad, the Indian? Of course,
complete answers to these queries will not be possible in a brief
essay, but answers of a suggestive nature are not only possible but
quite illuminating. Indeed, such answers, if carefully developed,
can increase an understanding of what many regard as the most
diverse and fascinating political arena in the American union.
Cultural politics in New Mexico were especially murky in the
beginning. The presence of American troops in 1846, recent conquerors of the territory during the Mexican-American War, muddied New Mexico's political waters as nothing else could. There
was, of course, the abrupt change caused by the reversal of roles;
Anglos replaced Hispanos as leaders of the new power structure
the American Army imposed under the Stars and Stripes. Prominent native New Mexicans willing to cooperate could participate
in the new order, but Anglos would have an influence far beyond
their meager numbers. Curiously, though, the most critical issue
facing the new leadership was the influence of the military in civil
affairs. To some of the recently arrived Anglos the attitude on the
part of many officers that they were superior in authority to civilian
officeholders ran contrary to the nation's traditional constitutional
interpretation. One of these was ex-army paymaster, later territorial delegate, Richard Weightman. Undoubtedly an opportunist,
Weightman carefully began to form political alliances with prominent ricos in much the same way that Catron would two decades
later. During New Mexico's premature effort to achieve statehood
in 1850, Weightman and his allies became vocal statehood boosters.
For support in this effort, they made important advances toward
the Roman Catholic Church, involving in their ranks such prominent members of the Mexican clergy as Jose Manuel Gallegos of
Albuquerque, one of the priests so vividly protrayed in Willa Cather's classic Death Comes for the Archbishop.
Weightman characterized his political opponents as diehard advocates of continued territorial status for New Mexico who were
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influential and powerful only because of their military support.
They were backed by Col. John Munroe, head of the armed forces
in the territory, who allowed them as self-serving Anglos to organize
a territorial party as a vehicle to continue their privileged status.
They were often called the Houghton faction because their leader
was the army-backed judge, Joab Houghton. Although Houghton
and his chief sponsor, Colonel Munroe, were eventually pressured
into supporting statehood for New Mexico by the presidential
administration of Zachary Taylor, the feud between the Weightman
and Houghton factions continued throughout the early territorial
years essentially along the lines of civil-versus-military authority.
At New Mexico's first statehood convention in Santa Fe in May
of 1850, another issue important to native Hispanos arose to divide
the feuding Anglos. It was the heated question of slavery. Of the
two chief rivals, Judge Houghton was an antislavery zealot, who
was determined to see New Mexico become a free state if admission
to the union were inevitable. And his views ultimately prevailed;
slavery was prohibited in the 1850 state constitution. Although
Weightman's views on this issue were somewhat neutral, he would
later fight for the Confederacy. As for the Spanish-speaking majority, it is difficult to conclude that the slavery issue could have
been that vital to them after the terrible recent trauma resulting
from the Conquest. In fact, during the 1850s Hispanos, at least
the ricas, demonstrated a curious ambivalence toward the sectional
controversy. One wealthy Hispano, Miguel A. Otero, who married
a southern belle from Charleston, South Carolina, used his influence while s~rving as territorial delegate during the 1850s to persuade territorial leaders to align themselves with the South on the
sectional question. In 1862 when the Confederates invaded northern New Mexico, however, the overwhelming majority of Spanishspeaking natives remained loyal to the Union. Yet one suspects
that their antipathy toward the Confederates was not so much
because of their slaveholding views as it was their Texas background. Memories of the ill-fated Texas-Santa Fe Expedition of
1841 and land-grabbing activities of Texans in the Mesilla Valley
region probably did more to galvanize resistance to the Confederate
invasion than other questions of morality.
The Union victory in 1865 put an end to the divisive slavery
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issue among the territory's Anglos. The slavery question had survived by many years the often bitter controversy over civil-versusmilitary authority, an issue that declined in importance shortly after
New Mexico received territorial rather than state government under the Compromise of 1850. Now that both issues were dead,
Anglo and native politicians could devote their energies to territorial questions, such as the adjudication of disputed land grant
titles and statehood for New Mexico. The close of the Civil War
also brought more ambitious Anglos to the territory. One particularly important group of new Anglos were the much-heralded
veterans of the California Column, the now-famous military unit
that marched from California to New Mexico to turn back Confederate invaders during the Civil War. Many members of the column
took their discharge in New Mexico to remain in the territory and
to exercise significant influence for years to come. One of them
was Albert J. Fountain who went on to become both the president
of the Territorial Council and speaker of the Territorial House of
Representatives. (Fountain's assassination in New Mexico's isolated
White Sands region in 1896 remains one of the state's more famous
unsolved murders.) Another soldier who served in the California
Column was William L. Rynerson, who won terms in both houses
of the territorial legislature and was an unsuccessful candidate for
territorial delegate in 1884. But some of those who had served the
Confederate cause also came to New Mexico to launch important
careers. Certainly the most noteworthy of these was "Tom" Catron,
the kingpin of our accommodation model.
Catron was the apparent leader of one of the territory's most
controversial institutions, the Santa Fe Ring. Since it was a covert
group of shrewd lawyers and politicians, the ring has been shrouded
in controversy for years. Some New Mexico historians have credited
it with all the questionable manipulations of that selfish alliance of
Anglos and ricos that constitute the core of our accommodation
model. Other historians have contended that no solid proof exists
for such a ring, only accusations of envious or threatened outsiders
alleging its existence. Certainly it would be difficult to place a
beginning or ending date to its activities. Since it was an informal
arrangement, probably a conspiratorial one, it is even difficult to
reconstruct the ring's history or describe accurately its structure.
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Perhaps it was the connecting link between the leadership of the
Democratic and Republican parties in New Mexico. The ring was
certainly bipartisan; it had prominent members from both parties.
If political partisanship was negligible, and the ring was as important as its detractors claim, the territory of New Mexico had what
historian Kenneth N. Owens has called a "no-party" system. In
other words, instead of there being one dominant party or two
healthy rival parties, a cooperative arrangement existed between
the territory's two political organizations that made true partisanship negligible. More important is the objective of the Santa Fe
Ring: its members were dedicated to the acquisition of economic
resources or the special privileges that would make the acquisition
possible. Land acquisition was especially significant, particularly
when it involved the immense tracts ofland awarded under Spanish
and Mexican rule.
Undoubtedly the best contemporary description of the Santa Fe
Ring was that by Territorial Governor Edmund Ross in 1887. Ross,
the courageous man whose refusal to vote against President Andrew
Johnson during the famous impeachment trial of 1868 may have
preserved the integrity of the presidency, was a Cleveland appointee who wanted nothing to do with the selfish machinations
of politicians regardless of their political stripe. In a long letter to
a friend, Ross described the organizers of the Santa Fe Ring as a
~'few sharp shrewd Americans" who purchased at nominal prices a
few small Spanish and Mexican land grants and proceeded to enlarge them by manufacturing titles and lobbying for congressional
recognition. They were largely successful because they had "ingratiated themselves" with New Mexico natives by learning their
language and currying their favor. (The name of Catron immediately comes to mind.) They had, according to an observation related
to Ro~s by an old veteran of the Mexican War, "some legal lore
with a large amount ofcheek and an unusual quantity oflow cunning
and astuteness that always had an inclination to run in a crooked
direction." They were most successful in corrupting some of the
native landowners, too. These Anglos taught Hispanos a "few tricks"
on how "to swell" their holdings to "colossal dimensions," the Anglos
receiving as compensation "large shares of these grants for their
services." Again another characteristic of the Catron model. But
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according to Ross, the Santa Fe Ring was more than a land grant
ring because the opportunities for "speculation and plunder" were
legion. As a consequence, there were "Cattle Rings, Public Land
Stealing Rings, Mining Rings, Treasury Rings, and Rings of almost
every description."
Santa Fe, as the political and commercial capital of New Mexico,
was the logical center for all this ring activity. The lawyers and
businessmen of this important territorial center were in an enviable
position to coordinate this speculation and plundering. And, as Ross
noted, their efforts were bipartisan: at least one Democrat and one
Republican served in every important law firm or commercial enterprise. Consequently, no matter which party was dominant, ring
members were in a position to influence political decisions. In
Catron's Santa Fe law firm, for instance, there were two powerful
Democrats, Charles H. Gildersleeve, who was once accused of
heading a clique of land grabbers, and William C. Thornton, who
was appointed territorial governor of New Mexico during Cleveland's second term. The prevalence of lawyers in the activities of
the Santa Fe Ring almost causes one to conclude that the New
Mexico bar and the Santa Fe Ring were synonymous. Moreover,
as testimony to Santa Fe's importance to the legal profession, ringconnected lawyers in other towns were subordinated to their counterparts in Santa Fe, the "central head." Ross insisted that there
was one lawyer for every ten Anglos in the territory during his
gubernatorial term. Such a figure seems remarkably high, but with
the number of land disputes that needed to be adjudicated in
American law courts the need for lawyers was undeniably great.
A striking aspect about those Anglos alleged to control the Santa
Fe Ring was the immensity of the land tracts they acquired. Catron,
labeled by Ross as one of two originators of the land grant ring
(generally considered synonymous with the Santa Fe Ring), had
an insatiable appetite for land. His holdings included the 593,000
acres of the Tierra Amarilla Grant in northern New Mexico and
southern Colorado, his largest acquisition, and the 240,000 acres
of the Mora Grant flanking the Sangre de Cristos on the east.
Stephen B. Elkins, a two-term territorial delegate and Republican
colleague of Catron who left the territory later to become a United
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States senator from West Virginia and secretary of war under Benjamin Harrjson, was the ring's other organjzer. When he departed
for the East, he left control of the ring in Catron's capable hands.
Despite his departure, Elkins, largely in cooperation with Catron,
could claim at one time a large portion of the Mora Grant and boast
of heing the principal owner of the Ortiz Grant north of Albuquerque. Other prominent Anglo politicians, lawyers, and businessmen were also successful speculators in land and possibly
connected with the Santa Fe Ring. Distinguished Republican Governor Le Baron Bradford Prince, for example, a leading lay Episcopalian with a national reputation, had presumed connections with
the ring; and Max Frost, editor of the Santa Fe New Mexican and
a man who was once indicted in a land fraud prosecution, may also
have been a member of the ring.
- While Ross' remarkable description of the Santa Fe Ring makes
the group appear solely Anglo, it was not. Well-to-do native leaders
were alleged members, benefiting from the sometimes illicit, often
steamroller, tactics of the ring. Antonio Joseph, a Democrat who
served as territorial delegate from 1884 to 1894, was once accused
of being a henchman of the powerful Democratic leader and ring
member, Gildersleeve. Joseph's first election victory was allegedly
engineered by the Santa Fe Ring with the help of a split in the
Republican party. He, too, had land grant holdings and was accused
of manipulating "poor ignorant Mexicans" to acquire his holdings
in the Chama and Ojo Caliente grants. Other Hispanos, or ricos,
to use the preferred term for our accommodation model, were
suspected of ring connections. J. Francisco Chaves, grandson of
one of the Mexican governors and a two-term territorial delegate,
was one. Mariano S. Otero, a shrewd Bernalillo businessman who
also served as territorial delegate, was another. And, the members
of the Perea family, which for a time controlled much of Bernalillo
County, were believed to have strong ring connections; one of the
family, Pedro Perea, was widely regarded as a Catron protege.
Because Ross' description of the Santa Fe Ring is so systematic
and complete, one is strongly inclined to believe most of his allegations. They have the undeniable appeal of a conspiracy theory
that most Americans tend to accept if at all convinCing. But one's
judgment must be tempered; after all, Ross was a fierce opponent
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of the power structure in Santa Fe, whatever it was called. He
arrived as an outsider following his appointment and remained one
throughout his term. Another aspect of the governor's analysis that
should not be accepted uncritically is his description of the interaction between the Anglos and their rico allies. The Anglo is the
catalyst in this relationship; he is the one who teaches the "dirty
tricks" that both will use to swindle or cheat los pobres out of their
lands and other sources of wealth. Although this interpretation
seems convincing, it does not necessarily follow that Anglos will
remain leaders in the resulting selfish conspiracies. Given the power
and prestige that an old or well-placed New Mexico family would
enjoy in a society oflanded aristocrats and beholden rural folk, one
would have to suspect th~t some ricos could do very well on their
own. If accusations of land-grabbing hurled at Antonio Joseph, for
instance, are true, he needed little help from Gildersleeve or any
other calculating Anglo to achieve his economic objectives; he operated effectively on his initiative.
Ross' analysis also suggests that harmony would inevitably result
from such a mutually profitable relationship. With millions of acres
of grant lands up for grabs and the Anglo's needing the rico because
of his connections and the rico's needing the Anglo because of his
legal knowledge, there seems little to cause friction between the
two parties. Yet the two cultural groups were so different that this
assumed harmony cannot be taken for granted. Observations recorded during the Conquest by such Americans as Susan Shelby
Magoffin, Lewis Garrard, and army officer Philip St~ George Cooke
reveal a disdain for all native Hispanos regardless of their social
station. That such an attitude would change in little over one generation seems unlikely. Besides, new Anglos were arriving each
year, and their views toward the Spanish-speaking majority would
have had to change significantly if they resembled in any way the
views of their elected representatives in Washington. Unfair, often
vicious, attacks in Congress against native New Mexicans were,
unfortunately, common during the Gilded Age, particularly on those
occasions when the territory's inhabitants were seeking statehood.
Antonio Joseph, while serving as territorial delegate during the
early nineties, heard his Spanish-speaking constituents criticized
as members of an "Aztec civilization" by a Republican congressman
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and a "race speaking a alien language" by a Populist representative.
Slurs about the territory's dominant religious faith during a debate
over statehood in 1894 caused one fair-minded congressman to ask
his colleagues "whether a man's relIgion is to be made a test of his
fitness for citizenship in the Union?"
Newspapers in the East were even more hostile to New Mexico.
In 1875, for instance, during one of the territory's bids for statehood, a Cincinnati newspaper char~cterized New Mexicans as "aliens to us in blood and language" who would undoubtedly dominate
any new "Catholic State." The Chicago Tribune waged an even
more abusive attack in 1888 when New Mexico sought admission
. under the Springer bill. Territorial natives were maligned as "not
American but 'Greaser,' persons ignorant of our laws, manners,
customs, language, and institutions." The Tribune also printed some
all-too-familiar stereotypes, characterizing native New Mexicans as
illiterate, shiftless, and superstitious.
How many of these negative stereotypes Anglo lawyers and businessmen who comprised the Santa Fe Ring accepted is difficult to
determine. Many of them were undoubtedly distressed by the
knowledge that such attacks on the Hispano majority crippled New
Mexico's statehood efforts, for any delay in admission would adversely affect the ring. It would, for example, deny ring members
opportunities to hold new offices, and several ring leaders coveted
state offices or seats in the United States Congress. Anglos also had
powerful economic reasons for seeking admission; statehood, whenever achieved, would mean increased values for many of their
extensive land speculations. But whether the frustrations caused
by the delay were in any way vented against those ricos involved
in the ring is unclear. More than likely these frustrations were
directed against los pobres. Such anger if manifested in criticism,
however, would have to be low-keyed and private, particularly if
its author had political aspirations in the territory. Mter all, the
Spanish-speaking people remained the electoral majority throughout the remainder of the territorial period. Consequently, when
Melvin W. Mills, a partisan Republican and probable ring member
from Colfax County, characterized the territorial natives as "ignorant people" unfit to govern, he did it in a confidential letter to
his fellow Republican, Gov. L. Bradford Prince.
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Of course, any discussion of the intercultural relationship of Anglos and native New Mexicans must include all Hispanos, including
los pobres. Poorer Hispanos obviously were important in that they
made up in numbers what they lacked in influence, and any attempt
to exclude them from our accommodation model would be ridiculous. Yet sometimes New Mexico historians have done just that,
leaving only ricos to represent the model's native component. Assessing relations between Anglos and poor Hispanos, however, is
a difficult task. For one thing, los pobres left little in the way of
written records, but many ricos, being highly literate (several had
graduated from such Catholic universities as St. Louis and Notre
Dame), gave their side in a record rich in its diversity and extensiveness. Obviously association with the ring is denied or ignored
in all such accounts; instead contributions to the welfare of all native
peoples are stressed. In fact, as a number of these ricas were
powerful, if not generous, patrons, their service to the community
was of unquestioned importance. Indeed, important safeguards for
the Spanish-speaking majority in New Mexico's state constitution
were largely the result of rico participation in the constitutional
convention of 1910. No provision that would work against the welfare of the Hispano majority was allowed in that conservative,
bilingual document. Soloman Luna, the wealthiest sheep owner in
the territory and the most influential native delegate at the convention, had only to "lift a finger or his eyebrows" to st~p any
detrimental proposal.
But what about the interaction between Anglos and los pobres?
How can this relationship fit into the accommodation model? Most
people with even a nodding acquaintance with New Mexico political
history know that the poor and the marginal were often the alleged
victims of land-grabbing, grant stealing, and legal manipulations.
One cannot conclude, however, that there was no accommodation
involving los pobres in this presumably adversarial relationship.
Anglos too acted as patrons, and Catron, once again, is one of the
best examples. Hispanos saw his ability to cater to their needs as
beneficial whether it advanced their true interests or not. Moreover, his political support in the territory's northern counties, where
the majority of native New Mexicans lived, was impressive; he
managed to capture most of these counties during all three of his
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bids for territorial delegate. His being a Republican, of course,
helped because the party, the dominant one during the territorial
period, had established an early alliance with the native majority.
But Catron as the dominant party figure, the "Mr. Republican" of
the territorial G.O.P., was a key person in bringing about this
important accord.
One interesting example of Catron's remarkable hold on the
territory's Spanish-speaking majority occurred in Union County
during Catron's successful bid for delegate in 1894. A number of
Hispanos in that remote county had been attracted to the Populist
party, which had a platform deliberately geared to appeal to people
from humble circumstances. The Populist movement, which managed to garner more than 8 percent of the presidential vote in the
national election of 1892, called for such reforms as government
ownership of the railroads (an appealing issue to people living in
a lonely stockgrazing county that would be adversely affected by
higher freight rates) and a graduated income tax. Other popular
issues included free coinage of silver, direct election of United
States senators, and a shorter work week to benefit the nation's
urban toilers. Many of these new converts to Populism had been
Democrats because throughout the West the often-disenchanted
Democratic party tended to provide more support for Populist goals
than the Republican party. And most were apparently Hispanos;
the members of the Union County Populist party central committee, for example, were Emiterio Gallegos, Mateo Lujan, Saturnio
Pinard, and Francisco Gallegos. Despite this Democratic-Populist
alignment, Catron, working through a Las Vegas attorney named
Lewis C. Fort, managed to win an endorsement for his.Republican
candidacy from the entire Union County Populist organization.
What is so extraordinary about Catron's feat is his ability as an
archconservative to attract members of a party regarded by many
as socialistic. But this is New Mexico, and Catron's success is another example of that unique brand of cultural politics so long
practiced in this state. First and foremost, of course, was Catron's
image as a patron, and thus his role as a friend of the Spanishspeaking people of northern New Mexico was a contributing factor
to his coup: Consider too the crucial favors needed to make a patron
a patron. In 1892, while Catron was maneuvering to control the
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territory's delegation to the Republican national convention, he
promised the citizens of Clayton and Folsom a new county; the
result was Union County created from Colfax and San Miguel counties. Finally, there were the necessary go-betweens that insure the
success of any politically adept patron. Catron's emissary in this
case was Lewis Fort. Fort had gained immense popularity in 1891
when he traveled to Clayton as district attorney of San Miguel to
take into custody a notorious. murderer who killed an old man in
his sleep. The accused killer's abusive statements about Fort during
his trial in Las Vegas could only make him a local hero in northeastern New Mexico. The popular Fort was a persuasive advocate
for Catron's candidacy in 1894.
Certainly Catron was not the only Anglo to appeal to the masses
of ordinary native New Mexicans. Even more successful was Bronson Cutting. An analysis of Cutting does not belong in this study
of territorial politics because his political career soared during the
statehood period when he became a widely respected and powerful
United States senator, but the pattern of political favors that characterized his approach resembles Catron's. He built a bloc of Spanish-speaking voters even more loyal to him than Catron's native
supporters were to the veteran territorial leader. Moreover, as a
political maverick, Cutting, a nominal Republican, was able to lead
his Hispano backers in and out of the Republican party as he
switched parties from election to election to pursue his more liberal
policies. Cutting's favors also took the form of loans to constituents
(another Catron tactic). But in Cutting's case, the amount of the
loans he extended was astonishingly large. Cutting, at the time of
his death from a plane crash in 1935, left $500,000 worth oflargely
unpaid loans to nearly 500 constituents. Many unpaid loans were
to Hispanos.
If the relations that Catron and Cutting had with los pobres were
typical of all Anglo leaders, then our accommodation model would
seem most appropriate in describing interaction between almost
all Anglos and Hispanos in New Mexico. Ricos cooperated with
Anglos through arrangements such as the Santa Fe Ring for the
mutual benefit of both, but los pobres tended to support Anglos
because of favors extended to them by leaders of the Anglo community. Accommodation, then, is the byword; it best describes
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relations between these two dominant cultural groups of territorial
New Mexico.
True? Of course not. Historians have long recognized the frictions that existed between these two cultural groups, frictions that
tended to surface dramatically during such well-publicized confrontations as the Maxwell Land Grant controversy, the Lincoln
County War, the White Cap raids, and the relatively recent raid
of Reies Lopez Tijerina and his Alianza supporters on the Tierra
Amarilla courthouse. But most New Mexico historians, including
this writer, have looked upon these celebrated conflicts in New
Mexico history as aberrations, and the numerous books about the
conflicts have, for the most part, treated them as such. Scholars
have rarely viewed these encounters as part of a broader struggle
pitting Anglos against Hispanos, a conflict that could discredit at
least a part of the accommodation model involving Anglos and los
pobres. Viewing these struggles as exceptions to the rule, of course,
means viewing the violent behavior of the native New Mexicans
involved as exceptional; thus the more familiar characterization of
territorial Hispanos as a patient, accepting, even docile people has
been allowed to prevail. Recent research, including that of this
. author, does not support these mild traits of behavior, particularly
when the legitimate rights of these native peoples were being
threatened or challenged.
One must, in fact, modify this accommodation view of intercultural relations and territorial politics so that the deep differences
that existed between Anglos and Hispanos of more humble means
be recognized. While the intercultural relations in territorial New
Mexico were more harmonious than in other parts of the Spanishspeaking Southwest, to argue this point without honest assessment
of the differences that often prevailed is to present an incomplete
and, therefore, inaccurate argument.
The major cause of these differences that led to confrontations
and violence was rivalry over land. Perhaps in no other state in
the union has land been more important as a cause of conflict than
in New Mexico. New Mexico'sdubious record of having more political assassinations than any other state is largely attributable to
struggle for land or the economic power associated with landholding. Clearly,· princely tracts of that coveted commodity awarded
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under Spanish or Mexican authority led to warfare in Colfax and
San Miguel counties. The struggles in both these counties have
been dealt with extensively, but, as previously mentioned, these
conflicts have been chronicled as exceptions rather than the rule
in analyzing the actions of participants. Land grants, however, were
not the only reason for violence; disputed grants of land were not
located in Lincoln County or in those parts of Rio Arriba and San
Juan counties where competition for land existed between Anglos
and Hispanos. So competition for all kinds ofland has characterized
much of this violence and has made the term accommodation inappropriate in describing some aspects of intercultural relations in
New Mexico.
Historian Robert Rosenbaum, who has conducted extensive research into violence as a native response to Anglo intrusion, has
done the most convincing job of defining the geographical region
in New Mexico where most of these serious intercultural confrontations occurred. He has described the "battle zone" as a region
extending from San Juan County in the northwest across the northern boundary of the state to the Sangre de Cristos and down the
eastern flank of that range into Lincoln County, which at one time
encompassed the entire southeastern corner of the state. Here
native frontiersmen moved during the late eighteenth century and
early nineteenth century in a movement that noted historical geographer Donald W. Meinig has characterized as a "spontaneous folk
migration. "
The problems began when Anglos moved into the same regions
during the latter half of the nineteenth century. The most typical
response of these native land claimants, many of whom held the
lands of this region in common, was extended resistance or opposition in what some modern historians and social scientists have
called long-term skirmishing. Such resistance occurred in Rio Arriba County and the more recently created San Juan County to the
west. Sometimes this resistance was a long-delayed process; in parts
of Rio Arriba County, for instance, n~tive settlers ignored Anglo
intruders until the very lands that they were cultivating or grazing
were threatened. Where Anglo iI!trusion was more dramatic and
aggressive, this skirmishing occurred sooner and tended toaccelerate into more serious violence. The wars in Lincoln County are

LARSON: TERRITORIAL POLITICS

265

the best example of this kind of conflict. Although historians have
been inclined to' concentrate on the feud between the McSween
and Murphy-Riley-Dolan factions that erupted in 1878, the rivalry
over land and water rights in Lincoln County began a decade before
and ended a decade after 1878 and involved Hispanos to a far
greater degree than previously recognized. Few historians, for instance, have dealt with the Horrell War, where native Hispanos
struggled to preserve their rights to the land, than with the legendary Lincoln County War. Moreover, far more attention has been
paid to such Lincoln County participants as Billy the Kid than to
such important native leaders as Juan Patron.
The same could be said of the long-term skirmishing along the
eastern side of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains in Colfax County
where the'famous Maxwell Land Grant was located. Most chronicles of the Maxwell controversy-and there have been some excellent ones-have concentrated on either the Anglo grant owner
or the Anglo resisters. Much less has been done with the native
resistance to the Maxwell claimants, which started later but was
in some respects more effective. In San Miguel County to the south.
an even more impressive show of native resistance occurred. As a
matter of fact, one should upgrade the resistance of Las Gorras
Blancas (White Caps) to Anglo encroachment in San Miguel to the
level of a coordinated rebellion, a term some historians and social
scientists use today to describe a much more advanced, better
planned show of resistance. In San Miguel another land grant was
involved, the Las Vegas Community Grant, and the better organized resisters were the heretoforementioned Las Gorras Blancas.
These resisters not only responded with force to immediate threats
to their land but established an alliance with a liberal Anglo union,
the Knights of Labor, and cooperated with more progressive-minded
Anglos in a political party, the Populist party or El Partido del
Pueblo, which agitated for the eventual incorporation of the grant
under the jurisdiction of the town of Las Vegas. These largely
successful Gorras came closer to perceiving their movement as one
representing small Hispano landowners everywhere than any group
or organization until Tijerina's Alianza was founded. Of course, Las
Gorras did not include all Hispanos in their social thinking; the
concept of a universal struggle was to elude them just as it did
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most of the followers of Tijerina, who were probably more concerned with the ancient land claims oftheir family than with general
welfare of Hispanics.
Clearly, this pattern of native resistance has not been fully understood or appreciated, but also it has not been adequately studied.
More articles and monographs are needed on this subject. For
instance, the territorial activities of native resisters in Rio Arriba
County have been almost ignored. Histories of the resistance in
Lincoln County hav~ been largely confined to the famous range
war of 1878, and accounts of the Colfax County War that erupted
because of the Maxwell Land Grant have focused on the Anglos
involved. While White Cap resistance in San Miguel has attracted
a more recent crop of historians, they have not been entirely successful in putting the efforts of these native night riders in the
broader historical perspective.
New research will not lead to simple answers. Indeed, reinterpretation may be thwarted by an array of frustrating complications.
Obviously some of the Anglo intruders were important grant-hungry capitalists. Catron, for example, was involved in the struggles
in Rio Arriba, along with Thomas Burns and two aggressive English
companies, the Rio Arriba Land and Cattle Company and the Carlisle Cattle Company. The man for whom the accommodation model
fits best was also allied with the Murphy-Riley-Dolan faction in the
Lincoln County War and was for a brief time co-owner of the
sprawling Maxwell Grant. On the other hand, many of the Anglo
intruders on the eastern plains were small settlers or westering
cowboys whose one aim was to extinguish the claims ofAnglo grant
speculators and native grantees so that the entire area could be
declared public domain and openoed to any enterprising homesteader. Also, there are cases where the Anglo landowner and the
native landowner made common cause against the powerful Anglo
speculator in alliance with the ricos.
On the basis of this newer interpretation or hypothesis, where
does the accommodation model stand? It appears intact concerning
relations between the more powerful and educated Anglos and their
rico allies. Outside this relationship, however, the term accommodation may not be accurate; the growing evidence of widespread
conflict between Anglos and los pobres has already been cited as
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evidence that confrontation may be the more appropriate term.
Other questions regarding cultural interaction should also be addressed. What type of relations existed, for instance, outside that
peripheral region of conflict that extended in an arc from San Juan
County to Lincoln in the southeast? Did Anglos and Hispanos of
ordinary means living in the more crowded Rio Grande Valley
accommodate their conflicting desires and needs to achieve greater
harmony?
One New Mexico historian, Gustav L. Seligmann, Jr., has suggested that many territorial Hispanos employed withdrawal as a
mechanism to deal with aggressive Anglo intruders. Withdrawal,
however, is not an accommodating action if harmonious relations
are the objective. As for Indians, the third group in the state's
cultural mix, they remained remote from the day-to-day social and
political activities of mainstream New Mexico life. Although Pueblo
Indians were involved in the Taos uprising of 1847 and some nomadic tribes were engaged in bloody violence as late as the eighties,
as wards of the federal government, Indians stayed detached from
territorial life even though their votes were sometimes solicited
during the early days following the Conquest. The whole concept,
then, of accommodation as a major characteristic of cultural interaction in territorial New Mexico is one that should be challenged,
studied, and probably modified.
But any reassessment of New Mexico's cultural relations should
not be confined to the political or economic realm. The social arena
is also a legitimate area for fresh examination. Intermarriage was
common in territorial New Mexico, yet most would concede that
the implications of this important social practice have never been
adequately studied. Relations involving Anglo and Hispano women
are just beginning to command the attention of historians. Other
facets of social interaction such as the influence of Protestant missionaries on native peoples also need further study to ascertain the
degree to which accommodation characterized cultural relations in
New Mexico.
The results of this proposed reassessment would not undercut
significantly the proud record of cultural harmony from which the
citizens of this state draw great pride. After all, two governors of
Hispanic background have served this state in the past decade, not
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to mention the members of this cultural heritage who have served
in Washington during these past years. A new assessment would,
however, show that healthy racial and cultural relations are rarely
achieved without struggle. It would also set the record straight
from a historical standpoint, a worthy objective for any free society.
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NEWS NOTES
Nancy Brown, office manager of the New Mexico Historical Review, is the recipient of the Paul
A. F. Walter award for services to the Historical Society of New Mexico through her work at the
NMHR. The award, presented at the society's annual conference in Las Cruces in April, cites
Ms. Brown for her untiring service to the society and the Review and her enthusiastic promotion
of history and related disciplines.
Other members of the NMHR staff who participated in the conference include Paul Hutton,
who will become editor of the Review in January 1986, Sandra Schackel, Richard Ellis, and Lynn
Brittner. Brittner presented a paper entitled «The History of the Portal Vendors at the Palace of
the Governors"; Hutton, Schackel, and Ellis presided over sessions.
The Colonial New Mexico Historical Foundation suggests you mark your calendars now for the
annual Harvest Festival at EI Rancho de Las Golondrinas, 5-6 October, 9 A.M. to 4 P.M. Local
crafts, exhibitions, food, and entertainment will be featured during the two-day event. In addition,
the rancho features guided tours on Wednesdays and Sundays, during June, July, and August;
tours begin at 10 A. M. Call the museum at 471-2261 for reservations. Membership in the foundation
entitles members to free admission at the annual festivals and open house days.
The Tularosa Basin Historical Society announces publication of volume two in their series on
Otero County pioneer families. One family history, written by George McNew, offers fresh insights
into the Albert Fountain murders, in which his father, William McNew, was implicated. Order a
copy from the society at Box 518, Alamogordo, N. Mex. 88310. The cost is $25.00 if picked up
at the museum, $30.00 if mailed.
News from the Taos County Historical Society includes the request for book reviews for their
new historical publication entitled Ayer y Hoy. Interested reviewers should contact David Caffrey,
Box 2447, Taos, N. Mex. 87571.
A group ride on the Cum bres and Toltec Scenic Railroad is On the society's schedule for
September. John Comstock is program chairman for this event and may be contacted at the above
address.
Northern New Mexico's many old adobe churches and moradas are slowly eroding away. Much
of their art work, including santos and retablos, have been stolen or sold to museums and private
collectors. In many cases, the churches have crumbled because villagers no longer have the time
or money to maintain them properly. To halt this erosion and attempt to restore these buildings
to their historical roles as functioning village churches, the El Valle Foundation, Inc. has been
created. Concerned citizens are requested to contribute to the fund to restore and preserve what
is left. The foundation does not intend to modernize the Church of Saint Michael at El Valle but
restore and maintain the building as a living church for the community. Please send tax-deductible
contributions to EI Valle Foundation, Inc., El Valle Route, Box 23, Chamisal, N. Mex. 87521.
Time, and the church, are slipping away.
The New Mexico Committee for the Promotion of History (NMCPH) has created a subcommittee
on the status of history in the New Mexico public schools. The committee, composed of educators,
historians, and administrators from around the state, met to review the status of history in public
schools and to suggest improvements. A position paper was sent to members of the New Mexico
Legislature involved with educational matters. It is hoped that the recommendations will call
attention to the imbalance in the educational system caused by the recent shift in school curricula
away from history and toward math, science, and contemporary social sciences. All of those who
participated in this project are to be commended for their interest and dedication.
NMCPH president Marc Simmons announces the appointment of Stan Hordes, state historian,
as executive director of the organization. The NMCPH is composed of persons interested in state
history. Others wishing their names added to the mailing list should contact Simmons. The officers
will meet soon to review the organization's status and decide if changes are warranted. Members
are encouraged to write to share their views, care of Marc Simmons, NMCPH, Box 51, Cerrillos,
N. Mex. 87010.

THE PAJARITO OR CLIFF DWELLERS'
NATIONAL PARK PROPOSAL, 1900-1920

THOMAS L. ALTHERR

IN ITS WASHINGTON COLUMN of 27 January 1901, the New York
Times informed its public that the "demand upon Congress for new
public parks, National in character, has been increased by one that
will strike many persons as possessing peculiar attractiveness. Mr.
Lacey has reported a bill to provide for the setting aside of a 'Cliff
Dwellers' National Park' in New Mexico."1 Two months earlier, the
Santa Fe New Mexican had alerted its readership to this development: "A movement has been on foot for some time to have the
region set aside as a national park and the ruins preserved for future
scientific study."2 Both papers referred to the beginning ofa twentyyear campaign to create a national park on the Pajarito Plateau
northwest of Santa Fe. This effort eventuated in the establishment
of Bandelier National Monument in 1916, but failed to win national
park status for the larger surrounding area.
During the first two decades of this century, a flurry oflegislative
and lobbying activity tried to create the variously named "Pajarito
National Park," "Cliff Dwellers' [or Cave Dwellers'] National Park,"
or "National Park of the Cliff Cities." The first peak of this activity
occurred around 1906, then a lull resulted until about 1914, when
a new, even more optimistic round of pro-park sentiment surfaced.
In 1916; the proclamation of the national monument dampened
this second surge, but backers kept bills in Congress until 1920. 3
During the 1920s, lingering requests for the park prompted a National Park Service study in 1930. The service concluded that the
national monument sufficiently protected the best ruins and that
a national park encompassing more land was unwarranted. In the
late 1930s, some of the land in question became part of the Los
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Alamos atomic testing facility. Since the 1940s two further proposals
attempted to combine the national monument with other nearby
ruins into the Valle Grande National Park plan in the 1960s and
the Pajarito-Valle Caldera National Park proposal in the 1970s.
Neither attempt resulted in any concrete action. At this time the
national park idea seems to be dormant or dead. This present
oblivion into which the Pajarito proposal has fallen is no indication,
however, of how bright its prospects were in 1905 and 1914.
By the first of those years, the success of the Pajarito National
Park plan seemed imminent to its supporters. Archeological societies and famous anthropologists had heaped blessings on the project, and New Mexico politicians had lined up for this territorial
cause, which they expected would further the campaign for statehood. Moreover, Iowa congressman John F. Lacey, ardent conservationist and chairman of the House Committee on Public Lands,
had visited the ruins in 1902 and since 1900 had been trying to
shepherd through Congress three bills under his name. Predicting
the double benefits of increased tourism and scientific advancement, the Santa Fe New Mexican had been vociferously in favor of
the trimmed-down proposals, and objections from the nearby Santa
Clara Pueblo Indians and local timber and grazing interests seemed
resolved by boundary adjustments in the plan. Like existing national parks, this proposal would appear to rob the nation of little
or no material resources. General national enthusiasm for preserving Indian antiquities in the Southwest found reflection in
Lacey's proposed protection act and the proposed Mesa Verde National Park in Colorado. With its scientific importance, scenic charm,
and minimal economic value, the Pajarito area seemed a likely
candidate for national park status.
This bright outlook of 1905 proved illusory, however. Congress
did not rush to create the park. Instead, foreign issues, such as the
instability in the Caribbean and the Philippines, the Panama Canal,
and national issues, such as elections and progressive reforms,
absorbed attention. In New Mexico the continuing drive for statehood drained political energies. Repeated argument over and redefinition of park boundaries blurred the focus of the plan. In
addition, transfer of proposed park land to the Santa Clara Pueblo
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under President Roosevelt's executive order in 1905 made protection of the remainder of the Pajarito region seem less urgent.
Passage of Lacey's Antiquities Act in 1906 gave archeologists a
mechanism for preserving and exploring the ruins without resorting
to national park reservation. Establishment of Mesa Verde National
Park that same year, a development on which Pajarito proponents
pinned their hopes, may also have hindered the New Mexico proposal, as congressmen may have seen the Pajarito version as duplication of the Colorado park. As a territory, New Mexico probably
was not able to wield the political clout that Colorado could. The
Pajarito plan may, moreover, have suffered from cloudiness in the
preservationist thinking of its supporters who expected that the
new park would embrace scientific study, tourism and recreati~n,
and grazing and timber-cutting. Such a park would have resulted
in an uneasy truce at best among such competing interests.
But in 1914 the Pajarito proposal emerged again, stronger than
before. Perhaps the immediate reason was a desire in Santa Fe to
garner the increased tourist travel that would pass through the city
on the way to the Panama Canal Exposition in California. Other
trends, however, made the Pajarito plan seem more feasible by
that year. Automobiles had proved capable of reaching remote
areas, and national pride in western parks had swelled, resulting
in the "See America First" promotions of the 191Os. On the local
level, New Mexico, a state since 1912, felt entitled to its own
national park, especially after Colorado obtained a second national
park, Rocky Mountain, in 1915. On the righteous and commercial
levels, New Mexico renewed its efforts for the park. The rejuvenated campaign owed much to the collaboration of the Santa Fe
Chamber of Commerce, the New Mexican, and particularly William
Boone Douglass, a federal surveyor who had mapped the region
in 1910 and who by 1914 had adopted the Pajarito park proposal
as nearly a personal crusade.
But again, like the attempt in 1905, the efforts in 1914 failed.
Worries about the Mexican revolution and border bandits and the
European war drew Americans away from specific concerns like
the Pajarito plan. Reform measures of Wilsonian Democrats engendered controversies that highlighted the pressing problems of
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urbanization, immigration, city and business corruption, and industrial violence. Against such a backdrop, the preservation and
conservation movements did not abate, but took on new meaning.
Americans saw resource management increasingly as an integral
part of the nationwide efficiency campaign and national parks as
antidotes to the ravages of urbanization. Indeed those diverging
viewpoints, evident in the Ballinger-Pinchot split in 1909-10 and
the Hetch Hetchy Valley controversy from 1908 to 1913, spelled
trouble for the Pajarito proposal. Around 1914, federal agencies
questioned whether the park as envisioned constituted a national
park or more properly a national forest. Moreover, requests for
grazing and timber-cutting rights seemed contrary to national park
policy by that date and more in keeping with the conservation
impulses of the national forests. The Pajarito proposal may have
been a 'park that Forester Henry S. Graves had in mind in 1920
when he charged that park supporters were compromising over
possible economic exploitation in proposed parks to reduce opposition from commercial interests. 4 On the local level, powerful
companies such as Bond & Nohl exerted pressure to keep the lands
open to herders and homesteaders. The plan even lost the sympathy of Edgar Hewett, an archeologist who had favored the earlier
idea but who by 1916 came to criticize the national park as unnecessary for the protection of the ruins. Although New Mexico
senators and congressmen placed bills before Congress until 1920,
enthusiasts had dwindled by that year to William Douglass and a
few of his friends.
What then is the historical significance of the Pajarito National
Park proposal? Why look at a failure, no matter how vocal its
support, how vibrant its prospects at the time? The Pajarito proposal demonstrates how complex national park formation process
was and further reveals that the creation of a national park was not
guaranteed. Historians have tended to concentrate on successful
national parks and to describe the opposition that they overcame.
Yet a cursory look at the Proposed Park file in the National Archives
shows that there were several unsuccessful proposals for each successful one. Many of those failures seem whimsical at best or porkbarrel projects of congressmen who interpreted Theodore Roosevelt's sudden arrival in the presidency as a green light for any
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proposal no matter what its inherent worth. Yet other suggested
parks, such as the Pajarito one, seemed to their supporters to have
worthiness equivalent to Mesa Verde and other existing national
parks. Explaining opposition to successful parks describes but part
of the hindrances parks proposals faced, including internecine conflicts among supporters. As H. Duane Hampton remarked in his
article "Opposition to National Parks," resistance "appeared in many
forms and involved a great many complementary and contradictory
ideals."5 The Pajarito National Park proposal, one part pork-barrel,
one part national in scope, illustrates the complexities of the preservation argument earlier in the century.
The first serious attempt to establish a national park in the Pajarito region occurred in July 1900, when the General Land Office
ordered over 150,000 acres withdrawn from public sale or entry. 6
Perhaps drawn to the area by the writings ofAdolph Bandelier and
Charles Lummis and the explorations of Edgar Hewett, then president of New Mexico Normal University~ the land office assigned
clerk James Mankin to study the possibilities for preservation. Mankin visited the area in late 1899, and his report, dated 4 December
1899, urged the reservation of vast acreage and immediate creation
of a national park named for the principal geographic feature there,
the Pajarito Canyon. 7 Shortly afterwards, the Smithsonian Institution expressed belief that sucha park would result "in the preservation for educational purposes of the most extensive system of
cavate [cliff dweller] dwellings known."8 In March 1900, Mankin
provided additional information about the Pajarito region and repeated his recommendations. In April, the New Mexican warned
that "deadly relic hunting" would cause the ."possibility of scientific
excavation" to "soon have passed away forever."9 Persuaded by such
reports and warnings, GLO Commissioner Binger Hermann obtained permission from the Department of the Interior for a temporary withdrawal order in July 1900. Accordingly Hermann ordered
the GLO register and receiver in Santa Fe to withdraw the specified
Pajarito lands from public availability and to publicize the order in
local newpapers. The order would not affect any existing "bona
fide" settlement or claim to that date. 10 That "temporary" order of
31 July 1900 stood in effect until its revocation in 1938.
The GLO order met at first with general approval. The agency
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took quick steps to implement the directive by sending special
agent S. J. Holsinger to Santa Fe for consultation on how to prevent
excavation and vandalism at the cliff dwellings. In September, the
Denver Times congratulated Hermann for withdrawing a stretch of
land "as bare of inhabitants as Robinson Crusoe found Juan Fernandez to be" and applauded protection of the ruins. One month
later Edgar Hewett wrote Hermann with warnings about "wanton
vandalism" bound to occur the next summer unless the GLO policed the ruins effectively. Hewett volunteered to draft a bill for
Congress, supply maps and other information and testify in the
Capitol, if needed. He declared that he believed "more earnestly
than ever in the desirability of creating this [Pajarito Park] into a
National Park under the protection of the government."11 Encouraged by such support, Hermann passed along his recommendation
to the secretary of the Interior, Ethan Allen Hitchcock, who in
turn interested the chairman of the House Committee on Public
Lands, John Lacey, in sponsoring the department's bill before Congress. 12 When Lacey introduced the intended plan in December,
1900, he too encountered harmonious opinion. The Archeological
Society in Santa Fe drafted a resolution that urged Lacey to preserve the grazing rights as well as protect the ruins. Hewett wrote
to Frederick Hodge of the Smithsonian's Bureau ofAmerican Ethnology and exhorted that agency to back the bill in Congress. The
only dissenting note came in the New Mexico governor's annual
report in which Paul A. F. Walter, later a tireless worker for the
park idea, argued that withdrawal of large areas of land to protect
the ruins was unnecessary, that appointment of a custodian would
accomplish the same purpose. 13
With 1901, however, came some disagreement from, of all people, Edgar Hewett. In a letter to Hodge, Hewett belittled the
choice of the term "Cliff Dweller" instead of "Pajarito" for the park's
name. He thought the former was archeologically inaccurate, since
other cliff dwelling areas existed throughout the Southwest. Hewett
also pointed out that the bill made no provision for artifacts from
the ruins. He suggested starting a museum in Santa Fe to house
the collection. These early criticisms indicate what became Hewett's general pattern of thought regarding the national park. He
saw reserving the lands from settlement as a means of archeological
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preservation, not as a national playground. 14 Later in January, Lacey's House committee reported out the bill but anticipated Hewitt's objection to the name for the park. The committee preferred
"Cliff Dwellers" because that name reflected "the purpose and object" of the proposed park and because they expected Englishspeaking people would mispronounce "Pajarito. "15 Apparently Hewett
calmed down and decided the park was worthy no matter what its
name. In March he wrote to the GLO and urged that agency to
continue protecting the ruins, to assign a ranger "to ride the park
during the four or five months of greatest travel. "16
Hewett also expected more serious vandalism for the ruins that
upcoming summer. Events proved him partially correct and underscored the need for the bill. An incident involving the arrest of
two men excavating in the ruins and a challenge from the Denver
and Rio Grande Railroad about timber-cutting privileges showed
how unsettled the matter was. In the first, two excavators, George
Cole and Milton Madden, claimed they had obtained permission
to dig from the secretary of the interior and accused their accuser,
Hewett, of more damage to the ruins than they had done. Caught
in the middle was a GLO special agent, S. S. Mathers, who received
a reprimand for exceeding his authority when he seized a shipment
of artifacts Cole and Madden had removed from the ruins. Interestingly, in his report to the commissioner, Mathers wrote enthusiastically of the Pajarito's prospects as a national park and sounded
an early note of patriotic tourism theory when he questioned rhetorically the wisdom of visiting Europe to see "some old robber
Baron of ancient days" when wonders like the Pajarito ruins existed
in America. 17 In the second issue, the Denver and Rio Grande
Railroad tried to claim rights, based on an act of 1872, to forested
land for cutting track ties. The GLO commissioner responded forcefully to letters from the railroad attorneys, directed them to the
difference between forest reserves and national parks, and ruled
that the withdrawal order of 1900 overrode the act of 1872. 18 This
interchange prefigured later problems for the park concept, confusion over national forest philosophy versus preservationism.
The Cole and Madden episode and the railroad challenge on
timber rights convinced park supporters of the justness of their
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cause. Calling for more interest in the cliff dwellings, if not specifically for a national park, the New Mexican reminded railroads
that they could "very profitably advertise them [the ruins] among
the leading attractions of the southwest," a theme prominent in
railroad support of national parks since the creation of Yellowstone
in 1872. The governor's report of 1901 called for gratitude from
academic societies and public-spirited citizens for the Department
of the Interior for its role in preserving the ruins. 19 With such
evidences of accord, Lacey re-introduced the park bill with minor
changes in January 1902, and in doing so triggered unexpected
reactions in Santa Fe.
During 1902, the New Mexican four times criticized the boundaries of the park plan. In March the paper quoted the opinions of
a pioneer settler of the region, P. H. Liese, who maintained that
the park as proposed was too large, that it would be detrimental
to local settlers, shepherds, and ranchers depending upon the lands
for their livelihoods. In August, while Lacey himself was inspecting
the ruins, the paper repeated Liese's advice. The New Mexican
favored preserving the ruins, but declared "Not an acre more than
necessary to accomplish these purposes should be included in the
area reserved. New Mexico is being plastered up with forest and
other reservations which include at least three times the area necessary to serve the purpose for which they are created. "20 This local
pressure had its effect on Lacey, who reduced the acreage entailed
in the bill drastically and introduced the revised bill in December
1903. Hewett had already predicted this change, in a letter to New
Mexico Governor Miguel Otero, who incorporated Hewett's speculations into the animal report of 1902. Hewett expected that reducing the land involved would stilI protect the ruins, provide for
rights-of-way to them, and "remove what has been practically the
only objection to the measure"-withdrawal of unnecessarily huge
amounts of land. 21
During late 1902 and 1903, however, new challenges arose from
other quarters. In December 1902, Washington ethnologist Henry
Mason Baum, in Records ofthe Past magazine, questioned whether
the Pajarito ruins needed national park status; he thought that their
relative isolation would protect them from much depradation. The
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Bureau of Forestry also wondered whether the proposed park involved lands that it expected to place in the proposed Jemez forest
reserve. Moreover, the nearby Santa Clara Pueblo protested the
creation of a national park because they feared disturbances to
Indian gravesites and loss of their present firewood supply. And
others doubted whether tourists could even reach the prospective
park, even if it met all other objections. 22 In 1903 the bureau sent
agent S. J. Holsinger to New Mexico to investigate these problems.
Having visited the ruins three years before, Holsinger was an
ideal choice for the investigation. But because he had switched
employment from the GLO to the Bureau of Forestry, jurisdictional
problems delayed his appointment to the task until late 1903. Finally, in January 1904, Holsinger examined the area and submitted
a report to Lacey's committee covering some of the objections. He
found, for example, that Lacey's bill did not include the lands that
interested the Bureau of Forestry, and thus no reason existed for
interdepartmental conflict. As to the isolation of the ruins, Holsinger admitted that at present they were somewhat inaccessible, but
he saw that isolation as a temporary condition. Indeed, he speculated that interest in the ruins would prompt the speedy construction of roads from the good road-building rock at hand in the
park vicinity. The Indian claims, however, would be less easy to
settle. He thought that the Santa Clara Pueblo would compromise
on the establishment of a national park, but not without assurances
of a right-of-way to the woods. 23
The controversy between the Santa Clara Pueblo and the park
proponents showed two liberal causes working at cross-purposes.
As early as January 1903, Clinton J. Crandall, the superintendent
of the Santa Fe Indian School and acting agent for the Pueblo,
suggested to the commissioner of Indian Affairs that the Interior
Department could accomplish two goals at once by transferring the
ruins to the Santa Clara Pueblo reservation. The Indians, Crandall
was convinced, would welcome the additional land, and they would
guard what they considered the graves of their ancestors. Throughout 1903 Crandall repeated this idea of Indian custodianship and
decried the national park as unnecessary. The Pueblo agent feared
that park supporters had decided to shortchange the needs of the
Indians when he learned that Lacey had submitted a revised bill
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in December. Furthermore, the failure of Holsinger to appear
caused Crandall additional consternation. In December, Crandall
stepped up his protest,.writing directly to Lacey and Bernard Rodey,
the New Mexico delegate to Congress. In his letter to Rodey,
Crandall, ignoring Hewett's letter to the governor and New Mexican
editorials, claimed that he knew of no one who wanted the Pajarito
Park, which was a "stumbling block" to Pueblo welfare. 24 Rodey
responded five days later and told Crandall that Lacey had "liberal
and splendid ideas" about not hampering settlers' rights. Rodey
also declared that he, ex-Governor L. Bradford Prince, J;-acey, and
others did advocate the national park idea. Knowledge of Prince's
support must have rankled Crandall because in a letter a few days
later he voiced suspicion that Prince, who owned a ranch near the
proposed park, stood to gain financially from tourism. Crandall
reserved his strongest words, however, for a letter to the Indian
Rights Association in Washington. The agent characterized the park
effort as yet the latest chapter in the sordid saga ofwhite oppression
of Indians. He charged that Hewett had "concocted" the "whole
scheme" and had duped Lacey into seeing "simply the scientific
side to the question" and missing the "true side-the Indian side
and claim. "25
Mter Crandall received a copy of Lacey's bill his anger cooled.
The conflict between proposed park lands and proposed Pueblo
reservation lands was minimal. As a result, while accompanying
Holsinger on his investigation, Crandall struck a more conciliatory
tone. Holsinger reported that, after some discussion, Crandall and
the tribe had "finally expressed themselves as willing to recognize
the necessity or advisability of creating a national park, embracing
the most interesting ruins, and declared they would be satisfied"
with a one-mile wide outlet strip, known later as the "shoestring
grant." Both the commissioner of the Office of Indian Affairs and
GLO commissioner approved this accord. 26 Perhaps Crandall retreated from his criticism because sympathy for the park was increasing both in Washington and in Santa Fe.
Meanwhile, Hewett had continued to press for a park for archeological study. He urged William Henry Holmes of the Smithsonian
Bureau of Ethnology to back Lacey's bill and particularly to recommend including the Ramon Vigil Grant in the proposed park.

Archaeological features, Bandelier National Monument. Courtesy of National Park
Service.
.
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That tract, presently due north of the national monument, would
afford direct access from Santa Fe, the direction from which Hewett
expected most tourism to originate. Then he revealed an interesting
wrinkle in his support for the park. Hewett thought creating the
national park in the Pajarito region, reserving representative ruins,
would draw off the tourist trade and leave the remainder of the
ruins open for "exploration etc., by reputable institutions and scientists," such as himself. If Hewett was self-serving is open to
debate, but clearly he worked for the cause of archeology first and
tourism second. 27
In Santa Fe, the New Mexican continued to work hard for the
park proposal throughout 1904 and the winter of 1905. In July, the
journal reported that Prince, Crandall, and Baum had just returned
from investigating Indian claims about the park and that all three
thought the park would not arouse great resentment at the pueblo.
The paper quoted Prince's conviction that the park "would be of
greater benefit to Santa Fe than any other measure proposed for
years" and reminded readers that the city could expect profits from
tourists, who "of course" would "come and go via Santa Fe." Three
weeks later, the New Mexican urged Rodey to save some time from
the statehood issue' to push for the park. In November, the daily
exhorted newly elected delegate William Andrews to steer his actions on behalf of the park. In January 1905, the paper warned that
only a public park could prevent depradations to the ruins and two
weeks later quoted a Washington correspondent who thought Lacey's bill would encounter no resistance. "There should be no
opposition to the bill," the editor agreed. 28
Hopes continued to rise in January 1905, when Lacey's committee held a hearing on the bill and reported it out favorably. The
11 January hearing, which concerned the Pajarito and Mesa Verde
park proposals, was a veritable chorus of praise for both. John
Foster of the Archeological Society of Washington, Francis W. Kelsey and Charles P. Bowditch of the Archaeological Institute of
America, F. W. Putnam of Harvard, Msgr. Dennis O'Connell of
the Catholic University of America, Holmes of the Bureau of Ethnology, and Hewitt all testified in glowing terms about the New
Mexico park's prospects. The only person to sound a sour note was
Rodey. He questioned the wisdom of reserving an area in New
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Mexico "as big as the State of New York." Rodey must have had
other forest reserves in mind as well because the Pajarito park was
nowhere near that large. Hewett and others met Rodey's question
squarely, and the meeting adjourned with supporters confident of
the future of Lacey's bill. Eight days later the House committee
gave its approval. 29
Although Congress did not act immediately on the bill, the forces
of optimism remained strong throughout the spring and summer
of 1905. A discernible change was occurring in the direction of the
support, however. Hewett, the most vocal spokesman for the park,
a man whom Lacey remembered as "perpetual motion at maximum
velocity," was shaping the national park proposal as an archeological
laboratory. In letters to Holmes and to the GLO commissioner the
previous year, Hewett's concerns had been clearly archeological,
still insisting on obtaining the Ramon Vigil Grant and opening the
ruins for scientific excavation. 30 Although Hewett spoke in a July
1905 editorial of "the educational value" of the ruins for "the traveling public," the bulk of his remarks pertained to archeological
matters. In addition, he emphasized that, in his opinion, the park
would encroach on no settlers' rights. 31 Also obvious at this time
was his linking the Pajarito proposal with Mesa Verde. Whether
this strategy was sincere on Hewett's part or whether he was prepared to jettison the New Mexico park in favor of the Colorado one
is not clear, but in 1905 he seemed desirous of having the government create both parks and worked hard in the public arena for
both.
In August, however, the New Mexico park plan received a shock.
The New Mexican reported that in late July President Roosevelt
had by executive order added about forty-seven square miles to
the Santa Clara Pueblo reservation. 32 Some of the land was from
the proposed park. The paper thought the transfer would conflict
"slightly" with the park boundaries, but Hewett was even more
disheartened. The reservation extension "embraces all the great
Puye and Santa Clara group of cliff dwellings, the principal center
of interest in the proposed Pajarito National Park," he wrote with
chagrin. While Hewett thought the addition of land was just, he
regretted that the order pertained to land with important ruins
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instead of better-timbered acreage without ruins. Hewett expressed his feelings to Crandall in September, but the agent responded that inclusion of the Puye ruins in a proposed park "would
materially injure the Indian reservation. " Consoled that the Indian
Office would protect some of the ruins and the newly formed Jemez
Forest Reserve would cover others, Hewett still feared the vulnerability of the rest because he wrote, "the national park proposition will probably be abandoned."33
Contrary to Hewett's pronouncement, the park effort did not
fade yet. In March 1906, Andrews introduced a bill that reflected
the Santa Clara Pueblo land grant, and interest back in Santa Fe
heated up again. The New Mexican, calling for a national park and
not just a forest reserve to protect the ruins and draw tourists,
struck a note for regionalisrn: "The northwest has its great national
parks in the Yellowstone region. There is no reason why the Southwest should not have a similar place of attraction." In April, the
paper continued its support by running a story on the progress of
road-building to the ruins and the next month featured a long article
by Hewett. After touting the scientific potential of the dwellings,
he departed from his usual archeological focus and argued that New
Mexico could match the standards of European tourism by supplying good roads, hotels, waystations, and regular summertime
conveyances to the park. The New Mexican agreed and added signposts to the list. In June the paper advertised a July excursion to
the park for $7.50, and then in late June declared that the recent
creation of Mesa Verde National Park would help usher in the
similar New Mexico park. 34
Those cheers faded qUickly, however, as preservation strategy
suddenly took a different turn. Indeed, the Mesa Verde success
and the passage of Lacey's Antiquities Act (34 Stat. L. 225) on 8
June 1906 signaled the immediate demise-not the success--of the
Pajarito National Park proposal. Although the New Mexican blamed
Rodey for failing to push the park hard enough, archeologists no
longer needed the national park to protect their treasures. 3.5 Hewett
and others did not waste much time lamenting the New Mexico
park, but plunged ahead with yearly excavation seminars on the
Pajarito Plateau. Later Hewett suggested that Lacey retired the
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Pajarito bill in favor of the "more popular Mesa Verde Park measure," but nothing in Lacey's papers confirms that view. 36 Why
Mesa Verde should have been more popular than the Pajarito location is not entirely obvious. Perhaps the Colorado park benefited
greatly from William Henry Jackson's photographs or from Colorado's longer connection with the national political arena. Whether
Hewett and Lacey had intended to sacrifice the New Mexico project
to save Mesa Verde cannot be proved, but the lack of any mention
of a national park proposal until 1914 was conspicuous.
Then in that year, the national park proposal reappeared, generating as much or more enthusiasm and controversy than the
earlier effort. Yet the proponents' energies were not enough to
overcome persistent confusion over the dimensions, goals, and
reasons for the park. Although by May 1914 the New Mexican was
declaring creation of the park a "national duty" and the Santa Fe
Chamber of Commerce was claiming that "nearly everybody is 'for
it,'" such hyperbole did not reflect differences among supporters,
growing local opposition, and environmental policy changes on the
national level. 37 The Chamber of Commerce and the New Mexican
acted mostly out of self-interest, as did Hewett and the other archeologists. The city elders sought to boost the local economy by
attracting tourists, and improving the appeal of New Mexico by
forming a national park was necessary to that tourism campaign.
On the other hand, Hewett's group placed preservation and excavation concerns first. William Boone Douglass, speaking after
1915 for the National Parks Association of New Mexico, stressed
all of those goals and then predicted wondrous benefits for both
the city and state and science beyond the fondest dreams of businessmen and archeologists. Throughout 1914 these three parties
cooperated in promoting the bills before Congress, but by 1915
splits were becoming evident. The newspaper began to waver between the national park and the national monument concepts, and
Hewett apparently felt the national monument strategy would be
sufficient to protect the ruins because by 1916 he became one of
the most severe critics of the park proposal. After 1916 only William
Douglass carried on the cause with much enthusiasm. The Chamber of Commerce and New Mexican chimed in occasionally with
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praise for Douglass' efforts, but those groups were also attuned to
the growing antagonism that the park idea had fostered.
This lack of solidarity among supporters may have been enough
in itself to doom the park, but the campaign aroused major local
opposition and also objections on the national level. On the local
level, adding much acreage to protect the ruins inevitably angered
one party or another that claimed grazing or timber rights. Area
ranchers and grazers, often encouraged and led by Frank Bond of
the powerful merchandising company, Bond & Nohl, objected
strenuously to what they saw as harmful restrictions in the bills.
Park backers tried to meet these criticisms by allowing many
concessions and by enlarging peoples' rights to utilize park lands.
Those provisions in turn brought the bills into disfavor with federal
agencies that perceived the Pajarito park as an anomaly, a proposal
that was not clearly a national park, a national forest, or a national
monument. Policies regarding usage and protection of natural 'resources were by no means clear in the 191Os, but the congeries of
competing designs embodied in the Pajarito proposal did not even
come close to existing categories of use and protection.
Above all the development that spurred Santa Feans to desire
a national park in 1914 was the Panama-Pacific Exposition in California. "We must have our park to secure our share of the Panama
Canal Exposition crouds [sic]," the Chamber of Commerce wrote
to Senator Thomas Catron. In more elegant prose the chamber
resolved: "That in view of the approaching Panama-Pacific Expositions with their resultant influex of visitors, the needs of the State
of New Mexico and the City of Santa Fe require the creation of
said National Park. "38 This emphasis on tourism, a stock comment
in chamber letters and New Mexican editorials throughout the year,
fueled the hopes of other park supporters. Hewett volunteered his
support in April and must have cheered when the Chamber of
Commerce asserted in a letter on 5 May, "Our Park is a virgin field
and we want it developed by ar,chaeologists, not by forest rangers
and Indian police," Bright with optimism in 1914, park proponents
saw virtually no opposition on the horizon. Instead of viewing the
Santa Clara Pueblo as a hindrance to the park, supporters insisted
that "Indians grouped around the Park add greatly to its value."
Moreover, from the supporters' viewpoint, the park would affect
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only lands with little agricultural value. With such confidence, park
backers expected nearly immediate establishment of the park. 39
But by October 1914 the park bills appeared, to one writer in
El Palacio, "to be buried in committee for the present." For one
thing, reservations about the bills had arisen in federal departments. In April the GLO commissioner noted that the ruins were
"more or less scattered," that park supporters wanted a national
park because Congress had yet to appropriate monies for national
monuments; he expected the Pajarito region would receive the
same use whether it was a national park or a forest reserve. In July
the commissioner repeated the office's noncommittal stance. The
Forest Service, arguing that the bill provided no standards for
protection stricter than what the service already required, contended that "a large part of the proposed park has no unusual
features of scientific interest, nor any of the natural wonders or
unusual scenic features for which other National Parks have been
established." In addition, the Department of the Interior pointed
out that the bills allowed for several "unusual" grazing allowances
and worried that such a park would lead to a jurisdictional problem
between the department and the Forest Service. Earlier in the
spring, Sen. Albert Fall had also expressed pessimism about the
bills' future in Washington; by October his predictions came true. 40
Despite Douglass' continuing optimism for the park, the campaign never recovered much steam after 1914. Contrary to what
park advocates hoped, the movement toward creating a national
monument instead of a larger national park began to win the sympathies of supporters throughout 1915. Douglass and others objected to the national monument because they thought that proposal
would not encompass enough of the ruins nor attract as many
tourists as would a national park. Still, the national monument
became a reality on 11 February 1916, and park proponents tried
to build upon that event to create the larger park. Douglass declared forthrightly that the chances fo~ the national park were better
than ever following the establishment of the monument, but ensuing efforts came to no avail. Local opposition remained strong
and persuasive, even in the face of point-by-point rebuttals from
Douglass. 41 Perhaps the toughest blow for park enthusiasts, however, came from Hewett. In April 1916 he challenged the entire
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contents of S.B. 2542 and asserted that no elected officials really
backed the bill. He wondered aloud whether the promises of the
park would materialize and asked: "What city has been built up or'
noticeably benefited from becoming a gateway to a National Park?"
Hewett was no particular friend of the Forest Service, which administered the national monument, but he thought the service had
done a good job of protecting the ruins. Since, he asserted, "no
serious vandalism [had] occurred in Pajarito Park for more than
ten years," he doubted the efficacy of withdrawing such a large
portion ofland from public availability. "Would it have been wise,"
he asked, "centuries ago to have made of Switzerland a vast park,
barring settlement and reserving it solely for a pleasure ground?"
Apparently Hewett was satisfied with national monument status
for the area and had decided further challenges to developers and
merchants would only aggravate his designs for excavation. 42
Douglass tried to answer Hewett's article, but the damage was
done. Senators Catron and Jones and Congressman William Walton
submitted bills to Congress in 1917, but that legislation was so
riddled with concessions that the federal departments were bound
to object once more. The establishment ofthe National Park Service
in 1916 did not help the Pajarito park proposal either. Instead of
taking the project under its wing, the new agency, beset with its
problems of winning respect in the federal arena, looked at the
New Mexico park only half-heartedly. While the service sent Boston
photographer Herbert Gleason out in 1919 to study and photograph
the region and though he filed a very enthusiastic report in that
year, the service did not follow his recommendation to create a
national park. William Douglass kept making trips to the Capitol
to push for the bills, but by 1918 he was linking his last hopes to
a national plan to create a scenic highway connecting national parks
and other pleasure spots. But by 1920, the national park proposal
had faded into the background. Perhaps the most ironic commentary on this development appears in National Park Service correspondence during that year. The only references to the park idea
were letters between officials trying to locate the Gleason report,
which had disappeared-a disappearance that reflected the decreased interest in the once-bright park proposal. 43
Although the idea for a national park in the Pajarito region emerged
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again sporadically in the 1920s and 1960s and 1970s, none of these
suggestions gained serious consideration. None provoked the controversy that efforts earlier in the century did. That campaign,
peaking in two phases in 1906 and 1914, shows the fragility of
national park proposals. Whether the Pajarito National Park had
as many salient attractions as did proposed parks that gained genuine national park status is moot for historical purposes. Still, unsuccessful park efforts-like successful ones-demonstrate the
complexity, the internecine arguments among proponents who supported the proposals. In short, the Pajarito National Park campaign,
with its attendant arguments among archeologists, politicians,
ranchers, the Chamber of Commerce, newspapers, the Santa Clara
pueblo and their agent, and other lobbying groups such as William
Douglass's association, illustrates well the flurry of competing designs for the same stretch of land and resources.
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THE UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
IN THE MIDDLE RIO GRANDE VALLEY, 1935-1955

MICHAEL WELSH

HISTORIANS OF NEW MEXICO have devoted little attention to the
causes and consequences in the past half century of the explosive
growth in the middle Rio Grande valley. The traditional perspective
of New Mexican scholarship prOVides too brief an understanding
of the political, economic, and social changes that have reshaped
present-day Albuquerque and its environs. Yet as the population
expands past the half-million mark and local leaders are pressured
to plan for the -future, they need an awareness of the recent past
to determine the wisest policies for the remainder of the century
and beyond.
A key to deciphering the mysteries of the modern era is an
assessment of water-policy planning for the Rio Grande basin. In
an area as devoid of surface moisture as central New'Mexico, the
use and abuse of precious water resources dictates all other factors
of growth and development. Prior to 1935, the sparse population
of the region required no elaborate policy making, but the combination of the Great Depression and the chaotic although exhilarating boom of World War II rendered obsolete the old methods
of water management. Henceforth, organized approaches by local
and state leaders had to coincide with federal plans for construction
of western water projects. These facilities contributed greatly to
the unparalleled expansion of the postwar years that shows no signs
of abatement in the Albuquerque area.
The vast majority of Albuquerque residents take for granted the
delivery of fresh water in generous quantities at low rates. Too
often they are not cognizant of the projects built since 1945 to
protect their city from periodic flood flows. Moreover, they know
0028-6206/85/0700-0295 $2.20
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little of the costs involved or the players in the drama of waterpolicy planning. Yet their lives and futures are different because
of the work conducted to prevent flooding in the middle Rio Grande
valley. One of these organizations charged with the duty of flood
protection has shaped local and state history to a surprising degree:
the Albuquerque District of the United States Army Corps of Engineers.
The army engineers can point to a lengthy record of national
public service over the past two hundred years. In the nineteenth
century they provided the eastern United States with harbors and
levees, channel-dredging, and military construction. In the West,
the branch of the corps known as the Topographical Engineers
drew maps, conducted scientific surveys, and recommended policies to Congress that would utilize the resource potential of the
region. But the lack of settlement, and the isolation and remoteness
from urban centers, inhibited development of any large-scale corps
projects beyond the Mississippi River. It was left to the regionally
based United States Reclamation Service, founded in 1902 and
renamed the Bureau of Reclamation in 1923, to begin construction
of irrigation facilities in western waters. Among these was Elephant
Butte Dam and Reservoir in southern New Mexico, completed in
1914, to serve farmers of the lower Rio Grande valley in New
Mexico and west Texas.
The presence ofthe Bureau of Reclamation in New Mexican and
other western river basins in the early twentieth century kept the
army engineers from active participation in regional water-policy
planning. Indeed, the ostensible mission of the corps to operate
only in navigable rivers excluded most western streams from their
purview. Only in 1927 did Congress authorize activities of the corps
throughout the West as part of House Resolution 308, which called
for surveys of flood protection and hydropower facilities in all United
States waterways. At the same time, the states of New Mexico,
Texas, and Colorado had attempted, with mixed success, to fashion
an interstate stream compact on the usage of the waters of the Rio
Grande. The need for technical assistance to conclude this important agreement thus became the vehicle for the army engineers to
enter the complex and challenging world of water-resource development in New Mexico. I
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By 1935 the river that held the lifeblood of central New Mexico
had undergone study by the state engineer's office, the International Boundary Commission, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Department ofAgriculture, the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District
(MRGCD), and other private irrigation companies. Despite an
overwhelming body of statistical data, the three compact commissioners from the affected states had doubts about the accuracy,
completeness, or what the New Mexico state engineer called the
"freedom from bias" in each agency's report. In this predicament
the federal government intervened, in the form of the National
Resources Committee, a New Deal organization devoted primarily
to the study of resource development in the West. Meeting twice
in Santa Fe in the winter of 1935-36, the committee sought clarification by asking the army engineers to join the Interior and
Agriculture Departments as part of the "Rio Grande Joint Investigation. "2
As a contributor to the formation of the Rio Grande Compactthe formal document on interstate stream use-the army engineers
gained invaluable knowledge about the appropriation of basin waters,
as well as the geology and topography of the region. Once these
studies had ended in 1938, the corps also established itself in the
area through its construction work at Conchas Dam on the Canadian
River near Tucumcari. After the completion of this project in 1939,
the corps served in an advisory capacity to state and federal agencies, such as the Works Progress Administration, on various small
retention and diversion dams in rural New Mexico communities.
Then in the spring of 1941 severe flooding along the midsection of
the Rio Grande brought a permanent presence for the soon-tobecome Albuquerque district in matters affecting the river.
Floods on the Rio Grande and its tributaries had been a fact of
life since time immemorial. Indian and Hispanic farmers who operated at a subsistence level worked around the flooding by waiting
for its arrival each spring and then planting their crops in the highly
fertile sediment deposited in the flood's wake. The American system of farming, however, involved massive production of surplus
crops for sale in a larger market economy. This practice meant
increasing the length of the growing season, the size of one's fields,
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and the volume of water used thereon. Spring floods then constituted a danger, not a blessing, to such organized methods of agriculture, and as more settlement occurred the need for flood control
grew accordingly.
This greater use of the river by farmers and city dwellers became
obvious after 1900. Since the Rio Grande flows through a desert
environment, it absorbs sand and dirt in large quantities as it scours
the river bed. This action decreases the volume of clear water
needed for fields cultivated with fertilizer. In addition, the excessive pumping of wells in the basin reduced the water table so that
the amount of irrigated land in the middle valley had declined by
two-thirds, from 125,000 acres in 1880 to less than 40,000 acres in
the 1930s. The stream bed was also rising as silt was deposited
every year, and where farms were lower than the shoreline the
groundwater seeped to the surface, killing the vegetation and leaving swamp and marshland behind. 3
At first the citizens of the river valley attempted to control their
water problems through formation of the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District. After a particularly difficult spring in 1917, water
users incorporated to pass bond issues that financed construction
of levees, irrigation canals, drainage ditches, and later a storage
pool at EI Vado Dam in northern New Mexico. Problems caused
by the Dust Bowl and the Depression combined with Albuquerque's small population base and low per capita income to convince
the conservancy district to seek outside help. In 1938 the Soil
Conservation Service made recommendations on the sediment
problem, and the next year the Bureau of Reclamation conducted
a preliminary survey on flood control and hydroelectric power facilities. Then in 1941, when the Rio Grande flooded almost nonstop
for two months, valley residents asked the corps of engineers for
their expertise as well. 4
The Galveston district of the army engineers first responded to
the flood situation on the Rio Grande, since it controlled the stream
flow of that river in southern Texas. But when the Albuquerque
district opened its doors in early 1942, all work on the New Mexico
reach transferred to the local office. The pressures on the new
district to complete its many military construction projects left little
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time, staff, materiel, or money for flood protection work. The conservancy district thus had to maintain its levees throughout the
war years-a task made more difficult by its precarious financial
situation. Tax assessments to property owners increased dramatically, yet the district spent an inordinate percentage of its funds
on flood damage, rather than on enlarging the irrigable acreage of
the valley. 5
The crises facing the Albuquerque area disturbed many residents, not the least being First District U. S. Congressman Clinton
P. Anderson. Elected to the House of Representatives in the fall
of 1940, the Democrat quickly learned in Washington how officials
from other states manipulated the levers of power to acquire public
works projects. Anderson's Albuquerque could not fund any large
facilities, and the outstanding conservancy district bonds had no
takers until the federal Reconstruction Finance Corporation had
purchased them in 1935. As tales of flooding on the Rio Grande
filtered back to Anderson in the spring of 1941, he watched the
federal budget process closely. Anderson first asked the Bureau of
Reclamation to assume the district bonds, as that would free conservancy district members from the debt service on their loans.
When that move failed, the Congressman learned that some western water projects, especially those the army engineers funded,
could be built on a nonreimbursable basis. Conchas Dam had been
constructed in such a manner, and the repayment schedule for the
proposed Arch Hurley Irrigation District at Conchas received very
liberal terms from the Bureau of Reclamation. Anderson did not
begrudge the farmers around Tucumcari their good fortune, but
he called upon "the people of Albuquerque and the middle Rio
Grande valley, the newspapers ofAlbuquerque, and the Legislature
of the State of New Mexico to get a little 'hot' on this subject." The
city needed "millions more spent" on flood control, and Anderson
believed that it "ought to be spent in an area where people are
already living and in distress."6
The flooding of 1941 helped Anderson's bill for flood protection,
House Resolution 4911, to pass both houses of Congress -in short
order. Public Law 78-534, known as the Flood Control Act of 1941,
directed the Chief of Engineers to conduct a preliminary study of

Clinton P. Anderson. Courtesy Special Collections, University of New Mexico
Library.
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the basin and its tributaries north of EI Paso. Anderson also detected a potential for conHict with the Bureau of Reclamation, the
other agency working in the river basin, when he added a clause
~requiring both groups to develop ajoint-use plan for the Rio Grande
near Albuquerque. Anderson hoped to avoid the bitter dispute
between the corps and the bureau unfolding in the Missouri River
valley that threatened future funding for that region. The Bureau
of Reclamation agreed with Anderson to study irrigation and water
conservation measures, while the Albuquerque district of the army
engineers would plan for Hood control and sediment storage via
reservoirs and levees.
The pace of change in the Albuquerque area caused by military
spending in World War II hampered the study of the Rio Grande
basin and left Clinton Anderson in a quandary. He saw the potential
for postwar economic growth in his district if only he could fashion
a network of transportation and communications for Albuquerque.
In his mind the federal government had the largest source of capital
to invest in the city's future. If he could not overcome the obstacles
of Hood control and irrigation, that future stood in jeopardy. Anderson then resurrected an idea that had met opposition in the
West just prior to World War II: the concept of a regional water
authority. Under this scenario, Congress would develop not only
Hood and irrigation projects, but water recreation faCilities and
inexpensive hydropower as well. Were Anderson to convince his
colleagues in Washington and New Mexico of the merits of such a
plan, the federal government would underwrite nearly the entire
cost of economic expansion for the middle Rio Grande valley, much
as it had done in the South with the Tennessee Valley Authority
in the 1930s.
To meet this urgent need, Anderson went before Congress in
the spring of 1945 with a bill entitled "Upper Rio Grande Reclamation Act of 1945." The legislation covered the drainage area of
the basin from its source in southern Colorado to San Marcial, a
town north of Elephant Butte Reservoir that Hooding had destroyed
in 1929. Anderson chose to work with the secretary of the interior
on this matter, giving that agency "such powers as may be necessary
to carry out the purposes of this act. "The sale of hydropower would
be a major component of any storage reservoir constructed on the
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river, with profits from the electricity to offset the costs of the
projects. Finally, the Corps of Engineers would be responsible for
flood control only, with all other uses of their projects ma~aged by
the Interior Department. 7
From his vantage point in Washington, Anderson believed that
his "Rio Grande Basin Authority" (RGBA) made eminent sense.
The Columbia River projects of the corps and reclamation in the
Pacific Northwest generated large quantities of cheap power that
transformed that area into a haven for agribusiness and defense
plants. The prevailing attitude among many New Deal supporters
still held true in the 1940s: that national solutions were best for
persistent problems of unemployment and economic stagnation.
But Anderson either forgot the lessons the corps learned when it
advanced the ill-fated Arkansas Valley Authority in 1941 or thought
that emergency conditions in wartime offered a compelling rationale for his RGBA. Anderson contacted influential backers in New
Mexico for their opinions, only to be stunned by their near-unanimous rejection. 8
The concerns of Anderson's constituents reflected the economic
and political dilemma they faced in World War II. Oscar M. Love,
president of the Albuquerque National Bank, told Anderson that
"development of the Rio Grande ... is perhaps the local matter
of transcendent importance to every citizen and owner of property
within the area." Fred C. Wilson of the conservancy district noted
that Joseph O'Mahoney, Democratic senator from Wyoming, had
pressed for similar legislation for the Upper Colorado River basin,
with "construction of the works at the entire expense of the United
States." All respondents sympathized with the Congressman's objectives. But the idea of the federal government taking direct responsibility for management of New Mexico water resources alarmed
local leaders, and they made Anderson aware of their hesitancies. 9
The critical evaluation of the RGBA proposal quickly expanded
beyond the Albuquerque area to the states of Colorado and Texas.
Clifford H. Stone, director of the Colorado Water Conservation
Board, echoed the displeasure of his state as a member of the Rio
Grande Compact Commission. Stone held that all basin authorities
were "wrong in principle in every respect." Federal officials would
not be sensitive enough to the water laws of the various western
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states and would find restrictive "the right of the states of the arid
West to control the appropriation and distribution of water." Colorado discounted Anderson's claim that basin-wide management would
further economic vitality, contending that the RGBA would "delay
rather than expedite desirable developments." Stone did not leave
the Congressman without hope, however. He saw in several actions
of the army engineers an attempt to resolve disputes in river basin
planning and recommended that Anderson study the latest flood
control and rivers and harbors bills, which guaranteed state control
of water rights. Stone then warned Anderson that the Albuquerque
District had to remain a strong partner in Rio Grande basin projects: "An attempt to relegate to them a minor role, or eliminate
them entirely from the field of water development ... will only
tend to unduly discourage and delay what is needed for the proper
utilization . . . of the water resources of that area."10
The other participant in the Rio Grande Compact, the state of
Texas, also moved to register its dissent with the Anderson proposal. Terrell Bartlett, a civil engineer from San Antonio who had
clients on the river below Elephant Butte Dam (technically considered part of the Texas reach of the Rio Grande), called the
preliminary plans of the corps and reclamation"grandiose. " Bartlett
not only disapproved of the authority concept, but believed that
many of the proposed projects would waste money and not deliver
on their promises. He called for less glamorous, but in his estimation more effective work, like raising of levees, dredging the
river channel for a deeper, swifter flow, and more attention to the
problems of evaporation and sedimentation in any reservoir under
study. The goal of Bartlett and other interested water officials in
Texas and New Mexico was quick and efficient delivery of all compact waters to Elephant Butte as soon as flooding occurred further
north, so that lower valley farmers would have enough irrigation
water to last through the summer. 11
Under the onslaught ofcriticism for his basin bill, Anderson chose
discretion. He wrote to Thomas McClure, state engineer for New
Mexico, to calm his fears about the authority's intent and purpose.
The congressman had no desire to "set up an appointive board in
Washington, which knows nothing of conditions in New Mexico."
Any commission fOf the RGBA, he added, would be "composed of
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people resident within the area" and would be selected "by the
President [with] the advice and consent of the Senate." Anderson
still considered his plan meritorious, telling McClure th~t federal
control of the operations and management of any flood protection
work was standard procedure throughout the West. He did admit,
however, that the impact of the RGBA on the delivery of compact
waters had not crossed his mind, but promised to negotiate with
the states on that point. Anderson reassured McClure that he had
not sold out the interests of his state or of Albuquerque with the
authority bill and concluded that "we all know what New Mexico
needs, wants, and ought to have, and our feelings are not far
apart."12 '
The battle for the RGBA changed character in 1945 when Clinton
Anderson resigned from his seat in Congress to accept the position
of secretary of agriculture in President Harry S. Truman's cabinet.
Although Anderson would maintain his interest in flood control and
irrigation projects for the basin, it would be left to New Mexico's
senior senator, Dennis Chavez, to fulfill the expectations of Rio
Grande valley water users. Chavez would assume coordination of
the various plans under the aegis of the Middle Rio Grande Project
(MRGP), and when he became chairman of the Senate Public Works
Committee in 1949 he would exert great influence on the funding
of army engineer projects nationwide.
As a lifelong resident of the Rio Grande valley, Dennis Chavez
knew first-hand the problems of flood control and sediment protection. His family lived in the small community of Los Chavez,
south ofAlbuquerque, where Chavez developed his understanding
of the New Mexico Democratic party and its important Hispanic
component. Clinton Anderson often spoke for the business and
professional interests of New Mexico, given his background as an
insurance agent who had come to the state to recuperate from
tuberculosis in 1917; but Dennis Chavez, on the other hand, paid
close attention to the concerns of small farmers and landowners
throughout the valley, and he knew that they too must share in
any improvements brought by the army engineers and other federal
agencies. David M. Cargo, former Republican governor of New
Mexico (1966-70), characterized Chavez's perspective on water
policy as "practical dreams," and it was Chavez's diligence and
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consensus-building in Congress that carried the day for the Rio
Grande basin where Clinton Anderson had gone astray. 13
Prior to 1945, Chavez had devoted his energies in the Senate to
acquiring military contracts for the state and New Deal social programs for his constituency. His forays into water development consisted of support for funding of Conchas Dam in 1935 and introduction
of bills to construct small flood protection works in northern New
Mexico. But the RGBA debate brought Chavez into the picture
when he agreed to write an article on the issue for the New Mexico
Quarterly Review. The senator also worked on passage of the Flood
Control Act of 1944, which added several tributaries of the Rio
Grande to the original corps study, and it also called upon such
disparate federal agencies as the Federal Power Commission, U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, Bureau of Indian
Affairs, U.S. Forest Service, and Soil Conservation Service to join
the Albuquerque district and the Bureau of Reclamation in developing a comprehensive basin report. 14
The deliberative pace of the federal bureaucracy irked the activist
Chavez, especially when the Middle Rio Grande Project report
did not surface in time for the off-year Congressional elections of
1946. The evident backlash against Democratic social programs,
postwar inflation, and the suspected Communist menace of the
Cold War, made Republican fortunes bright that fall. Chavez saw
two problems on the horizon: one for himself and the other for the
MRGP. His re-election campaign pitted him· against Patrick W.
Hurley, secretary of war in the administration of Herbert Hoover,
and a former general in the army. In addition, a Republican sweep
ofthe Senate might doom federal support for western water projects
since budget-cutting and criticism of "big government" provided
the GOP with ammunition in all contested races.
To deflect the attacks of Hurley, et al., and to insure success of
the MRGP, Chavez made an issue of Republican insensitivity to
public works and social programs. He also issued an unsigned
statement on the eve of the election warning New Mexico voters
that Arizona Senator Carl V. Hayden, a Democrat who championed
western water projects, could be replaced as chairman of the powerful Appropriations Committee by Senator Styles Bridges, a Republican from New Hampshire. Chavez depicted Bridges as "a
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reactionary easterner" who knew "nothing of the West and cares
less." By inference Chavez painted his opponent with the same
brush. To save Hurley's candidacy, Bridges responded immediately
by telegram to the Albuquerque Tribune. The New Englander
reminded New Mexicans that a Republican, Theodore Roosevelt,
had supported funding of Elephant Butte Reservoir in 1906 and
that Secretary of War Hurley had authorized the corps to conduct
its survey of the middle Rio Grande. Bridges had visited New
Mexico on several occasions and assured Tribune readers: "I have
been and am now in favor of flood control that will protect the
magnificent city of Albuquerque . . . and I shall be very glad to
work with you [Dennis Chavez], Pat Hurley, and all others interested to that end. "15
Chavez and the Democrats did lose control of the U. S. Senate
that year and had to wait until the Truman upset of 1948 to regain
their positions of power in that body. Once back in command of
the Congress, the Democrats named Chavez to head the Public
Works Committee. In the summer of 1949 he received the longawaited Rio Grande report from the secretary of the army and
moved for quick action on its recommendations. The report, known
as House Document No. 243, 81st Congress, 1st session (HDoc
243), did call for extensive construction in New Mexico, but also
revealed the complexity of water management in the Southwest.
No less than five federal agencies worked on HDoc 243, along
with the Rio Grande Compact commissioners for New Mexico,
Texas, and Colorado. The Flood Control Act of 1948 had authorized
several projects, the most prominent being Chamita Dam above
Espanola, Jemez Canyon Dam above the town of Bernalillo, and
flood protection for the middle Rio Grande valley. The act also
recommended projects to control the heavy sedimentation of the
river and to upgrade the present irrigation systems to gain efficiency. Federal officials took notice of the memorandum of agreement signed between the interior secretary and the chief of engineers
on 25 July 1947. This statement delineated the areas of responsibility for the corps and reclamation in the Rio Grande basin. The
director of the Bureau of the Budget, Frank Pace, Jr., hailed this
cooperative posture and commented: "It is gratifying to note the
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high degree of coordination.... Both agencies are deserving of
commendation for such an achievement. "16
Despite these words of praise, the budget director also could
not ignore the number of deficiencies in the report. Many of the
agencies involved, including the Park Service, Bureau of Indian
Affairs, the Geological Survey and Soil Conservation Service, had
yet to file their recommendations, and thus the survey of 1949
lacked sufficient data on soil erosion and retention of silt. In addition, Colorado and Texas expressed concern over the amount of
water stored in the basin and the operation of the proposed facilities, while New Mexico worried about meeting its delivery schedule to Texas under the Rio Grande Compact. But of all the aspects
of the Middle Rio Grande Project study, most objectionable was
the flood control dam and reservoir at Cerro Chiflo, north of Questa
on the upper reach of the river.
The Albuquerque district's plans for Chiflo Dam drew the special
attention of Colorado water authorities. Their estimate of the savings the facility offered showed that Chiflo would cost three times
as much to maintain each year ($1.26 million) as it would offer in
flood protection benefits ($384,000). The damsite would be too far
north of Elephant Butte Reservoir to effect sedimentation control
since only 1 percent of the basin's silt flowed past Chiflo. Forty
percent of the floodwaters of the Rio Grande came from the Rio
Chama above Espanola, and the army engineers did not plan to
advance construction on that stream in the near future. To help
cover the costs of building Chiflo Dam, the corps had suggested
placing hydroelectric power works at the site. Colorado, however,
feared that storage of water at Chiflo would endanger similar plans
for the San Luis Valley project, authorized in 1940 and as yet
unfinished. Finally, Colorado was not sure that the Rio Grande
Compact would permit waters to be stored for long periods that
far north .. The damsite had not been thoroughly tested for watertightness, and the seepage into underground wells would drain
away the flow that needed to remain in the channel. 17
Criticisms of Chiflo disturbed Senator Chavez, who had pushed
for its construction by the Albuquerque district. Chavez saw the
project as providing a multipurpose water resources facility for the
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Hispanic farmers of the Taos-Questa region of northern New Mexico and especially as a source of low-cost electricity for an area.
among the poorest in the nation. Still, as negative commentary
built on the subject of Chitlo, this criticism loomed as a threat to
the funding of the entire basin project. To limit the damage, Chavez
sent word to the Albuquerque district that no employees engaged
in drilling core samples at the site were to discuss their work with
the general public. The final version of the 1949 report requested
that Congress remove Chiflo Dam from the overall planning, either
to be replaced by a dam near Jaroso, Colorado, or to be eliminated
altogether. 18
Regardless of his preferences on Chiflo, Dennis Chavez believed
that the entire Middle Rio Grande Project had to be enacted quickly
to spare central New Mexico the devastation of 1941. The opportunity to employ hundreds of workers at salaries comparable to
World War II wages also spurred the senator because the postwar
recession had proven long-lasting for unskilled and semiskilled laborers in New Mexico. Even before the report of the army engineers became public, Chavez called upon the newly seated EightyFirst Congress to enact legislation giving reclamation and the corps
a combined national budget of $53 million for new water projects.
Of this, more than $1.2 million would be needed for starting the
MRGP. 19
Senator Chavez realized that his proposed legislation might confuse many senators not supportive of western water projects and
resorted to a variety of tactics to gain approval for his measure. He
drummed up testimonials from the Santa Fe Railway to prove his
contention that Rio Grande basin flooding disrupted communications and transportation almost every spring. The railroad even
composed a two-page handbill detailing all major floods on the
river since 1874, listing crop and track damage, loss of life, and
costs of repair. Maj. Gen. K. D. Nichols, chief of the Special Weapons Project at Sandia Base in Albuquerque, informed Chavez that
any loss of services would hinder the work of the nuclear missile
program there. Similar commentary came from David Lilienthal,
former director of the TVA and then-chairman of the United States
Atomic Energy Commission. Lilienthal worried about "rail, air and
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road communication for both the Los Alamos and Sandia Laboratories." The railhead at Albuquerque had to be protected so that
shipments of uranium products and nuclear devices met no harm. 20
Encouraged by these letters of support, Chavez called upon
Albuquerque municipal water officials to testify before his committee. John P. Murphy, executive secretary of the Middle Rio
Grande Flood Control Association,· wrote to Chavez offering his
services as a' witness. The chairman responded with recommendations for Murphy's remarks so as to strengthen the case of the
MRGP. "Although the Corps of Engineers will be represented,"
said Chavez, "and will furnish technical data, I believe it would be
very much to your advantage [to] be reasonably well posted on
such several matters pertaining to the physical aspects of the river
and its problems." Committees that held lengthy hearings were
often "much more favorably impressed with clear, concise statements," and Murphy should not read from a prepared text if at all
possible. Chavez needed Murphy's statement to justify another
increase to $3.5 million for the first phase of the MRGP, and he
knew that Murphy would "be questioned somewhat extensively on
almost any aspect of the project. "21
The New Mexico senator's efforts to fund construction of the
MRGP went for naught in 1949. He then prepared new legislation
to increase nationwide water project funding to sixty million dollars,
which included $750,000 for preliminary studies of Jemez Canyon
Dam, north of Bernalillo. Chavez then scheduled hearings of his
Public Works Committee in the state on 9-19 January 1950. The
group would visit Carlsbad and Roswell, observing the work of the
Albuquerque district in the Pecos River basin. Then committee
members would adjourn to Albuquerque, where they would be
confronted with the necessity for the MRGP. 22
.
The session with the Senate committee convinced Chavez, the
corps, and local proponents of the Middle Rio Grande Project that
Jemez Canyon dam offered the best hope of initial construction of
Hood protection works for the Albuquerque area. Its proximity to
the metropolitan center, its large storage capacity, and its price tag
of $7.2 million made it easier to pass through Congress than the
$27 million needed for the defunct Chiflo site or the $28 million
being discussed for Chamita Dam near Espanola. On 4 May 1950,
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the Albuquerque district awarded a contract for construction of an
access road and outlet works, amounting to $236,000. Chavez and
the corps congratulated themselves on their good fortune and could
almost ignore the decrease in the fiscal year 1951 budget for Jemez
Dam from one million dollars to $500,000. The project had begun,
and Congress rarely halted production of a facility once monies had
been expended. 22
As the New Mexico congressional delegation pressed their case
for Jemez Canyon dam in Washington, events far away in East Asia
threatened another round of budget cuts and termination of the
MRGP. In the fall of 1950 President Truman committed U. S. military forces to the growing conflict between North and South Korea.
While this action meant additional authorizations for military construction branches of the Albuquerque district, it also drained away
staff, materials, and funds from the civil works segments engaged
with Jemez Canyon dam. The risks of flooding did not abate, nor
did the rate of sedimentation decrease in the Rio Grande basin.
Yet the war effort led many in Congress to scrutinize more carefully
all nonmilitary portions of the budget. As funds for water projects
shrank, interagency disputes over jurisdiction threatened whatever
public works money Congress did appropriate. In the face of such
conflict and tension, Dennis Chavez fought for any and all funds
he could get for the MRGP.
The prevailing mood of economizing in government in the early
1950s resurrected interagency disputes over water projects that
had lain dormant during the years of rapid growth and increasing
expenditures. The culprit in the eyes of the corps was the Bureau
of Reclamation, whose constituency resided within the seventeen
western states that organization served. While the Albuquerque
district had reached a compromise with reclamation in the Rio
Grande basin, differences of opinion about missions and delivery
of services emerged during the war years. The Albuquerque district
was not alone in this regard, and the crisis prompted Gen. Samuel
D. Sturgis, chief of engineers, to draft a statement of concern about
similar feuding nationwide.
Convinced of the wisdom of the corps's approach to water policy
in the West, and believing that reclamation operated within a more
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narrow framework, Sturgis spoke bluntly about the future relationship between the agencies. "Differences are usually not technical," the chief acknowledged. They stemmed from the "more
nebulous realm of the political or social philosophy of water resource development." Sturgis viewed reclamation's goal as "greater
centralized authority" over western water. In so doing the bureau
moved "with the trend of the time . . . during the Roosevelt and
Truman administrations." To his way of thinking, the corps did not
commit this sin of "empire-building." The army engineers had "followed a fairly consistent course of recognizing local and state rights,"
the chief contended, "of federal participation rather than control;
and of leaving policy making in the hands of Congress. "23
Sturgis then outlined several areas where reclamation appeared
to overreach its legislated authority. These included its desire to
utilize all waters in corps flood control reservoirs for irrigation;
management of their own flood protection facilities; and attempts
to appropriate hydroelectric power from corps projects to sell to
their own customers rather than have the proceeds returned to the
U.S. Treasury. Sturgis listed a number of western river basins
where confict had already surfaced and then highlighted the agreement of 1947 between reclamation and the Albuquerque district.
Giving Rio Grande channel rectification to the bureau, Sturgis
thought, was a "shotgun affair"; a reference to a forced compromise.
Sturgis suspected that New Mexico politicians had wanted to placate reclamation when they knew that the bulk of Rio Grande
projects belonged with the corps. "This is actually our type ofwork,"
the chief concluded, leaving no doubt as to the nature of the corpsreclamation relationship. 24
Frayed nerves all around involving the Middle Rio Grande Project reached their peak when colleagues of Dennis Chavez, and
finally General Sturgis himself, took the senator to task for his
handling of the affair. Senator Guy Cordon, a Republican from
Oregon, disliked Chavez's attempt in 1952 to revive the funding
cuts for the Jemez Canyon dam without the support of the Bur~au
of the Budget. Having sat through a series of witnesses lamenting
Albuquerque's fate without flood protection, Cordon interrupted
the testimony of the corps officials to exclaim: "It seems to me that
[the MRGP] cried aloud for the earliest possible action at the
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earliest possible minute. I cannot understand why work was not
commenced the minute there was authorization. "25
The army engineers in Washington mirrored Cordon's frustration
at the lack of progress in the Rio Grande basin and adopted countermeasures to deflect future criticism. By late 1954 General Sturgis had tired of the inability of Dennis Chavez to deliver local
support for the MRGP. He vented his frustration by labeling the
corps's presentation to the New Mexican senator as the "Chavez
background." Sturgis encouraged his staff when speaking before
Chavez to use maps "in rustic but clear and adequate style" in order
to "save manpower." As for the project itself, Sturgis asked his aides,
"What risks have we accepted in going along with Senator Chavez?"
The chief of engineers doubted that the senator could grasp the
complexity of all the legal, financial, political, and bureaucratic
tangents to the MRGP and told his subordinates no longer to assume "a position of caution and appeasement" with Chavez. 26
This rift between Chavez and Sturgis did not surface in public,
and the effects of their troubled relationship cannot be measured
accurately. In the federal budget for fiscal year 1952, Chavez inserted $900,000 for completion of the outlet works at Jemez Canyon
dam, despite the wish of the House Appropriations Committee for
no monies. The following year identical circumstances obtained,
but Chavez joined with Clinton Anderson to gain $2.1 million for
the bulk of construction. The Albuquerque district began closing
the 136-foot high dam in August 1952 and two months later had
opened the sluice gates for testing. Once completed, the dam
stretched 780 feet across the canyon and contained 120,000 acrefeet of flood and sediment control storage. The fight for Jemez
Canyon dam had ended, leaving interested observers to wonder
at the volume of acrimony and intrigue awaiting later segments of
the Middle Rio Grande Project. 27
The completion in 1953 ofJemez Canyon dam marked a turning
point in the history of the Albuquerque district and the planning
for the middle Rio Grande basin. With its first large flood protection
facility in place, the corps could direct its attention to the challenges
of the remainder of the MRGP:high dams at Chamita and Abiquiu
and a floodway through Albuquerque. Several small items remained for Jemez Canyon dam, not the least being $310,000 worth
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of levee protection for the pueblo of Santa Ana, directly upriver
from the dam. The Santa Ana people had granted easements to the
army engineers in return for protection from the storage of water
at flood stage. When an abnormally high spring runoff in 1958
created the need for nearly 70,000 acre-feet of flood storage behind
the dam, pressure from Albuquerque residents mounted for retention of the pool to provide recreation. H. Cook's sporting goods
store, the only local dealer in motorboats, sold more than one
hundred pleasure craft while the corps held the waters of the Jemez
River in check. But permanent storage would mean damage to
Santa Ana farm and grazing lands as well as violation of the Rio
Grande Compact delivery schedule of excess waters to Elephant
Butte Reservoir. Albuquerque was still without a recreational pool
nearby; a situation that would obtain until completion of Cochiti
Lake by the army engineers in 1973. 28
As the citizens of the middle Rio Grande valley contemplate
their future, they must reflect on those factors of economics and
politics that have merged to create the world in which they live.
Careful analysis of the recent past demonstrates the close relationship between regional growth and federal spending. Reduced government expenditures, more reliance on state and local assumption
of public works projects, and the inevitable expansion of the Albuquerque area are elements in an equation that demand more
attention than heretofore given by native and newcomer alike.
Ironically, the "golden age" of western water projects is ending just
as Albuquerque attracts large numbers of Sunbelt migrants and
strains the limits of its water resources. The expertise, financial
support, and management skills of one partner in past Albuquerque
endeavors, the army engineers, cannot be ignored as the city and
its planners confront these realities and venture down the uncertain
path that awaits the region in the twenty-first century.
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BOOK NOTES
Cowgirls: Women of the American West, An Oral History by Teresa Jordan, was first
published in 1982 and is now available in paper (Anchor Books, Doubleday $10.95). A
pioneering work, it focuses on women in the cattle business and related activities in Colorado, Wyoming, and Montana. Jordan was raised on a ranch in Wyoming and based her
book on selections from more than one hundred interviews (with women who work on
ranches or in rodeos on a regular basis). Thus it is not a book about ranch wives; it is about
owners, ranch hands, and bronc riders. Oral history is interspersed with excerpts from
autobiographies, newspapers, poetry, and songs, and the text is well illustrated. Cowgirls
is readable and interesting and includes such notables as Marie Scott of Ridgeway, Colo.,
and Fern Sawyer of Nogal, N. Mex.
Of related interest is The Last of the Wild Horses (Doubleday, cloth $30.00) with text by
Martin Harbury and photographs by Ron Watts. This book gives worldwide coverage to
. wild horses from places as varied as Mongolia, Australia, Sable Island of Canada, the Camarque region of France, and the American West. There more than one hundred color
photographs, many of which are stunning. This is an attractive coffee table book.
A number of books have recently appeared in the field of Mexican history. Broadest in
coverage is Mexico, volume forty-eight in the World Bibliographical Series by Clio Press
(cloth $35.00). Compiled by Naomi Robbins and edited by Sheila Herstein, its 165 pages
include 640 entries in forty-eight subject categories, including geography, flora and fauna,
prehistory, history, religion, foreign relations, and literature, in addition to a thorough index.
Mexico is intended for general readers and librarians, covers only works in English, and
includes brief annotation.

The Olmecs: The Oldest Civilization in Mexico by Jacques Soustelle (Doubleday, cloth
$17.95) was first published in France in 1979 and is aimed at a general audience. It describes
the rise and disappearance of Olmec civilization, noted for its pyramids, sculptures, wall
paintings, and hieroglyphic writings. Mayan civilization receives attractive coverage in Maya
Ruins of Mexico in Color by William M. Ferguson in collaboration with John Royce (University of Oklahoma Press, paper $16.95). This pictorial gUide includes approximately 200
color plates and accompanying text. Ferguson works in aerial photography and has samples
of such work in this book, but readers should anticipate his forthcoming book with the
University of New Mexico Press that will consist largely of aerial photographs of Anasazi
sites in the Southwest.

Mter many years of work the University of Utah Press and School of American Research
have completed the final volume of the Florentine Codex (cloth $35.00). This is the introductory volume, and includes a preface by Miguel Leon-Portilla and introductions by Arthur
Anderson and Charles Dibble. A number of noted New Mexicans have been involved with
this project over the years. Edgar Hewett wanted Adolph Bandelier to translate Sahagun's
Nahuatl text into English; Lansing Bloom microfilmed the codex in Spanish, and Bertha
Dutton and others of the School of American Research have been associated with this work
in various ways. This particular volume has Sahagun's prologues and interpolations, the
general bibliography, and general indexes. The completion of the Florentine Codex is a
significant accomplishment.
The School of American Research is also responsible for New Light on Chaco Canyon
(School of American Research Press, paper $9.95). Edited by David Grant Noble, this large
format paperback consists of articles by experts such as Robert H. Lister and W. James
Judge, past and present directors ofthe National Park Service Chaco Center at the Universi~y
of New Mexico. The articles are written for general readers and describe current theories
about Chaco Canyon and its people. J. J. Brody deals with art, William Lumpkins with
architecture, William Gillespie with the environment, Robert Powers with the road system,

Polly Schaafsma with rock art, Michael Zeilik with archaeoastronomy, and David Brugge
with the Chaco Navajos, a topic that he has covered more fully in a separate monograph.
Jim Judge sets the stage with his introduction and Bob Lister describes the history of
archaeological research in Chaco Canyon. This heavily illustrated volume is a fine example
of "popular" archaeology and should be required reading for general readers interested in
the subject and particularly for those planning a visit to Chaco Canyon.
Other attractive and heavily illustrated books are Santa Fe: Then and Now (Sunstone
Press, paper $14.95), Akicita: Early Plains and Woodlands Indian Art from the Collection
of Alexander Acevedo (University of New Mexico Press, paper $9.95), and Yazz: Navajo
Painter (Northland Press, paper $17.95). The former is designed to show what Santa Fe
looked like one hundred years ago and utilizes more than eighty historic and modern
photographs. Akicita was first published in 1983 as a catalog for an exhibit of Indian artifacts
at the Southwest Museum. Seventy-eight color photographs effectively illustrate this fine
collection of traditional Indian art. Yazz consists of a biographical sketch of Navajo artist
Beatien Yazz Gimmy Toddy), an evaluation of his art, and autobiographical comments by
the artist as well as some fifty illustrations of his paintings.
In 1947 Joseph Epes Brown recorded the seven sacred rites of the Oglala Sioux, and his
book has been Widely used since that time. In The Gift of the Sacred Pipe (University of
Oklahoma Press, cloth $29.95), Vera Louise Drysdale has condensed the original text and
added illustrations but unfortunately failed to add a bibliography on Oglala religion.
Noted southwestern historian George P. Hammond is author of The Weber Era in Stockton
History (Friends of the Bancroft Library). Charles Weber, a German immigrant, was a
member of the first overland party from Missouri to California in 1841 and founded the city
of Stockton. He was a merchant, rancher, and miner. Hammond effectively describes Weber's life and proVides valuable comments on California during a period of significant change.

Between the Sacred Mountains: Navajo Stories and Lessons from the Land (University
of Arizona Press, cloth $35.00, paper $19.95) was first published in 1982 by the Rock Point
Community School on the Navajo Reservation. This book consists of Navajo comments on
the environment, culture, history, and contemporary issues such as relations with Hopis
and resource use.
The University of New Mexico Press recently published The State Parks of New Mexico
by John Young (cloth $19.95, paper $9.95), a gUidebook to state parks ranging from Bluewater
Lake to Villanueva State Park on the Pecos. This heaVily illustrated volume includes a brief
history of each park and a description of facilities.

Texas Politics: Constraints and Opportunities by Wilbourn E. Benton (Nelson-Hall, cloth
$26.95, paper $13.95) is now in its fifth edition. It is a standard text on Texas politics at the
state, municipal, and county levels.
Western outlaws are the subject of Historical Atlas of the Outlaw West by Richard Patterson Gohnson Books, Boulder, Colo., paper $14.95). This large format volume is well
illustrated and is organized by states, localities, and communities. The text describes activities of outlaws in and around each town. Eleven pages are devoted to New Mexico. A
bibliography and index accompany the text.
Two recent publications focus on specific areas in New Mexico. Time of Trouble, Time of
Triumph by John D. McKee (First Presbyterian Church, Socorro, paper $13.50) is a centennial history of the First Presbyterian Church of Socorro. Using church records, newspapers, and published materials, McKee relates the history of the church to that of the
community. You Take the Sundials and Give Me the Sun by David Townsend (Alamogordo
Daily News) consists of twenty-two short historical sketches about the Tularosa Basin. Subjects range from Mescalero Apache history to Oliver Lee, Albert B. Fall, John Prather, and
the atomic bomb. Each item appeared as an article in the Alamogordo Daily News.

Book Reviews
THE DAY THE SUN ROSE TWICE. By Ferenc Morton Szasz. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984. Pp. xi, 224. Preface, notes, index. $15.95.
BEGINNING IN 1943 there arrived in New Mexico some of the world's most distinguished scientists bringing with them and developing soon thereafter some of
the world's most sophisticated technology. More than two billion dollars were
spent under wartime exigencies and urgencies to develop and test the world's
first atom bomb, which was detonated because of political pressures at 5:30 A. M.,
Mountain War Time on the morning of 16 July 1945 on a stretch of semidesert
land in the south central part of the Land of Enchantment. New Mexico, and the
world as well, would never be the same again. Advanced technology and modern
science were forcefully imposed on an area not far removed from a frontier mining
and grazing economy.
In this fast-paced, well-written, deeply researched monograph, which reads
like a gripping adventure tale, Ferenc Morton· Szaz presents the story of the
Trinity site nuclear explosion. In nine succinct chapters he acquaints the reader
with the scientific knowledge necessary to comprehend what the physicists, engineers, physicians, meteorologists, and others were doing in Los Alamos and at
the Trin.ity site. He examines their activities within the framework of wartime
concerns and local conditions, including the question of weather. Individuals
frantically working at the edges of scientific knowledge, fearful that the outcome
of the war depended on their efforts, developed a momentum that, taxing their
energies to' the utmost, brought their combined, cooperative efforts to a successful
conclusion.
Szasz examines these themes and the aftermath, as well as the legacy of the
explosion, in part by focusing on individuals, utilizing in several instances recently
declassified manuscript sources, and by relating developments in New Mexico to
broader concerns affecting the course of the war and the direction of the postwar
world. Particularly interesting is his discussion of the historiography that has
flourished concerning the validity of exploding atom bombs over Japanese cities
and the questions pertaining to President Truman's decision. Szasz carefully examines the reasons offered, both pro and con, for using the bomb and offers a
meaningful alternative analysis within the context of the conditions under which
Los Alamos and other scientists worked to develop the weapon. This debate has
extended far beyond the range of academic discussion involving historians, scientists, and theologians. It is now a public issue and shows little sign of disappearing.
Certainly the Trinity explosion launched a new era, which Szasz notes in his
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introduction and spells out in his chapters. Everything about the project marked
a "first" that changed the world in which we and our posterity will live out our
lives. Among the most important issues first raised were the still unanswered
questions of whether nuclear explosions might generate enough heat to ignite the
atmosphere and tum the planet into another star. By producing the world's initial
experience with airborne radioactive fallout, Trinity raised questions that have
yet to be resolved.
What occurred on a mid-summer day in 1945 in a remote area of a picturesque
and equally remote American state changed the course of history and offers the
distinct possibility that the biblical account of Armageddon can be translated into
reality. Certainly the events of that day make a mockery ofT. S. Eliot's prophecy
in "The Hollow Men" of "This is the way the world ends, not with a bang but a
whimper."
Szasz's impressive study should attract a wide audience, and when it appears
in paperback, it most assuredly will.

Iowa State University

RICHARD LOWITT

JAMES C. MALIN, HISTORY AND ECOLOGY: STUDIES OF THE GRASSLAND. Edited
by Robert P. Swierenga. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984. Pp. xxix,
376. Selected bibliog., references, index. $13.95 paper.
JAMES C. MALIN WAS ONE OF AMERICA'S most original historians. A quiet, retiring
scholar who taught at the University of Kansas from 1921 to 1963, Malin was not
nearly so well known as Walter P. Webb, Edward Everett Dale, and a number
of other contemporaries who studied and wrote in the field of western history.
His writings did not gain as much attention as they deserved during his lifetime
because he published some of his. most important books himself, and because
they were rather ponderously written. One had really to want to know ~hat Malin
had to say to plow through some of his works.
Malin wrote eighteen books and monographs and nearly 100 articles. These
covered a fairly wide range of topics, varying from a general history of The United
States after the World War (1930) to his difficult and highly interpretative, The
Grassland of North America: Prolegomena to Its History (1947). His reputation
rests mainly on his grassland studies in which he integrated history and ecology.
According to Malin, it was man more than environment that determined the
course of human events, but man, he argued, must fit into the natural environment.
In bringing together a large sample of Mali\l's writings, Robert P. Swierenga
has edited a highly important book. He begins with a most insightful and stimulating essay on "Malin's Ecological Interpretation of the Grassland," which is the
best summary available on Malin's thought and its effect on later writers. For
those who have struggled through Malin's grassland studies, Swierenga's interpretative summary is most welcome.
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The book is divided into four parts. Part I includes some of Malin's best interpretative writing on the grassland. A second section deals with case studies of
those who adjusted to the grassland, an aspect of Malin's writing that towered
above that of most of his contemporaries. Part III provides examples of Malin's
writings that deal primarily with farm population and agricultural development
in Kansas. In this section the reader is treated to some of Malin's statistical
methodology. The final section is a selected bibliography of Malin's principal
writings.
Professor Swierenga has chosen well from the writings ofJames C. Malin, works
that should be more readily available and more widely read. The editor introduces
each selection with a perceptive discussion of the reading to follow. Both Professor
Swierenga and the University of Nebraska Press are to be congratulated for this
outstanding publication. It will be of use to historians, economists, environmentalists, and others.

University of Georgia

GILBERT C. FITE

VOICES FROM THE OIL FIELDS. Edited by Paul F. Lambert and Kenny A. Franks.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984. Pp. xii, 257. IlIus., index. $19.95.
DURING THE LATE 19305, Ned DeWitt, Welborn Hope, and other employees of
the Federal Writers' Project recorded and transcribed scores of interviews with
oil field workers in Oklahoma. In twenty short chapters, organized by job specialties for the most part, Paul F. Lambert and Kenny A. Franks present the best
of this material, along with brief introductions, succinct explanations of technical
terms, and about forty well-chosen photographs.
The result is a lively and significant book, which contains highly speci,fic descriptions ofjob skills and procedures common to all parts of the oil patch between
1900 and 1935. Most 'of this work was taxing and occasionally dangerous. For
example, shooters, who made and worked with nitroglycerine, rarely survived
their first accident or mistake. Rig builders, roughnecks; and casing pullers ran
the risk of injury or death from falling objects, hydrogen sulfide, and explosions;
Those who survived were often worn out by age forty: tank builders were ruptured
and had varicose veins, while roughnecks added back injuries and missing fingers
to the toll heavy work exacted.
Through most of Voices, the interviewees expound their experiences and opinions, offering vivid expressions of attitudes and life styles. Hard work was man's
work: "You've got to have muscle when you're roughnecking" (p. 76). Work was
intermittent; even when steady work was available, hands took offto spend their
wages when a job was done: "the dice caught a lot of what I did make anyway"
(p. 67). Men who worked together drank together, and real men could hold their
liquor: "Beer don't make you drunk 'less you've got a big imagination or you're
nervous to start with" (p. 103). Such material provides interesting reading for the
general reader and useful examples for social and business historians.
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The scholarly value of the interview material, however, is sometimes impaired
by several weaknesses. Without an explanation of the editorial procedures of the
interviewers, oral historians may be at a loss to identify an authentic text. The
absence of the normally abundant swear words, for example, suggests heavy and
consistent editing, and the highly regular sentence structure seems inauthentic.
One chapter, "Oil Mixes Right Handy with the Lord," begins with several pages
of narrative, much like a short story. Although Lambert and Franks provide a
brief description of their editorial procedures, the practices of DeWitt, et al. are
obscure.
A further problem occurs because Lambert and Franks tend to include tall tales
without warning to the reader. For example, Jake Simms, who worked for either
the I. R. S. (p. 157) or the F. B. I. (p. 158), or possibly for both, tells offorty-seven
killings in one night in front of the Palace Dance Hall in Chancre Flats, near
Seminole. In addition, the editors, themselves, claim that as many as 100,000
boomers flocked to Seminole County "within a few months" of the opening of the
Greater Seminole Field in 1927.
The most serious shortcoming of Voices, however, is inherent in the original
material: the interviewers focused their work too narrowly on working men. The
only women considered are a prostitute and an apparently psychotic widowhardly representative of the large numbers of women and children who lived and
worked in the oil fields. As a result the book offers a partial but somewhat distorted
view of life in the oil fields of Oklahoma.
Even with these limitations, Voices is often compellingly interesting, and it
provides useful insights into the life, work, and society of men in the oilfields
before World War II.

University of Texas-Permian Basin

ROGER M. OLIEN

WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT. Edited by Terry L. Anderson. San Francisco: Pacific Institute for
Public Policy Research; Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1983.
Pp. xxiii, 348. Illus., bibliog., index. $35.00.
THIS VOLUME IS ONE OF A SERIES of Pacific Studies in Public Policy designed to
engender, through research and commentary, new departures in public policy.
More particularly, this work seeks to apply the "New Resources Economics" panacea of the free market to solving the present water crisis facing the nation,
especially the West. The crisis derives from a combination of factors including a
taxpayers' revolt against funding monumental and conveyance systems, rising
energy costs, increasing environmental sensitivity to projects' impact on riverine
ecosystems and instream flow. At issue is the ultimate depletion of surface and
ground water sources. The economists who have authored this collection ofarticles
are sanguine in their belief that the time has come to put into practice an allembracing water rights transfer system, whereby cheap water can be purchased
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for higher value purposes in the marketplace. Privatization is to replace or to
supplement the publicization of water institutions, allegedly a failed system in
place since the turn of the century. Originally, the system was dominant in providing cheap water for agriculture and for operating according to the so-called
principle of "distributive politics." These contributors are not lacking in the ideological fervor with which they denigrate the rent-seeking bureaucrats and constituents of the Reclamation Bureau and Army Corps of Engineers projects, state
water agencies, and local water districts. The market approach for allocation of
water seems especially apropos to the capacity of the urban and industrial sector
to pay high prices for scarce water supplies. Current studies have demonstrated
the elasticity of water pricing. Consequently, the time is ripe to utilize the free
market mechanism to its maximum extent in order to achieve conservation of this
scarce resource, as well as put in place a more rational system of allocation.
The articles agree that former conditions justifying public sector water resource
functions are no longer significant. These included exorbitant capital start-up
demands, the potential for monopoly and speculative exploitation by private enterprise, and the variable nature of water supply. They minimize the obstacles
that must be surmounted in applying the free market, mechanism to the allocation
of both surface and ground water resources, as well as in such arcane fields as
providing essential instream flow and pollution rights. The authors are primarily
interested in demolishing the institutional structure that prevents water rights
from becoming articles of private property freely negotiable for sale or lease so
owners can capitalize on higher value markets.
This reviewer found the Rucker and Fishback study most insightful. It traced
the combined rent seeking maneuvers of Bureau of Reclamation bureaucrats and
land owners as they exploited the tax free and excess land provisions of the law
to their advantage. The best example of institutional change to permit a water
rights market is found in the New Mexico statute, where the state engineer's
authority facilitates the exchange of water rights. Even here, the Ginser and
Johnson study points out the resistance that a local water district offered, motivated
by its survival needs.
Overall, the substantial contribution of this book is to present an alternative
system of water distribution that will be more efficient, truly cost effective, and
conserving ofwater resources. Each study presents a model ofan improved system
based on market forces and econometric analysis. These reformers wish to revamp
the public sector's institutional dominance with its rigid adherence to riparian
rights, appropriative water rights held by water districts or state and federal
agencies, and block market forces that could deploy water rights to their highest
value. Overlooked are the consequences of such a drastic overturning of present
systems. Questions arise, however. What bodies in the private sector will be
responsible for constructing the infrastructure for storing and conveying water to
new high-priced customers? What happens to bypassed agricultural districts? The
Owens Valley-Los Angeles story is an example. Finally, what public agencies will
administer the water rights market? Will the much-abused water districts persist
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in this guise? Certainly this new dispensation will have to be introduced in each
state on a gradual basis.

San Jose, Calif.

LAWRENCE B. LEE

THE LAND BEFORE HER: FANTASY AND EXPERIENCE OF THE AMERICAN FRONTIERS,
1630-1860. By Annette Kolodny. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1984. Pp. xv, 293. Illus., bibliog., index. $28.00 cloth, $9.95 paper.
OBVIOUSLY, ANNETTE KOLODNY HAS FOUND HER LIFEWORK. This book is the
second of a projected trilogy on her chosen topic, the historical relationship
between (white) women and the land in American literature. Kolodny's first book,
The Lay of the Land, analyzed the attitudes of European males toward the American land in the colonial period. Using the tools of feminist scholarship, Kolodny
found that women and the land were equated and that men sought domination
of a blatantly psychosexual nature over this female landscape. The Lay of the
Land was a significant contribution to American literary criticism.
This second, eagerly awaited volume, The Land Before Her, brilliantly extends
the insights of the first book. Now we see the land as it appeared in the literary
imagination of American women of the colonial period and the early nineteenth
century. The female sense of the land, Kolodny argues, has been fundamentally
different from the male version. She traces the process by which American women
came to terms with the land, beginning with frightened and deeply alienated first
encounters and culminating in the high tide of midwest settlement as women
confidently imagined the transformation of the land into a cultivated landscape.
No violent "taking" of the land occurs here, no heroism. Instead there is the
mundane (albeit mysteriously moral) creation of a kitchen garden.
Kolodny derives her thesis from an impressive range of sources, the best known
ofwhich are captivity narratives (real and fictional) and popular nineteenth-century
women's novels. Underpinning that research is Kolodny's extensive reading in
women's nontraditional literature, in particular, diaries and letters. From these
varied sources, Kolodny builds her case for a peaceful, domestic, modest female
perspective on the land. In the process, she very quietly and without fuss reveals
the male bias of previous considerations of the frontier myth.
Some people have expressed disappointment that Kolodny's research has revealed such an unadventurous, prosaic female view of the land. This search for
female heroes is surely misplaced. The strength of Kolodny's argument rests on
the fact that the female version is so different from the male. The extent of the
difference makes essential a reconsideration of the frontier myth.
In her concluding chapter, Kolodny offers a tantalizing preview of a new female
approach that combines the domestic and the adventurous, which she will explore
in her third volume, a study of women's responses to the trans- Mississippi West.
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In the meantime, read The Land Before Her. It is a brilliant, engrossing, important
study.

Washington State University

SUE ARMITAGE

MORMON ENIGMA: EMMA HALE SMITH. By Linda King Newell and Valeen Tippets
Avery. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc. Pp. xiii, 386. IIlus.,
notes, tables, index. $19.95.
EMMA SMITH, WIFE OF THE MORMON PROPHET Joseph Smith, has too long been
caught between two extreme, conflicting interpretations. She is either the noble,
patient, near-perfect Emma, constantly protecting the image of her maligned
husband, or she is the once "elect" lady who was the ideal wife of a prophet but
who betrayed her religion and demonstrated her corruption by not folloWing
Brigham Young to the West, by marrying a nonbeliever, and by supporting the
Reorganization headed by her son, Joseph Smith III. Mormon Enigma rescues
her by creating the image of a woman who was not just "an appendage and
helpmeet to prominent men," but also "a capable, articulate, and influential individual in her own right who profoundly affected the development of the religious
movements with which she was associated." The authors' solid research makes a
convincing case, and their book is a highly important contribution to the fastgrowing body of scholarly Mormon studies.
From the time Emma eloped with Joseph in 1827, the reader is touched with
vivid accounts of hardship and struggle in connection with all the highlights of
their next seventeen and a half years together. Throughout Emma is protrayed
as a loving, caring, and supporting wife in everything except the matter of polygamy. Three years after Joseph's brutal murder she married Lewis Bidaman,
with whom she lived in the Nauvoo Mansion House until her death in 1879.
The overriding issue in the book, however, is plural marriage. Joseph received
a revelation authorizing the practice as early as 1831, but at first kept it hidden
from Emma as well as most church members. When he finally broached the
subject to Emma, she rejected the idea, and as he continued to press polygamy,
this became the major point of stress in their otherwise seemingly ideal relationship. She even used the Women's Relief Society, over which she presided, as a
tool to fight polygamy. When she finally consented to the idea, she claimed the
right to choose Joseph's plural wives, wrongly assuming that he had not yet taken
any. She chose four young women, all of whom were living with the Smith family,
but little did she realize that Joseph already had several plural wives and that
two of her choices, Eliza and Emily Partridge, were among them.
Almost immediately Emma began again to deny the validity of the plural marriage doctrine, eventually claiming that it was begun by Brigham Young. Her
greatest aim after Joseph died seemed to be to protect her sons from the stigma
of believing that their father had ever taught or practiced it, and just shortly
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before her death she firmly denied the practice again. The denials are puzzling,
given the general integrity ascribed to her, and are never satisfactorily explained.
Emma Smith was remarkable in her patience and compassion. After all her
pain over polygamy, she even forgave her second husband when he was unfaithful
to her and sired a son, Charles, by the young widow Nancy Abercrombe. What's
more, in 1868, when Charles was four years old and his mother was having serious
financial problems, Emma took him into her home and raised him as her own,
and later she hired Nancy to work for her. Just before Emma died, she called
Nancy and Lewis to her bedside and asked them to marry so the boy would have
proper parentage. "An extraordinary act of compassion," the authors call it, and
so it was.
As important as Morman Enigma is to Mormon historiography, it is not without
its flaws, particularly its lack of balance. For one thing, only about sixty pages
are devoted to the last thirty-two years of Emma's life, after she married Bidamon,
and about half of that is given to the activities of her sons. More importantly, the
heavy emphasis on a single issue, polygamy, leaves the treatment of the political
and economic issues surrounding Joseph and the resulting controversy in Nauvoo
wanting. Finally, and most important, the authors do a disservice to Joseph and
Emma in the general image they leave of Joseph. In spite of a few efforts to build
him up, they create in the minds of their readers a weak, deceptive Mormon
prophet. Undoubtedly, he had human Jaults and failings, but he was also a man
of warmth and compassion who attracted thousands of loyal disciples who followed
and trusted him. The authors easily could have provided a more balanced, believable interpretation, but the reader is left wondering why the strong-willed,
moral, and deeply religious woman they create could contine to love and show
loyalty to the kind of man who emerges here. If there is any enigma in the book,
that is it.

Brigham Young University

JAMES B. ALLEN

MABEL DODGE LUHAN: NEW WOMAN, NEW WORLDS. By Lois Palken Rudnick.
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984. Pp. xvi, 384. lIlus., index.
$19.95.
MABEL DODGE LUHAN (1879-1962) PURSUED her own soul relentlessly, even
frenetically. She was a woman of immense ego, consumed by the need to "find
herself" in relation to the universe. For many years she assumed that her major
role was to encourage and inspire creativity in those of genius. The place in which
she finally "found herself" was Taos, New Mexico. This book is almost as much
about Taos as it is about Luhan.
While always self-engrossed, Luhan was also aware of important issues in her
world. She appears to have known almost everybody of importance in America
(and often in Europe), particularly in the creative arts. She knew social reformers
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as well, and in her young days was involved with the "lyrical left," or Greenwich
Village radicals.
Lois Palken Rudnick has portrayed Mabel Luhan's life with infinite detail.
Reading this book, one is no longer apt to think patronizingly of Luhan as the
eccentric dilettante or the amateur author who wrote because her psychiatrist
told her she needed something to do. Rudnick has recorded the many relationships
Luhan miiintained with important people of the day, several of whom she introduced to the American public. The number of writers who used Luhan as a
prototype for their works is by itself an astounding list: these included Carl Van
Vechten, D. H. Lawrence, Frieda Lawrence, Jacques-Emile Blanche, Max Eastman, Myron Brinig, N. B. Hapgood, and Witter Bynner.
Rudnick's well-researched work depicts the world in which Luhan grew up,
the rebellious daughter of a wealthy Buffalo banking family during the late Victorian period. As a young widow, she was sent to Europe to recover from her loss
(and to quell a scandal involving her and a local doctor). She married Edwin
Dodge and established an exquisite villa in Florence, Italy, attracting such guests
as Gertrude Stein, whose talents she recognized long before the general public
did. Tiring of the "artificiality" of Europe, Mabel, with her son and husband,
moved back to New York. Determined to be the "new woman" of the period, she
became sexually and intellectually involved with members of the radical movement. Shedding her second husband, she married Maurice Sterne, an artist. It
was he who first persuaded her to come out to New Mexico; here, he was sure,
she would be able to find release from her tortured search for fulfillment.
Taos was Mabel's spiritual resting place; she seems to have experienced at last
the epiphanies that helped in her personal odyssey. The most important influence
was the Taos Pueblo Indian Tony Luhan, who became her fourth husband; they
were married for more than forty years. He introduced her to the ways of life in
the Taos pueblo, where she found in the religious customs and ceremonies something that satisfied her. She also found Taos to be a place ofbeauty and inspiration,
which she energetically insisted on sharing with acquaintances for the rest of her
life. The most notable was D. H. Lawrence, her greatest prize, but she was
hostess to many other famous figures as well.
Rudnick has conveyed the beauty of the Taos landscape that exemplifies the
power of the Southwest to inspire creative people. She has also given a detailed
picture of other places and times important to Mabel Dodge Luhan.
The flaws are relatively minor. Because Rudnickrecords Luhan's life according
to the major figure important to her at the time, there is inevitable chronological
overlapping. While the author gives a plethora of detail on some phases of the
subject's life, she is rather reticent about Mabel's relationships with husbands
two and three and mentions her son only briefly. The lack of information about
these vital and close ties may contribute to the reader's difficulty in sympathizing
with Luhan's long search for her place in the world. On the other hand; this may
be due to the subject herself; someone with such a monumental ego, such consistent narcissism, and such wealth may evoke fascination, rather than sympathy.
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Mabel Dodge Luhan: New Woman, New World is a fine biography. It is also
worth reading for anyone interested in the state of American society in the first
half of this century, in the history of the arts in America, orin the development
of Taos as a cultural center.
Copiously supplied with excellent photographs, the book also includes a complete and useful index.
Kearney State College

HELEN WINTER STAUFFER

MISSIONARIES, OUTLAWS, AND INDIANS: TAYLOR F. EALY AT LINCOLN AND ZUNI,
1878-1881. Edited and annotated by Norman J. Bender. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984. Pp. xxi, 234. lIlus., bibliog., notes, index.
$17.50 cloth, $9.95 paper.
EDITOR AND ANNOTATOR NORMAN J. BENDER INDICATES in the preface that this
book recounts the confrontation between the eastern Anglo-Saxon value system
of Taylor and Mary Ealy and those sets of values operating in two frontier cultures
of territorial New Mexico. Specifically, Ealy was a medical missionary for the
Presbyterian Church who had the misfortune to find himself in Lincoln, New
Mexico, at the height of the Lincoln County War and in the Zuni Pueblo at a
time of particular sensitivity to external threats to Indian culture. Clearly, the
Ealys did not prevail, for hostility drove them from Lincoln and futility from
Zuni. The Ealys did, however, leave their mark not so much on Lincoln or Zuni
but on students of New Mexico history, for their records of their experiences
presented in this work provide unique and insightful pictures of two special
conditions in New Mexico's past.
Professor Bender builds on the earlier efforts of Maurice Fulton and Robert
Mullin and uses various sources to allow the Ealys to record their impressions.
These sources include Taylor Ealy's diary, extant in the Lawrence Ealy Collection
at the University of Arizona; the transcriptions of Ealys' daughter Ruth from her
parents' diaries and correspondence, which she published in a book, Water In a
Thirsty Land; letters in the Sheldon Jackson Collection in the Presbyterian Historical Collection in Philadelphia; and letters from Taylor Ealy to U. S. Indian
Agent Ben Thomas in the National Archives.
These accounts reflect few if any successes, and Bender may have correctly
subtitled this book, "Three Years of Fear and Frustration on the Frontier." The
arrival of the Ealys in Lincoln could have not been more untimely, for it coincided
with the murder of John Tunstall, which ushered in a period of violence that they
witnessed from behind various "barricades" for si~ months of 1878. From Lincoln
they were soon sent to Zuni where they were unexpected, unprepared for, and
generally unwelcome. Continued difficulty in providing reasonable accommodations for the family and the school, persistent conflict with the Indian Agent, lack
of response from the Zuni populace, and finally the death of their first son all
contributed to their decision to return to Pennsylvania.
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Professor Bender does an outstanding job, especially in editing the materials.
He provides extensive and accurate background that puts the Ealy observations
in an historical context sufficient for those readers not especially familiar with the
time or places. Every name or reference, however peripheral, is given extensive
consideration in explanatory endnotes. A very thorough bibliography that includes
references to holdings of the Presbyterian Church furnishes adequate sources for
further work on Presbyt~rian missionary activities on the western frontier. Bender's interpretive efforts to tie the experiences of the Ealys to the cultural winning
of. the West are interesting; however, it is questionable whether the Ealys, especially after reaching Lincoln, saw themselves in that role. Taylor Ealy probably
better typifies the young, innovative, American entrepreneur in his development
of the T. F. Ealy Baby Powder Company than the rearguard agent of Manifest
Destiny. Mere presence in the Southwest during the period did not make the
Ealys a civilizing force. It did, however, make them witnesses, and in this capacity
they rendered a valuable service to New Mexicans. Professor Bender not only
makes the testimony of the Ealys available but, through careful editing, more
meaningful. Students of history and professional historians should profit both from
the substantive content and editorial craftsmanship.

New Mexico Military Institute

WILLIAM E. GIBBS

THE INDIAN MAN: A BIOGRAPHY OF JAMES MOONEY. By L. G. Moses. Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1984. Pp. xvii, 293. lIlus., bibliog., index. $24.95.
THIS IS THE FIRST BIOGRAPHY of a distinguished scholar who made major contributions to American Indian ethnology. Because of his lack of formal training and
a university affiliation, James Mooney's contributions have not received the attention his biographer feels they merit. Moses' exhaustive research and felicitous
writing should remedy that. This is a biography that not only firmly establishes
the scholarly reputation of Mooney, but by placing him in the context of his times,
tells a great deal about the history of the discipline of anthropology.
Best known for his work on the Ghost Dance, Mooney published that classic
only a decade after joining the staff of the Bureau of Ethnology. In his thirty-six
years with the bureau he made significant contributions in other areas, including
Plains Indian heraldry, North American Indian demography, Cherokee myths,
Kiowa calendar history, and the peyote religion.
A man of principle, Mooney's championing of the right of Native Americans to
practice their peyote rituals finally caused him to be barred from reservations by
the order of the commissioner of Indian affairs. To the firm believer in field work
that Mooney was, this exclusion was a disaster, although his deteriorating health
had made further extended field trips unlikely in any eventuality.
As a field worker, Mooney combined an ingratiating personality with intellectual
curiosity and the persistence necessary to get the job done. He was also prompt
to take advantage of new technology, making good use of a camera and experi-
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menting with the Edison Graphaphone, a forerunner of today's ubiquitous tape
recorder.
Unfortunately, Mooney in his prime had difficulty finishing projects, and in his
last years his energy level was quite low. As a result he left behind large quantities
of undigested field notes. These, because of his poor penmanship and the absence
of disciples that he would have had with a university connection, have been
unexploited, and ethnology is the poorer for that fact.
Moses manages to remain objective in his evaluation of a man whose admirable
qualities might have seduced a less able biographer. The author makes no effort
to conceal Mooney's early acceptance of assimilation as the only answer for the
Indian, not an acceptable view these days. Like many contemporary friends of
the Indian, Mooney believed that most Native Americans would lose out in the
struggle for survival. Nevertheless, in time he would move toward a belief in
cultural pluralism, today's conventional wisdom. As Mooney made this transition,
he found himself increasingly at odds with missionaries and such vocal champions
of complete assimilation as Richard H. Pratt. His critics would first charge him
unfairly with staging a Sun Dance that he might document portions of it on film,
and later belabor him for helping legitimize the Native American Church and its
controversial use of peyote.
All of this is presented with a wealth of detail, relieved by a lively style. This
reviewer found particularly pleasing such descriptions as the one of the roughhewn John H. Seger who, "in the polite company of missionaries and teachers,
swam about like a porcupine among swans" (p. ISO).
This biography should stand the test of time.

State University of New York Col)ege, Fredonia

WILLIAM T. HAGAN

FLORENTINE CODEX: GENERAL HISTORY OF THINGS OF NEW SPAIN. BOOK 2, THE
CEREMONIES. Second edition, revised. Fray Bernardino de Sahagun. Trans. by
Arthur J. O. Anderson and Charles E. Dibble. Santa Fe: School of American
Research; Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1981. Pp. 247. Illus., notes,
appendix. $40.00.
CODEX EN CRUZ. By Charles E. Dibble. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press,
1981. Vol. I. Pp. 63. Illus., indexes, bibliog.
CODEX EN CRUZ. ATLAS. By Charles E. Dibble. Salt Lake City: University of
Utah Press, 1981. Vol. 2. Pp. 57. Illus. Vols. 1 and 2, $45.00
TWELVE VOLUMES COMPRISE the Florentine Codex, of which Ceremonies is perhaps the most significant. As a study of the vital center of Aztec life, culture, and
religion, this volume serves an especially valuable purpose. It is also a highly
significant document that reveals the process and relationship of oral tradition.
The document is based on pictorial codices and the scholastic system of knowledge
and learning -that came from the calmecac centers of pre-Columbian Mexico.
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The development of what would become the Florentine Codex, over the period
1547-77, involved intensive periods of collaboration between the Franciscan fathers and a wide range of Aztec elders. Sahagun, a Franciscan father, was devoted
to more effective proselytization of the Aztecs through a missionary program based
on comprehension and use of language and a clear understanding of the customs
and institutions of Mexico's native people. This project became known as the
Historia de las Cosas de Nueva Espana. That effort, lasting nearly sixty years,
revolved around the gathering of data, organization, and many editings of the
Historia manuscript. Sahagun's techniques were modern by contemporary ethnographic field-study procedures. Carefully worded questionnaires were employed to elicit specific, yet varied, information on the society and its institutional
system. The knowledge of such individuals was codex-based, ideally suited to
compilation of the types of information Sahagun needed, Ceremonies represents
an example of the correlation of pictorial codex and verbal exposition that characterized the pre-Columbian systems of recording and transmitting ritual, historical, genealogical, and other knowledge.
Ceremonies is also a description of the Aztec ceremonial calendar (tonalpohualli). Like others of the ritual codex genre, it provides a detailed description
and account of all facets of the ceremonial system of ancient Mexico. Described
are gods of each of the major months and the five "left over" days-Nemontemi.
The Atamaluahliztli, a major feast celebrated every eight years, is depicted as
well as examples of ritual scenes. An appendix contains extensive descriptions of
the priests and their many services that were necessary to maintain the intensive
pantheon of Aztec gods. Excellent accounts are given of the size, location, and
activity that took place in nearly eighty temples, shri~es, and other important
sites. The final entry of the appendix includes perhaps the most eloquent passages
of material found in the volume. These entries are the oaths and songs offered to
the major gods.
Revision of Ceremonies occurred in two ways: (1) .extensive review and retranslation of all text, resulting in longer passages, often repetitive, but obviously closer
to the original Nahuatl. The result is a greater sense of drama in the ritual scene.
An intensity is conveyed by the repeated phrases that transmit the oral traditions'
special detail to personal emotion while describing the high detail of the ceremony.
(2) All passages on the songs were changed by translating the Nahuatl as verses
rather than the simple paragraphs of the earlier edition (p. 221 ff.). The authors
are to be commended for this change. The verse form more accurately conveys
the ceremonial rhythm, and with the metric sounds, which appear to be notations
for musical instrument or vocal accompaniment, one is able to appreciate the full
significance of the ritual drama. The overall effect is dramatic and greatly enhances
the value of these materials.
Codex en Cruz is a pictorial manuscript depicting native life in the Valley of
Mexico, particularly Texcoco. The final manuscript consists of three pages divided
into quarters, each extending from a center point in a windmill arrangement.
Each arm chronicles, in native pictorial style, a history of fifty-two years, the
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Aztec "century" for the region. The codex reports annual events from 1402 through
1533. Depicted are extensive accounts of political and kinship ties involving Texcoco and its dependent centers of Chiautla and Tepetlaoztoc. Relationships of
these municipalities with the great Aztec capital, Tenochtitlan, also appear in the
accounts. Throughout, important incidents of war, famine, and other events are
recorded for respective rulers and regions.
The appearance of these works enriches the growing collection of primary
documentation, albeit in facsimile, and extensive studies on the historiography
of this virtually untapped corpus of information on Mesoamerican civilization.
After three decades of deliberate dedication, the publication of these works also
provides a fiUing tribute to the lifetime work of Professors Dibble and Anderson.
As the decanos of the Nahuatlistas, their scholarship and contributions and that
of others in native literature and philosophy are indeed a legacy of which all who
undertake the study and analysis of culture and history can be proud.

Institute of American Indian Arts

DAVE WARREN

EXPLORATIONS IN ETHNOHISTORY: INDIANS OF CENTRAL MEXICO IN THE SIXTEENTH
CENTURY. Edited by H. R. Harvey and Hanns J. Premo Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984. Pp. vii, 312. Illus., contributors. $35.00.
THIS COLLECTION OF ESSAYS PROVIDES a valuable sampler of current trends in
ethnohistorical study of the native cultures and societies of central Mexico. Although about one-half of the essays deal with colonial Mexico, a major focus is
on the effort to reconstruct the social organization of Aztec Mexico, its class
structure, land tenure systems, and other similar issues. In their useful introduction, H. R. Harvey and Hanns J. Prem trace the evolution of Mexican ethnohistory from the sixteenth century to the present. Since World War II there has
been anotable increase in interest and publications in ethnohistory, accompanied
by a shift in emphasis regarding source materials, from the classic Spanish accounts
to Indian pictorial and textual documents, a growing concentration on local level
materials, and the use of a wide variety of interdisciplinary methods and techniques.
Woodrow Borah's stimulating essay deals with problems confronted by ethnohistorians in working with source materials. Especially interesting are his comments on the "puzzling discrepancy" between Spanish and Indian accounts regarding
Aztec social organization. This discrepancy has led some scholars to question the
reliability of the most important of the traditional Spanish sources, Alonso de
Zorita's famous Relaci6n. Properly dismissing the notion that Spanish students
like Zorita knew little about Aztec society or that they exaggerated or were simply
wrong, Borah suggests other more convincing explanations: (1) there were "marked
regional differences that have yet to be explored," and (2) "the conquest, by
changing the balance of power and pressures, brought rapid change even in the
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earliest years," with the result that the situation portrayed in the Indian records
was very different from that which existed on the eve of the conquest.
Equally instructive is H. R. Harvey's careful survey of past and current research
on land tenure in ancient Mexico. Like Borah, Harvey rejects the attitude of
scholars who discount the value of early Spanish account~, especially that ofZorita,
because of discrepancies between those accounts and later Indian and Spanish
documents dealing with land litigation, bills ofsale, and other issues. He concludes
that the early accounts "provide a general outline of a system that is not incompatible with what can be seen in actual practice from local documents." He adds,
however, that "what seems to emerge from individual case studies ... is that the
land tenure system varied with locality or region and, in any case, was more
flexible than a literal interpretation ofZorita and some other general descriptions
seem to allow."
Pedro Carrasco's essay on the various types of marriage among ruling dynasties
in ancient central Mexico clearly demonstrates that, whatever may have been the
situation among commoners, those marriages were determined not by prescriptive
marriage rules defined by kinship categories but by political relations and successionrules of the ruling houses. James A. Offner's study of household organization
in the Texcocan heartland concludes that traditional descriptions of Aztec household organization, inheritance, and land tenure "are clearly inadequate and must
be supplemented by the study of archival material." In the same vein, S. L.
Cline's study ofland tenure and inheritance in late sixteenth-century Culhuacan
argues that "prehispanic land tenure was more complex than standard sources
indicate."
Finally, one must commend two essays by German scholars. Hanns J. Prem's
essay on early Spanish colonization in Puebla refutes the claim of Franc;ois Chevalier that the Spanish effort to make Spaniards in the Puebla region engage in
small-scale agriculture was a success; Prem shows that in Puebla, as elsewhere,
there developed a system of immense Spanish estates worked by Indian labor.
Wolfgang Trautmann's innovative essay employs a center-periphery model to trace
the succession and direction of such processes as the abandonment or resettlement
of pueblos, the rise of haciendas, and race mixture in colonial Tlaxcala.
Santa Fe

BENJAMIN KEEN

FOUR LEAGUES OF PECOS: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE PECOS GRANT, 1800-1933.
By G. Emlen Hall. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984. Pp.
xxi, 367. Illus., maps, notes, index. $24.95 cloth, $14.95 paper.
THIS IS A WELL-CRAFTED BOOK of many uses. It will be read with profit by anyone
interested in the struggle to possess Indian lands in the Southwest. It reveals the
greed and corruption of speculators, both Hispanic and Anglo, who exploited the
Pecos Indians, and it chronicles the inconsistency of congressional and court
decisions, always at the expense of the Pecos survivors.
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Hall's interest in Pecos is more than casual. He is an attorney who lived and
worked there from 1971 to 1980. He knows the land, and he knows the language.
For him, the writing of Four Leagues is a kind of "legal history with a vengeance"
(p. xviii), in which members of his profession participated in the emasculation of
what had once been a proud and powerful Indian community.
The approach is chronological. Hall notes how Pecos Pueblo had begun to
weaken under Spanish rule and how Hispanic population explosion during the
first thirty years of the nineteenth century led to the search for arable land. By
1803, and with Gov. Fernando Chacon's approval, Spaniards had moved onto
lands bordering the Pecos River and inside the Pecos league.
When Mexico won its independence from Spain, the movement toward Pecos
accelerated. Whereas the boundaries ofthe Pecos league had been disputed during
the Spanish colonial period, after 1821, Mexicans moved right in claiming that
the 9 November 1812 and 4 January 1813 laws the Spanish Cortes passed gave
the Mexicans the right to develop excess Pueblo lands (sobrantes) in order to
improve the dismal state of agriculture. The newly organized legislature of New
Mexico (diputaci6n) contributed to this encroachment by providing allotments of
Pecos land to Mexican citizens, while others simply bought what they coveted
from the Indians. Meanwhile, the Indians insisted on their right to dispose of
land, arguing that they were equal citizens in the eyes of Mexican law. As their
numbers declined, the pueblo became weaker, until finally the last choice piece
of agricultural land was deeded over to Juan Estevan Pino by Jose Cota acting
on behalf of the entire pueblo. By 1846, when the North Americans arrived in
New Mexico with a new set of laws, the few surviving Pecos Indian families had
left the pueblo to live with their relatives at Jemez.
The remainder of Hall's narrative deals with the status of Pecos pueblo and its
lands under United States jurisdiction. He provides illuminating biographical
sketches of those who used their money, their wiles, their position, or their power
to get a piece of land that President Abraham Lincoln had patented to the Pecos
pueblo in 1864. He shows how the speculative interest in Pecos reached the
financial markets of New York; how the entire grant was bought and sold many
times over by people whose singular objective was to make a profit on the resale;
and how this kind of outside activity finally resulted in Hispanic landowners'
registering their Mexican period land titles in the San Miguel County Court
House.
In the final chapters, Hall discusses the conflicting claims to Pecos pueblo and
the significance of the decision in U. S. v. Sandoval, 1912, which both reversed
the ruling in U.S. v. Joseph, 1877, and won back for the Pueblos the protection
of the federal government. However, when the Pueblo Lands Board finally turned
to the Pecos grant, it decided that no lands could be returned to the Pecos
survivors, that all Indian claims to Pecos pueblo were extinguished, and that a
cash award of $28,145 could be made to the Indian survivors. When this act
occurred in 1936, Pecos pueblo ceased to function as a legal entity.
Hall has written a superb book. He has unraveled numerous legal knots in a
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presentation that is crisply written, sensitive to human fOibles, and powerful in
its conclusions. He has the touch of one who has lived intimately with his subject,
turned over every document to satisfy the scholar's curiosity, and distilled the
evidence with·an evenhandedness that merits praise. Four Leagues of Pecos is a
tour de force written by a modern-day "Pecoseiio."

Fort Collins, Colo.

DANIEL TYLER

SCHOLARS AND THE INDIAN EXPERlENCE: CRITICAL REVIEWS OF RECENT WRITING
IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. Edited by W. R. Swagerty. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1984. Pp. x, 268. Index. $22.50 cloth, $9.95 paper.
SCHOLARS AND THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE is the thirtieth volume in the D'Arcy
McNickle Center (formerly the Newberry Library Center) for the History of the
American Indian Bibliographical Series. Unlike previously published studies in
the series, which focused on literature pertaining to one particular subject, this
book contains recent literature on several subject areas.
Editor William R. Swagerty, a member of the Department of History at the
University of Idaho, has assembled ten essays, each written by a specialist. They
are: "Native American Prehistory" by Dean R. Snow, "Native American Population
Collapse and Recovery" by Henry F. Dobyns, "Spanish-Indian Relations, 15131821" by W. R. Swagerty, "Anglo-Indian Relations in Colonial North America" by
J. Frederick Fausz, "Indian-White Relations: 1790-1900"by Frederick E. Hoxie,
"Twentieth Century Federal Indain Policy" by Donald L. Fixico, "Contemporary
American Indians" by Russell Thornton, "Native Americans and the Environment"
by Richard White, "Indian Tribal Histories" by Peter Iverson, and "The Indian
and the Fur Trade" by Jacqueline Peterson and John Anfinson.
In each essay, authors comment on the recent and important literature in their
respective areas of expertise and conclude with a selected bibliography. Sources
cited include books, articles, and doctoral dissertations. As is common in such
studies, the quality of the essays varies, particularly regarding the authors' evaluations ofthe literature. Some authors should have provided more in-depth critical
observations of the literature relating to their subject areas. Others, however,
supplied significant critiques of the sources.
Scholars and the Indian Experience contains an introduction by Francis Jennings, director emeritus of the D'Arcy McNickle Center in which Jennings traces
the purposes of the center's publications. This book should be a useful resource
guide for scholars and college students.

Fort Hays State University

RAYMOND WILSON

JOURNAL OF AMOUNTAIN MAN: JAMES CLYMAN. Edited by Linda M. Hasselstrom.
Missoula, Mont.: Mountain Press Publishing Company, 1984. Pp. xi, 295. Index,
bibliog., maps. $24.95 cloth, $9.95 paper.
JOURNAL OF A MOUNTAIN MAN is the second in a series of fur trade classics to
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be published by Mountain Press, under the general editorship of Winfred Blevins.
This publication brings to a broad audience the important writings of James
Clyman, one of the famed "Ashley men" who in the 1820s mounted the first
successfully orchestrated assault on the fur resources of the central Rockies. Clyman is considered a very credible source in the primary literature of the fur trade.
His chronicle spans the years from 1823 to 1871, with data concentrated in the
1820s and 1840s. James Clyman is perhaps best remembered for his terse but
stirring accounts of the disastrous affray in 1823 between Ashley's trappers and
the bellicose and intractable Arikaras and, later, the "surgical" ministrations he
applied to Jedediah Smith, after the incipient explorer was badly mauled by a
grizzly bear.
Of equal interest, however, are the nine field notebooks Clyman kept on the
trail to Oregon and California from 1844 to 1846. Far from being a greenhorn,
Clyman's experience and wisdom made him an important addition to the caravan. His comments include observations on fellow travellers, Indians, Mexican
Californios, landscape, animal life, and his former companions in the fur trade.
A few excerpts of his homely poetry and some ancillary documents are also
printed here.
The foundation for this reprinting is the masterful scholarship of Charles L.
Camp's James Clyman, Frontiersman (1960). Much of editor Linda M. Hasselstrom's work consisted of recasting Camp's exhaustive annotations, which are
presented in an abridged narrative format at the beginning and end of chapters.
The chapters are further divided by subheadings that highlight noteworthy features within the text.
In her introduction, the editor has the "conspicuously sober and meticulous"
Clyman poised in stark contrast to his "tough and savage" peers, presumably the
rest of trapperdom. This comparison, like other passages, evinces a tendency
toward oversimplification and generalization from notions that have become associated with the trappers. This weakness, in combination with a form of postfrontier romanticism, has conspired to uphold the "popular" imagery of the mountain
men, while failing to provide any fresh insights on the "reckless breed." Fur trade
scholars have argued, countered, and commented at length over expectant capitalists, frontier proletarians, corporate ruthlessness, and other socioeconomic
characteristics of a profoundly diverse group of men whose major unifying earmark
was the occupation they followed. The bestowal of the term "mountain man" has
the effect of at least partially obscuring all other facets of a man's life, due to a
transcendent, mythic quality with which Americans have invested these menturned-heroes.
This book was published "with the genersl reader in mind," and we applaud
those who have revived this significant work, and at a reasonable price. However,
as the editor states, "the scholar is advised to find a copy of Camp for the smaller
details and references to repositories of original Clyman material."
National Park Service

BARTON BARBOUR
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OVERLAND TO CALIFORNIA WITH THE PIONEER LINE: THE GOLD RUSH DIARY OF
BERNARD J. REID. Edited by Mary McDougall Gordon. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1983. Pp. xvi, 247. lllus., maps, bibliog., index. $19.95.
WHILE FOR MOST CALIFORNIA EMIGRANTS the overland journey was a family
farmer's emigration, the gold fever of 1849 caused many men unused to the rigors
and routines offarm and frontier life to head for the gold fields. In this marvelously
edited diary of one man's excursion, we discover life on the "Pioneer Line," a
commercial St. Louis venture that for $200 offered Eastern passengers a berth in
specially built "carriages," tented sleeping quarters, meals, and one hundred
pounds of allowable baggage. The line guaranteed to get the passengers to California in sixty days or less. But plagued with bad planning, underfinancing, and
poor leadership, the trip took more than 150 hard days of travel and cost the lives
of a considerable portion of the company.
The diarist in this book is Bernard J. Reid, a western Pennsylvania schoolteacher, newspaper editor, and sometime surveyor in his mid-twenties, who decided, after reading Fremont's best-selling report of his 1842 expedition, to take
the chance of "going west and growing up with the country." Later, in his old
age, Reid wrote a journal based on the diary. This publication reproduces the
introduction from the journal, the diary in its entirety, and interposes additional
detail from the journal and Reid's letters home, as well as the reminiscences and
letters of several other participants in the "Pioneer Line." .
Like Reid, most passengers were urban-raised and middle-class greenhorns,
hardly suited to the rigors of overland travel. None were so "green," however, as
the men who organized the line. Progress in the late spring of 1849 was laborious,
even on the relatively easy leg of the journey to Fort Kearney. West of Fort
Laramie the company began to worry that they would not make it, and visions
of the stranded Donner party haunted them. Some men set out on their own,
abandoning their baggage and fares, but for most that was too much of a risk. So
the passengers took matters into their own hands. They convened a meeting,
elected officers and an executive committee, and overthrew the authority of the
captain and proprietor. "Pioneer train on its last legs, and needs reform," wrote
Reid. "Meeting called in the corral at 1 o'clock to adopt measures for lightening
the train" (pp. 80-81).
From these events Gordon suggests an important conclusion: "Even though
the Pioneers remained armed and in the majority, they still refrained from violence," and "demonstrated to the end that the frontier did not lead necessarily
to lawlessness. The restraints of their social conditionIng in the East carried over
into the wilderness." Moreover, despite the lack of kin and family cohesion "the
passengers did forge strong fraternal bonds a~ong themselves," connections that
Reid suggested when he wrote that there had been a "family jar [or fight] in our
mess" of single men (p. 97). Men shared food, assisted the sick and straggling,
and demonstrated very little of the "each man for himself" kind of individualism
that supposedly characterized the American frontier.
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The Pioneer Line offers an interesting contrast to other overland experiences.
Reid's diary is lively and colorful, and the juxtaposition of journal, diary, letters,
and accounts of others make. this one of the finest editions of an overland diary
to appear in many years.

Mount Holyoke College

JOHN MACK FARAGHER

WEST BY SOUTHWEST: LETTERS OF JOSEPH PRATT ALLYN, A TRAVELLER ALONG
THE SANTA FE TRAIL, 1863. Edited by David K. Strate. Dodge City: Kansas
Heritage Center, 1984. Pp. 193. Illus., bibliog., index. $7.95.
IN 1863 PRESIDENT .LINCOLN APPOINTED Joseph P. Allyn to be one of the associate
justices of the supreme court for the newly created Arizona Territory. Allyn, with
most of the other territorial officials, left New York in August 1863 to travel overland
to Arizona. Before he left his native Connecticut, Allyn agreed to provide the
Hartford Evening Press with periodic accounts of his experiences and observations
in the West. His letters were published in the newspaper during the next several
years.
The twenty letters republished here cover Allyn's trip from St. Louis, Missouri,
to Fort Wingate (located at the present San Rafael), New Mexico. The route the
party followed, accompanied by a large military escort, included the Santa Fe
Trail via the mountain branch. Allyn describes the towns and military posts through
which he passed, the Indians encountered, the problems and incidents of western
travel-in fact, everything intended to interest and instruct the eastern reader
unfamiliar with the West. Because the Civil War is underway, the impact of that
conflict on the areas through which he travels is always present in his correspondence. Allyn is a perceptive observer, and his writing is colorful and often amusing.
In addition to a general introduction, the editor has provided an introduction
to each of the five sections into which he divides the letters. The letters are
reproduced as they appeared in the newspaper; the misspellings, as noted, are
probably a result of the inability to decipher Allyn's handwriting. The numerous
misspellings of personal and place names in other portions of the book, however,
are unexplained. Factual errors also occur, such as the editor's statement that the
invading Texans occupied Fort Craig (p. 117) and the substitution of Camp Floyd,
New Mexico, for what should be Camp Floyd, Utah (p. 179). Furthermore, many
of the sources cited in the footnotes are not included in the bibliography, and the
index is incomplete.
Still, Allyn's letters are an interesting addition to the published travel accounts
for the West. They can be read for pleasure, but they also contain much of use
for the serious student of that period of the West. Although the account published
here ends at -Fort Wingate, Allyn's subsequent correspondence has been published
in John Nicholson, ed., The Arizona ofJoseph Pratt Allyn.

Casa Granck, Ariz.

ROBERT W. FRAZER
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TEXAS COWBOYS. Edited by Jim Lanning and Judy Lanning. College Station:
Texas A&M University Press, 1984. Pp. xvii, 233. IIlus., bibliog. $15.95.
IN MAY OF 1915 GEORGE W. SAUNDERS, founder of the Old Time Trail Drivers
Association, contacted the membership of his fledgling organization requesting
each member to write a personal account of the "dangers, vicissitudes, and hardships" they endured while driving cattle and horses up the trail from 1865 to
1896. The more than three hundred reminiscences received were subsequently
published in two volumes (1920, 1923) entitled The Trail Drivers of Texas.
In 1938, writers with the Works Projects Administration (WPA), Federal Writers'
Project in Texas began to collect similar first-person narratives from former trail
drivers along with accounts from men who had worked on many of the early
ranches of the state. Copies of these narratives, nearly four hundred in number,
were sent to the Library of Congress in response to instructions from the WPA
Washington office in 1940.
Forty-two years later, Jim and Judy Lanning reviewed the narratives in what
became the Texas Rangelore Collection at the Library of Congress and selected
thirty-two representative pieces to form the present volume. Their purpose, as
stated in the introduction, was to "present first-person narratives of old-time Texas
cowboys recounting their perceptions of range life" (p. xi).
The reader of Texas Cowboys learns of the often-told perils incident to stopping
stampedes, pushing cattle across swollen rivers, and counteracting Indians and
cattle rustlers. The portion of each narrative, however, that fulfills the editors'
purpose and makes the book of special value is that which reveals the predominant
attitudes and preoccupations of these men of the early Texas range. Almost to a
person, each informant discusses such pertinent cowboy subjects as loyalty to
one's brand, their devotion and overwhelming interest in horses, and the changes
brought about in range work because of the coming of railroads and fences into
Texas.
The editors have done well in grouping the narratives into five thematic chapters
with accounts by ranch cowboys, trail drivers, wranglers/horse breakers, minorities, and women. Because the WPA informants were interviewed more than
twenty years after the Trail Drivers accounts were collected, some informants
detail events different from those of their earlier colleagues. For example, along
with encountering accounts of trailing cattle to railheads in Kansas and pastures
in Montana, one also reads of later and shorter drives to shipping points such as
Amarillo or markets like Fort Worth.
Photographs by cowboy photographer Erwin Smith are included to illustrate
typical events or situations in the text and are indicative of the editors' genuine
understanding of their subject. Altogether Texas Cowboys is an oral history that
makes good, informative reading for everyone interested in cowboy life on the
early Texas range.

Cimarron, N. Mex.

STEPHEN ZIMMER
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HASHKNIFE COWBOY: RECOLLECTIONS OF MACK HUGHES. Edited by Stella Hughes.
Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1984. Pp. xiii, 234. lIlus., index, $17.50.
By THE 1920s THE FAMOUS HASHKNIFE OUTFIT no longer controlled the immense
rangelands that its original investors had acquired in northern Arizona in 1884.
Seemingly endless stretches of open land still remained the dominant characteristic of the area, although a few small towns had grown up along the main line
of the Santa Fe railroad. As Mack Hughes relates in Hashknife Cowboy: The
Recollections of Mack Hughes, that sparsely settled terrain was "sure fine for cattle
ranchin'." Compiled and edited by Stella Hughes, the book details the experiences
of a young ranch hand during the twenties and early Depression years. More
than two dozen illustrations by western artist Joe Beeler accompany the narrative
and effectively complement Hughes's descriptions of the events and incidents of
his boyhood years in northern Arizona.
The Hashknife brand belonged initially to the Aztec Land and Cattle Company,
but when it failed in the early twentieth century Flagstaff's Babbitt brothers
purchased most of its holdings along with the famous brand. By then Hashknife
cowboys were no longer the "wild and lawless bunch" described by Earle R.
Forrest in Arizona's Dark and Bloody Ground. Mack Hughes's father disputed
the dime novel stereotypes, arguing that most Hashknife employees were just
hard-working cowboys, anxious to make a living. "It was them western story
writers that ruined their reputations," he explained to young Mack.
Hughes went to work for the outfit in 1922 at the age of twelve and spent most
of the next thirteen years on its payroll. Cowboys' wages were meager thenonly thirty dollars a month and "found." Even a top hand like his father drew
only sixty-five dollars a month. Indeed, Mack Hughes never made much money
as an employee of the Hashknife ranch; he accumulated a "neat little pile" only
in the early 1930s when a local bootlegger hired him as a truck driver at five
dollars a day.
Pleasant working conditions hardly compensated for the low wages, and a
cowboy's chores invariably were physically demanding and usually dirty. Hughes
recalls the clouds of dust that enveloped roundups and remembers well the
stinking process of dipping cattle to prevent an outbreak of the "scab." Such
accounts are as vivid as his occasional praise for the region's clear air and pristine
scenery. A chapter on "Winter at Sixteen Mile" recounts the solitude of a winter
camp on Chevelon Creek-"the most awful lonesome place in the whole, wide
world."
Hughes never explains directly the powerful lure that attracted men to the
lifestyle of a cowboy; more often he is content to explain that "You gotta want to
be a cowboy. " His reminiscences suggest, however, that a sense of independence
and self-confidence were strong incentives. Earning the respect of older ranch
hands and enjoying the camaraderie among cowboys no doubt contributed also.
Upon leaving the Sixteen Mile camp in 1924, Hughes could boast that "I'd sure
come up a notch in the world, holding down a winter camp by myself, a full
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month's pay in my pocket, and ridin' to town to visit my folks wearing real cowboy
boots for the first time in my life."
Beyond acquiring a few personal possessions over the years, Hughes's years as
a Hashknife cowboy brought little else tangible. His hopes of owning his own
spread grew slimmer each year and perhaps induced him to abandon Hashknife
country in 1935 to go to work on his uncle's ranch near Superior, Arizona.
Hashknife Cowboy is an enjoyable book, and it will appeal to general readers
and professional historians. The book is an important contribution to the historical
literature on the twentieth-century cattle industry; it also illuminates a significant
portion of the history of the Little Colorado River area of northern Arizona.

Northern Arizona University

GEORGE LUBICK

UNLIKELY WARRIORS: GENERAL BENJAMIN GRIERSON AND HIS FAMILY. By William H. Leckie and Shirley A. Leckie. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1984. Pp. xv, 368. Illus., bibliog., notes, index. $19.95.
THE LECKIES HAVE SKILFULLY WOVEN three stories into a single fascinating narrative. This is the story of Gen. Benjamin H. Grierson, the story of the military
events of the Civil War and Indian conflicts in which he participated, and the
story of the Grierson family. That such a complicated undertaking is successful is
testimony to the Leckies' abilities as historians and to a remarkable family's habit
oflaying all bare in a great outpouring of paper, then saving the paper for posterity.
Ben Grierson was not one of America's great soldiers, but he played a role in
the Civil and Indian wars significant enough to deserve chronicling. He left civil
life in 1861 a failed merchant and penniless music teacher to demonstrate leadership, energy, and military aptitude in the western armies. As colonel of an
Illinois cavalry regiment, he led the famed "Grierson's Raid" through Mississippi
in 1863, then repeated the triumph a year later. He emerged from the war a
major general of volunteers, which gained him a colonel's commission in the
postwar regular army. For the next twenty-five years he commanded the Tenth
Cavalry, one of two mounted black regiments. In Indian Territory, Texas, and
Arizona, Grierson and his "buffalo soldiers" wrote a record of punishing service
and constructive achievement that went largely unrecognized and even ridiculed
because of widespread prejudice against blacks, both in and out of the army. In
the Leckies' rendition, both military history and military biography are competently presented.
An even greater virtue of the book, however, is the portrayal of Grierson the
man and the Grierson family. The voluminous Grierson Papers permit this to be
done with unusual authority. Grierson himself was a gentle, kindly man, competent and energetic in military endeavors though judged by many to be too
tolerant to enforce proper discipline and, out West, too ready to see the Indian
side of the question.
With his wife, Alice Kirk Grierson, Ben pursued a rocky course that featured
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pleasure and pain, warm affection and cold rejection. Alice also brought to the
union a fatal gene that struck the Grierson children with insanity. Not only the
relationships of the immediate family are probed, but also of brothers, sisters,
and in-laws. These Griersons and Kirks may not be of great historical significance,
but their story, as expertly presented by the Leckies, is always interesting and
often absorbing.
Unlikely Warriors should rest on all bookshelves devoted to military and frontier
history and may be commended to all who simply wish a good story, well told,
about people trying to cope with one another and with themselves.
Santa Fe

ROBERT M. UTLEY

CITIZEN SOLDIERS: OKLAHOMA'S NATIONAL GUARD. By Kenny Franks. Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1984. Pp. xiii, 234. Bibliog., illus., index. $24.95.
IN 1895, IN AMPLE TIME FOR MEMBERS to participate in the Spanish-American
War, the territorial government of Oklahoma established the state's first citizen
militia. In 1908 this state militia became the Oklahoma National Guard, with a
complement of 945 men. With congressional approval of the National Defense
Act of 1916, the government directed the reorganization of state guard units and
the general upgrading of their combat preparedness. Shortly after this action,
President Woodrow Wilson federalized the Oklahoma National Guard and sent it
to the Rio Grande. Mexico was suffering a revolution, and in March 1916, Mexican
bandit-revolutionary Francisco "Pancho" Villa had led his soldados across the
international border in an attack on Columbus, New Mexico. Wilson ordered the
United States Army into Mexico to capture Villa. He also called up several National
Guard units, including the Oklahomans, for border duty. The army ended its
chase in January 1917, but the Oklahoma Guardsmen remained at the border
until 31 March 1917.
The Oklahoma guardsmen were home only briefly, however, for their services
were needed in the impending war in Europe. The Oklahomans participated in
the Meuse-Argonne offensive and in several other battles. Mter the war, all national guard divisions were restructured. Between World War I and II, the Oklahoma group became part of the Forty-Fifth Infantry Division. The Thunderbird
Division, as it was known, was federalized again in August 1940, as war loomed
in Europe. In July 1943, the men of the division joined the allied invasion of
Sicily and later battles at Salerno and Anzio. At the end of the war the FortyFifth returned to its state duties.
In 1950, with the Communist invasion of South Korea, the division once again
was called to federal service. It was the first national guard division to enter the
fighting and engaged in several bitter battles. The Oklahomans did not return
home until 1954.
While this work contains information primarily about the foot soldiers, it also
includes a brief outline of the establishment and operation of the Oklahoma Air

BOOK REVIEWS

343

National Guard. Organized in the 1930s, this group was mobilized and served
during World War II. It, too, was recalled for the Korean conflict.
This book is not intended to be a comprehensive nor interpretive history. It
contains only general infor~ation about activities ofthe Oklahoma National Guard.
The author researched most of the text from secondary sources, although he also
used a few primary materials in the Oklahoma National Guard Museum in Oklahoma City. This is basically a popular, pictoral history. Adequate maps, excellent
Bill Mauldin cartoons, and photographs make this a worthwhile purchase for the
military history buff.

Oklahoma State University

JOE A. STOUT, JR.

KARL BODMER'S AMERICA. Introduction by William H. Goetzmann; annotated by
David C. Hunt and Marsha V. Gallagher; artist's biography by William J. Orr.
Omaha: Joslyn Art Museum; Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984. Pp.
viii, 376. IlIus., notes. $65.00.
IN THE SPRING OF 1833, a scientific party led by an experienced German naturalist,
Maximilian, Prince of Wied-Neuwied, ascended the Missouri River to a remote
fur trading post, Fort McKenzie, hundreds of miles above St. Louis in the heart
of Blackfoot territory. After a brutal but productive winter on the upper Missouri
at the Mandan trading post of Fort Clark, Maximilian's party returned to St. Louis
the following spring. The most significant work to come out of this scientific
blitzkrieg was that of Maximilian's hired artist, Karl Bodmer, a young Swiss draftsman. Reflecting the ethnological interests of his employer, Bodmer drew remarkably detailed portraits of tribes of the upper Missouri-Omahas, Sioux,
Mandans, Crows, Blackfeet, and Assiniboines-and their accoutrements. Al- .
though the American artist George Catlin had sketched his way up the Missouri
to the Yellowstone just a year ahead of Bodmer, the Swiss artist had greater time
and skill. Bodmer's drawings, more accurate and fully realized than Catlin's,
capture the personalities of individual Indians. Catlin and Bodmer were the first
artists to draw the Missouri River tribes, and for many Indians these drawings
would be the last. A smallpox epidemic in 1838 took the lives of all of the Mandans
and half of the Blackfeet. Bodmer's images remain the best visual record of a
world rapidly vanishing in the face of white encroachment.
For a time, Bodmer's drawings also vanished. Eighty-one aquatint plates based
on Bodmer's American sketches were published in Europe in 1839, but most of
the original drawings disappeared into the Wied castle on the Rhine, not to surface
again until after World War II. Today, Bodmer's original American sketches and
watercolors are housed at the Joslyn Art Museum in Omaha.
In 1984, on the 150th anniversary of the expedition, the Joslyn mounted an
impressive exhibit, Views of a Vanishing Frontier. The exhibit contains some 120
Bodmer sketches and watercolors; Karl Bodmer's America, a beautiful, oversize
book, contains reproductions of nearly three times that number of Bodmer draw-
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ings-almost the entire collection at the Joslyn. The illustrations, individually
explicated by David C. Hunt and Marsha V. Gallagher, curators at the Joslyn,
comprise the bulk of this book. The decision to print the illustrations on uncoated
paper gives them the delicate appearance ofwatercolors, but represents a gamble.
Uncoated paper absorbs ink and makes the task ofcontrolling colors more difficult.
The printer was not up to the challenge. Some images copied well, but reproductions of some of Bodmer's best-known watercolors lack vividness of color and
tonal range.
Another Joslyn curator, William J. Orr, provides a brief, fascinating biography
of Bodmer, and the artist's work is suggestively evaluated and placed in context
by America's most renowned historian of the art of exploration, William Goetzmann. In addition to explaining the significance of Bodmer's Missouri River
drawings, Goetzmann argues that if Bodmer's sketches of his trips between the
East Coast and St. Louis, and of a side trip to New Orleans, had been published,
they "might have been the best illustrated travel book of Jacksonian America" (p.
18). Bodmer's America, together with the excellent exhibition catalogue, Views
of a Vanishing Frontier, now makes Bodmer's remarkable work easily accessible
and understandable. This is a splendid achievement, worthy of the work of the
artist.

Southern Methodist University

DAVID J. WEBER

VIEWS OF AVANISHING FRONTIER. By John C. Ewers, Marsha V. Gallagher, David
C. Hunt, Joseph C. Porter. Omaha: Center for Western Studies/Joslyn Art
Museum; Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984. Pp. 103. Illus. $29.95.
GEORGE CATLIN WAS NOT THE FIRST ARTIST to paint a gallery of Indian portraits.
Nor was he the first to paint Indians in their own setting. His claim to primacy
rests on the fact that he was the first to paint an extensive record of Indian life
on his own initiative, thus distinguishing himself from those artists who accompanied U. S. government expeditions, and from the two other well-known Indian
painters of the 1830s, Karl Bodmer and Alfred Jacob Miller, who were hired by
foreign patrons to accompany them into the American interior in 1833-34 and
1837, respectively. Arti~ts and patrons alike were linked in interesting ways.
Bodmer with Prince Maximilian of Wied saw Catlin's Missouri River Indian paintings in St. Louis in 1833 and instead of retracing his 1832 travels up the Missouri
came near to traipsing overland to Santa Fe partly at the instigation of the Scottish
nobleman Sir William Drummond Stewart, later Miller's patron and an acquaintance of Catlin personally familiar with his wprk. In the end, Maximilian and
Bodmer ascended the Missouri further than Catlin, to Blackfoot country, and
produced their record of the Missouri tribes. All this seems relevant because the
150th anniversary of the Maximilian-Bodmer expedition has inspired a major
retrospective exhibition and several publications advancing the case for Karl Bodmer as the supreme painter of the American Indian in the 1830s.
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Views of a Vanishing Frontier, the exhibition catalogue, makes the case implicitly (with excellent plates of some of Bodmer's scenes and portraits) and explicitly (in John C. Ewers's "An Appreciation of Karl Bodmer's Pictures ofIndians,"
one of three scholarly essays in the catalogue). As for the plates, Bodmer's watercolors are striking, meticulous representations of exactly what he saw before
him, executed under the eye of his demanding patron. Joseph Porter's essay on
Maximilian effectively places him in the early nineteenth-century natural history
tradition dominated by a "zeal to acquire specimens and record factual details"
and dedicated to "observation, description, and classification" (p. 12). Bodmer's
work faithfully mirrors Maximilian's concerns. Beneath his vivid colors and fine
draftsmanship is an almost clinical detachment, which helps explain the enthusiasm of an ethnologist like Ewers who credits Bodmer with the most accurate
(and artisti~) depictions extant of an intertribal battle, a sizable Indian village, the
interior of an earth lodge, a full-length figure, and an Indian dance. Because
Bodmer's subjects were dressed up for the picture-taking, their finery is not really
representative, though as Ewers points out, the notion of tribal costume is skewed
by the extensive interchange documented in Bodmer's studies and the influence
of individual taste. In short, Bodmer accomplished what he set out to do. His
work preserves specimens under glass, as dose to one kind of reality as we will
ever come. It is not as clear that Bodmer captured the human reality, the person,
before him; his is the art of precisely rendered surfaces, not interiors. In this
respect Catlin, for all his manifest weaknesses, was the superior portrait painter.
Besides the essays by Ewers and Porter, Views of a Vanishing Frontier includes
Marsha Gallagher and David Hunt's chronicle of Maximilian and Bodmer's travels
in the American interior. A special feature of the exhibition and the catalog is a
selection of ethnographic and historic objects (some of which are illustrated) that
complement Bodmer's pictorial record of the expedition.
University of Victoria

BRIAN W. DIPPlE

PUEBLO DECO: THE ART DECO ARCHITECTURE OF THE SOUTHWEST. By Marcus
Whiffen and Carla Breeze. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984.
Pp. xi, 125. Illus., notes, index. $19.95.
PUEBLO DECO CONTAINS THREE PARTS: 1) Introduction, a brief historical summary
by Marcus Whiffen of the Art Deco movement; 2) Examples, a factual catalogue
of selected southwestern Art Deco buildings; and 3) Color Plates, a collection of
glossy color photographs by Carla Breeze of those buildings. Suggesting a scaleddown coffee table book (like the presently popular "economy size" automobile)
with its elegantly phrased yet lamentably compact text aggrandized by the artistic
detailing of numerous photographs, it belongs to an increasingly familiar academic
genre. The most direct prototype is Cervin Robinson and Rosemary Haag Bletter's
Skyscraper Style: Art Deco New York (1975), although one might also think of
David Gebhard and Harriette Von Breton's L.A. in the 1930's (1975) if one over-
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looked the utilitarian photographs of that book. These books share the common
premise of being introductions to a long-ignored, recently rediscovered subject.
But if introductions per se are perfectly acceptable, the introductory premise of
Art Deco books is rapidly becoming (like the 1950s automobile) a methodological
dinosaur. When, this scholar wonders, are historians going to stop introducing
the Art Deco as if no one had heard of it? When, instead, are they going to start
studying it with the thoughtful analysis that it deserves?
The consequent frustration is illustrated by the authors' treatment of their
purported subject. Apart from a catalogue so incomplete that even Whiffen admits
that it is "not a complete guide" (p. 19), the general and regional definitions of
Art Deco are terse to the point of raising more questions than they answer.
Chapter IV of the Introduction, "Art Deco in the Southwest," devotes most of
its three pages to historical background on the evolution of Pueblo and Spanish
styles. One short paragraph deals with southwestern Art Deco (p. 19). We are
told that "Pueblo-style forms are combined with ornament from North American
Indian sources" or that "Indian motifs are used in a frankly modern architectural
setting"; and that these motifs, "taken from pottery, basket work, jewelry and
textiles," share qualities of "angularity, repetitiveness, and abstraction ... with
much Art Deco ornament, so that aesthetic as well as regional considerations
sanctioned their use." This assertion agrees with the claim made on page 16 that
Art Deco was primarily "a style of ornament," although it hardly explains why
the many buildings included in the book that do not use Indian motifs qualify as
examples of Pueblo Deco.
The confusion is compounded by a claim made earlier on page 16 that Art Deco
architects were "intent on creating works of architecture that should be, first of
all, contemporary-expressive of their time, of their present." Since the modernism of Indian motifs is never explained, it remains unclear why their use on
such buildings as the KiMo Theater in Albuquerque is Art Deco-although the
KiMo, a movie theater located on the automobile strip of Route 66, was certainly
expressive of its time. It is revealing in this context that Whiffen, when summarizing Art Deco's origins, fails to mention Hugh Ferriss, the New York City
architect whose studies of skyscraper massings directly influenced American Art
Deco architecture.
Although Art Deco was a highly decorative style, its aesthetic identity lay, not
in its widely varied ornamental motifs, but in more abstract formal qualities that
determined a building's forms as well as its details. Art Deco's contemporaneity
was expressed by a stylistic coherence of architectural form and ornament according to the qualities of "angularity, repetitiveness, and abstraction"; having
introduced those qualities, Whiffen needs to re-examine works like the KiMo
Theater to explain why its entire design, not just its Indian motifs, is Art Deco,
and to explain how-if at all-this Art Deco aesthetic was inflected by its use in
the Southwest.

University of New Mexico

CHRISTOPHER MEAD
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THE REEL WEST: CLASSIC STORIES THAT INSPIRED CLASSIC FILMS. Edited by
Bill Pronzini and Martin H. Greenberg. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday &
Company, Inc., 1984. Pp. ix, 177. $11.95.
EDITORS BILL PRONZINI AND MARTIN H. GREENBERG have resurrected ten short
stories that presumably "inspired classic films." The stories are certainly worth
reading in their own right and represent the early mastery of Bret Harte ("Tennessee's Partner"), Stephen Crane ("The Bride Comes To Yellow Sky," filmed as
part of Face to Face), and O. Henry ("A Double-Dyed Deceiver," filmed as The
Texan), along with the postwar writing ofJames Warner Bellah ("Massacre," filmed
as Fort Apache), John Cunningham ("The Tin Star," filmed as High Noon), Steve
Frazee ("My Brother Down There," filmed as Running Target), Elmore Leonard
("Three-Ten to/Yuma," filmed as 3:10 to Yuma), Dorothy M. Johnson ("The Man
Who Shot Liberty Valance"), Frank Gruber (''Town Tamer"), and Jack Schaefer
("Jeremy Rodock," filmed as Tribute to a Bad Man).
The subtitle of this anthology is misleading in that most of the short stories did
not become "Classic" films. Only High Noon, Fort Apache, and, arguably, The
Man Who Shot Liberty Valance merit such distinction. I doubt that other than
the most avid fan of B-westerns will have sampled or even know of the filmed
version of "Tennessee's Partner," "My Brother Down There," or "Town Tamer."
(One wonders about the editors' familiarity with the better-known 3:10 to Yuma
since they mistakenly have Felicia Farr playing Van Heflin's wife instead of the
lonely barmaid.) Film scholars may also wince at the notion that a short story
"inspired" a film (Classic or otherwise), as if screenwriters and directors had little
to do with the venture. The introduction does at least suggest that some of the
short stories, because of their brevity, "contributed only the basic idea of the
movies they became."
Still, for the film historian, this collection is valuable for exploring questions
of authorship. For example, it is clear from reading John Cunningham's "The Tin
Star" that blacklisted Carl Foreman's screenplay for High Noon accounts for the
film's decidedly critical view of a western community. By the same token, screenwriter Michael Blankfort and director Robert Wise must take the. blame for the
talky melodramatics of Tribute to a Bad Man when that film is compared with
Jack Schaefer's lean and leathery portrait of "Jeremy Rodock."
Whether Hollywood filmmakers improved or diminished their original material,
they cannot be faulted for having selected the kind of literary fare offered in this
volume. It is good to have most of these sh()rt stories back in print.

Texas A&M University

JOHN H. LENIHAN

ZANE GREY'S ARIZONA. By Candace C. Kant. Flagstaff, Ariz.: Northland Press,
1984. Pp. xix, 184. IIlus., bibliog., notes. $14.95.
ONE OF THE TRULY DEPLORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES under which western literary
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scholars have to operate is the continuing presence of the Zane Grey papers under
the capricious administrative custody of the Grey family rather than some public
archives where access could be had at least under some consistent policy, however
restrictive. Studies of Grey's life and work consequently fall into two main categories: those written by a mediocre lot who somehow gained access to the mother
lode but failed to mine it properly, and those who have exhibited some interpretive
skill but have been forced to exercise it only upon the novels and whatever Grey
collections are publicly accessible.
Candace C. Kant's new study is a refreshing exception, though the more pessimistic among us will wonder if whatever mystifying alignment of astral bodies
that conspired to bring this capable scholar into contact with at least a major part
of the Grey materials will ever repeat itself. But no matter. Let us be thankful
that Kant had access at least to liberal portions of the Grey correspondence (though
not, evidently, the extensive diaries kept by both Grey and his wife, diaries that
surely would have been a major help to her), and that she had the diligence to
support the opportunity by visits to other major Grey collections, a thorough
reading and understanding of his books, and especially by utilization of a considerable variety of fugitive newspaper and magazine articles by and about Grey, a
wonderfully revealing body of source material largely ignored by previous scholars.
Her theme, indicated by the title, is Grey's real-life experiences in Arizona and
the ways in which he turned them into fictional and cinematic material. If one
expands the term "Arizona" slightly, as she does, to include the canyon country
of southern Utah, her thesis is correct that Grey's experiences in that area and
the creative works based on those experiences are absolutely central to his life,
thought, and art.
The book is divided into two main sections: biographical and literary, with an
added chapter on the Grey movies. In each of the two main sections, she considers
his experiences and novels relating to four geographical regions: the canyons, the
Navajo-Hopi reservations, the southern Arizona desert, and the Mogollon Rim.
It is a bit of a lopsided scheme, as she acknowledges, for Grey's love for the desert
never rivaled his attachment to the other regions.
Kant is fully aware of the contemporary intellectual and political developments
by which Grey was influenced and against which he reacted, though she devotes
little space to comparisons with other similar writers who dealt with some of the
same themes that concerned Grey. One applauds, too, her consideration of the
Grey movies; students of western literature are increasingly including cinema
within their purview to good effect, and Kant's chapter helps deepen and extend
her literary studies.
In spite of its seeming geographical limitations, Zane Grey's Arizona is the
finest interpretive study of Grey's life and work available. It calls to our notice
once again the need for a full-scale literary biography, but unrestricted access to
the sources will obViously have to precede that.
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